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The document defines a 'Just Transition' as a framework to ensure that the shift toward a green economy is fair and inclusive, preventing vulnerable populations from bearing disproportionate costs. It traces the concept's evolution from 1980s US trade union concerns over pollution regulations to a broader global framework integrated into the UNFCCC and the 2015 Paris Agreement. The text emphasizes three types of justice—procedural, distributional, and restorative—and argues that transition planning must be participatory and cross-governmental. Using Malawi's agricultural mechanization as an example, it illustrates how top-down transitions can marginalize smallholder farmers despite overall GDP growth. While historically focused on the energy sector and fossil fuel phase-outs, the document asserts that Just Transition principles are equally critical for sectors like agriculture, transport, waste, and forestry, especially regarding adaptation priorities in the global south.

The document outlines the financial impact of a low-carbon transition across four major economies. It highlights that net oil consumers, including China, the EU, India, and the US, could see significant financial benefits from reducing oil demand. However, it warns of substantial asset stranding risks in China and India due to planned coal-fired power capacity exceeding IEA two-degree thresholds. In contrast, the EU and US face lower coal stranding risks but must manage the eventual peak of natural gas consumption by 2030 to minimize value loss.

The document provides a framework for governments to assess how climate policies affect national budgets, focusing on the production side of fossil fuels and infrastructure. It details a five-step methodology: establishing a base case, developing scenarios, assessing policy impacts, allocating value between consumers and producers, and splitting value between government and commercial entities. The report applies this to Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Egypt, highlighting that oil assets are most sensitive to global demand shifts, while coal and gas are more influenced by regional dynamics and infrastructure. It recommends that governments reduce upfront capital commitments, adapt tax regimes, and diversify into low-carbon technologies to mitigate the risk of stranded assets.

The report finds that EU member states are failing to responsibly govern negative emissions, often relying on vulnerable land-based sinks that are declining due to climate impacts. It highlights a systemic lack of separate, binding targets for permanent CDR and a failure to clearly define 'residual emissions' that CDR is intended to balance. While some countries like Sweden and Germany have initiated research or funding for bio-CCS, the report argues that most plans lack feasibility assessments and conflate permanent removals with fossil-fuel-related carbon capture and storage (CCS).

The Social Climate Fund (SCF) is an EU initiative designed to mitigate the social impacts of the new Emissions Trading System (ETS2), which applies carbon pricing to fuels used in buildings and road transport. Operating from 2026 to 2032, the fund will provide approximately €86.7 billion in targeted support for lower-income groups and micro-enterprises. Member states must submit Social Climate Plans (SCPs) by June 2025 to access funding, which is allocated based on need. While the SCF supports investments in energy-saving renovations and zero-emission transport, it is limited to alleviating new poverty risks and is deemed insufficient to address the root causes of existing energy and transport poverty in Europe. The document recommends increasing available funds, avoiding fossil fuel lock-in by prohibiting 'low-emission' fossil-based investments, and ensuring earlier fund availability through loans.

The report analyzes international public opinion on climate change, finding widespread belief that it is happening and a general desire for increased government action, though levels of worry and perceived personal risk vary significantly by country.

The report identifies 67 planned coal-to-biomass projects in the EU that could increase biomass consumption by 607 PJ per year, potentially tripling the current levels of biomass burnt in coal power plants. This expansion would require approximately 36 million tonnes of wood pellets annually, which is similar to current global production. The authors argue that these projects are expensive, rely on public subsidies, and risk accelerating climate change because the CO2 emitted during combustion is not reabsorbed quickly enough to meet Paris Agreement targets. The report highlights that five countries—Finland, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands—are responsible for most of this potential growth, with the Netherlands accounting for 25%.

The document details the technical approach for calculating and harmonising monthly wind and solar capacity data. It defines 'installed capacity' as the maximum potential output and explains the process for converting solar data between AC and DC values, using a default conversion factor of 1.3. The methodology describes how onshore and offshore wind are distinguished, often relying on IRENA data when primary sources lack a breakdown. It also specifies the publication schedule (twice monthly) and the use of proxies and linear interpolation to estimate missing data for global aggregates and specific countries. Detailed country-specific sections list data sources, publication lags, and specific adjustments for 25 territories, including the US, China, and the EU.

The document critiques carbon emission markets, including 'cap and trade' and 'offsetting' mechanisms, as ineffective tools for climate action. It asserts that these systems allow historical polluters to avoid reducing emissions at the source while causing human rights abuses and 'climate colonialism' in the Global South. The briefing specifically warns against the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement at COP25, arguing that it would institutionalize these flawed mechanisms and prioritize corporate interests over climate justice.

The briefing argues that the COVID-19 crisis exposed systemic fragilities and provides an opportunity to build resilience against climate change, biodiversity loss, and inequality. It outlines ten priority options, including the adoption of green economy principles, the use of 'Green Deals', the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and the implementation of gender-responsive recovery plans. The authors emphasize that recovery spending must align with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, particularly in the global South where public debt may limit fiscal space.

The Global Resilience Partnership (GRP) engaged in several high-level activities at COP24, including hosting sessions at the Development & Climate (D&C) Days, chairing a High Level Roundtable on Resilience under the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action, and co-hosting an event on Nature-based solutions with the Global Environmental Facility. These efforts focused on the narrative of "Leaving no-one behind," specifically targeting the needs of the global South, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and urban informal settlement dwellers. Key themes included the intersection of climate volatility with peace and stability, urban resilience, and the scaling of investments in resilience for the most vulnerable.

The statement by Svitlana Romanko asserts that fossil fuel revenues directly fund the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that global dependence on these fuels empowers authoritarian regimes and exacerbates the climate crisis. It calls for an immediate embargo on Russian fossil fuels, divestment from related infrastructure, and the adoption of a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty to transition to clean energy.

Global Witness asserts that tensions between NATO allies in the eastern Mediterranean over fossil gas are futile, as the EU's projected 90 percent reduction in gas demand by 2050 renders these reserves unnecessary. The report highlights that extracting discovered gas in disputed waters would produce carbon emissions comparable to the annual output of France and Spain combined. It specifically calls for the cancellation of the €6 billion EastMed pipeline, which is currently a "Project of Common Interest," arguing that its operation would cause immense environmental damage and further escalate regional conflict.

The report examines the relationship between ENTSOG, a body that influences EU gas infrastructure funding, and GIE, a gas industry lobby group. It highlights significant membership overlap and a lack of transparency regarding meetings and conflict-of-interest policies. Global Witness asserts that this relationship has led to billions in EU subsidies flowing to industry-favoured projects, some of which are failing, while contradicting the EU's climate targets.

Global Witness reports that the EU has spent nearly €5 billion in taxpayer-funded grants and loans on 41 gas projects since 2013, with approximately €439 million wasted on seven projects that failed or are unlikely to function. The author contends that the TEN-E regulation creates a conflict of interest by allowing the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) to influence project selection. The report specifically highlights the BRUA pipeline, which received €431 million but faces significant viability issues regarding Black Sea gas extraction. Global Witness calls for the European Commission to remove all gas projects from the fifth Project of Common Interest (PCI) list and to reform the TEN-E regulation to redirect funds toward renewable energy.

An investigation by Global Witness found that ten European companies imported approximately €2 million worth of high-risk timber from Industrie Forestière du Congo (IFCO) in 2018. The report alleges that IFCO engaged in illegal logging practices, including operating outside boundaries and failing to pay taxes, while potentially maintaining links to sanctions-listed Hezbollah financiers via its predecessor, Cotrefor.

The report details a showcase event hosted by GreenCape to connect South African brand owners and retailers with packaging manufacturers offering recyclable alternatives to problematic flexible plastics, specifically targeting polypropylene (PP) and multilayer multi-polymer packaging. While mono-material polyethylene alternatives are identified as viable, the report highlights significant barriers to adoption, including a lack of local demand to justify dedicated production lines, high costs of upgrading filling lines, and a need for operator training. These challenges hinder the progress toward the South African Plastics Pact's 2025 targets, including the goal for 100% of plastic packaging to be reusable, recyclable, or compostable.

This report analyzes the implications of the European Green Deal (EGD) for South African small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and broader trade. It examines the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the Farm to Fork strategy, and the Circular Economy Action Plan, identifying significant risks in the automotive, mining, and agricultural sectors while highlighting potential export opportunities for environmental goods.

The report presents a series of expert contributions from Green movements in 16 European countries, arguing that labour taxes are often the primary source of government revenue and should be shifted toward taxes on pollution, capital, and resource use. Proposed alternatives include carbon taxes, wealth taxes, and taxes on automated work, while improvements to labour taxation focus on increasing progressivity, introducing negative income taxes for low earners, and simplifying tax codes.

The transition to renewable energy is expected to reduce dependencies on fossil fuel importers and lower energy prices, but it introduces new geopolitical challenges. The author argues that 'pipeline politics' will be replaced by 'grid politics', where control over interconnectors, hubs, and storage facilities becomes central. For Europe, while the transition offers a path away from reliance on Russia and the Gulf region, success depends on the EU's ability to manage internal divergences in national energy priorities and compete with Asia and the US in the clean tech market and for rare minerals.