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The Council on Strategic Risks outlines critical priorities for the nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense (ASD(NCB)), focusing on biological threats highlighted by COVID-19, the erosion of chemical weapons norms, and the maintenance of civilian oversight of the U.S. nuclear enterprise.

The Council on Strategic Risks outlines key policy challenges and proposed Senate questioning for Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins' nomination as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. The authors emphasize the need for the U.S. to address the erosion of norms against chemical weapons, vulnerabilities exposed by COVID-19 regarding biological threats, and the rising risks of nuclear proliferation and treaty dissolution. They suggest that the nominee should be questioned on strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, managing the final destruction of U.S. chemical stockpiles by 2023, and reinvigorating 21st-century nuclear arms control.

The briefing assesses the critical role of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) in U.S. national security, highlighting its success in developing medical countermeasures for threats like Ebola and swine flu. Despite these capabilities, the authors report a decade-long decline in CBDP funding, which continued during the COVID-19 pandemic. The document recommends doubling the budget to $2 billion in the short term and increasing it to $6.5–$7 billion annually in subsequent years. It advocates for a shift toward 'rapid response platforms,' including nucleic-acid based therapeutics and metagenomic sequencing, while calling for clarified mission authorities to allow CBDP to respond to natural pandemics.

The document analyzes the historical development of the 'WMD paradigm' in the United States, which primarily equates WMD with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The author argues that while this framework provided bureaucratic stability during the Cold War and post-9/11 era, it now creates a 'failure of imagination' by excluding other technologies—such as cyber weapons, drones, and synthetic biology—that can produce similar mass-casualty or mass-destruction effects. The text highlights a disconnect between the WMD paradigm and the actual historical record since 1990, noting that violent non-state actors often rely on conventional means and state actors frequently use CBRN for targeted assassinations or psychological impact rather than mass destruction.

The briefing examines the limitations of the current WMD paradigm, which focuses primarily on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. By comparing the treatment of fentanyls and novichoks, the author illustrates how narrow definitions of WMD can lead to a misalignment of policy priorities, where a highly lethal but non-WMD designated substance like fentanyl causes more domestic death and economic damage than designated WMDs used in targeted assassinations. The author advocates for a shift toward a 'mass effects' framing to encompass systemic risks like climate change and pandemics, as well as emerging technologies like drone swarms.

The research argues that while food insecurity provides the motivation for urban unrest, the actual occurrence of collective action is contingent on the presence of organizational networks and the level of state repression. Using a combination of cross-national data from urban Africa (1990–2014) and individual-level survey data from Johannesburg, the author finds that food insecurity increases the likelihood of unrest, particularly demonstrations and strikes. However, the study challenges the notion that food is a uniquely potent driver of unrest compared to other living expenses and finds no evidence that food insecurity leads specifically to more violent behavior.

The briefing argues that biological weapons remain a viable and rational strategic option for some states due to their low cost, potential for deniability, and asymmetric impact. It challenges the notion that these weapons are tactically useless or too risky to develop, noting that historical precedents and the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate that leaders may prioritize state status or regime survival over the risks of blowback. The authors further contend that bioweapons programs are not always top-down initiatives and that current international norms, specifically the Biological Weapons Convention, lack the enforcement and verification mechanisms necessary to effectively stop such programs.

The IEU report for the first half of 2020 outlines the progress of several major evaluations, including assessments of the GCF's country ownership approach, environmental and social safeguards, and the Simplified Approval Process. It highlights the unit's efforts to integrate behavioural science through the new Behaviour and Design Lab (BaDLab) and the LORTA programme. The report also details extensive communication efforts via webinars and social media to increase the uptake of evaluation findings, and provides a budget update showing a total expenditure and commitment of USD 2,447,221 against a 2020 budget of USD 5,581,985 as of 30 April 2020.

The research analyzes 259 autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 to determine if the predictability of election dates influences regime durability. The author posits that regular election cycles create focal points for dissident collective action and prevent incumbents from 'surfing' favorable political or economic conditions. Statistical analysis indicates that regimes with more regular electoral cycles have a significantly higher probability of failure. The study suggests that manipulating the electoral calendar—through snap elections or delays—serves as a survival strategy to stymie challengers and optimize the use of state violence.

The document examines South Africa's strategic positioning in global nuclear security amidst domestic economic decline and budget cuts to its foreign affairs and defence sectors. It highlights the risks posed by nuclear tensions in Iran and the Korean Peninsula, and suggests that South Africa can maintain its global relevance through 'niche diplomacy' and strategic partnerships. The author recommends using the 2020 NPT Review Conference and AU chairmanship to build a unified African position on nuclear disarmament and exploring informal 'Friends of the Chair' diplomatic models to bypass political impasses.

The report finds that energy access finance remains critically below the levels needed for SDG7, with a significant mismatch between where finance is committed and where the need is greatest. While electricity finance increased to USD 43.6 billion in 2018, much of this was driven by fossil fuel projects in a few countries, while Sub-Saharan Africa remains chronically underfunded. Clean cooking finance is even more limited, dominated by a few large projects in Bangladesh. The report advocates for a shift toward renewable energy, the termination of fossil fuel financing, and the adoption of innovative business models and gender-responsive tracking methodologies.

The briefing argues that the world is entering a period of high risk due to the collapse of formal arms control agreements between the US and Russia, the emergence of new nuclear powers, and the introduction of destabilizing technologies. To counter this, the author proposes the adoption of 'Nuclear Strategic Stability' (NSS) as a primary metric, where the risk of nuclear conflict is kept as low as achievable. The author outlines a '10-point Code of Responsible Nuclear Armed States' based on six elements: restraint, relevance, reassurance, readiness, reciprocity, and reduction. Furthermore, the document suggests a three-gateway (T1, T2, T3) schematic pathway to disarmament, emphasizing that the removal of tactical weapons and the establishment of conventional arms control are prerequisites for the final elimination of nuclear arsenals under the NPT framework.

The report examines the global governance of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), noting a trend of weakening norms and rising threats. While highlighting successes like the 97% destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and the near-universality of the NPT, CWC, and BWC, it warns of a new nuclear arms race and the increasing use of chemical weapons. It identifies critical gaps in verification—particularly for biological weapons—and the risks posed by technological convergence, such as synthetic biology and AI. The author recommends augmenting existing regimes with ad hoc mechanisms, increasing experiential learning for policymakers, and focusing on eliminating specific destabilizing capabilities like nuclear cruise missiles.

The briefing argues that the world is entering a period without formal arms control agreements between the US and Russia, increasing the risk of nuclear miscalculation and a new arms race. To counter this, the author introduces 'Nuclear Strategic Stability' (NSS) as a metric to assess postures and capabilities, and proposes a '10-point Code of Responsible Nuclear Weapon Capable States' based on restraint, relevance, reassurance, readiness, reciprocity, and reduction. The author outlines a three-gateway (T1, T2, T3) framework to transition from current deterrents to total disarmament, emphasizing that the security of states must be ensured through conventional arms control before final nuclear elimination can occur.

The Council on Strategic Risks examines the implications of the Trump administration's intention to withdraw from the 1987 INF Treaty. The authors argue that this move, alongside the potential withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the JCPOA, signals a profound shift in the global security environment. They advocate for new arms control strategies that focus on specific destabilizing weapon classes—particularly those with indistinguishable conventional variants—and emphasize the need for non-governmental expertise and consultation with international allies to maintain global stability.

The Union of Concerned Scientists argues that space-based missile defense is an ineffective and dangerous strategy. The document explains that interceptors in orbit aim to destroy ICBMs during the boost phase to avoid decoy warheads, but this requires a massive number of satellites to ensure coverage. For example, covering North Korea would require 300 to 400 interceptors across seven or eight orbits. The National Academies of Science and Engineering estimated an 'austere' system of 600 interceptors would cost approximately $300 billion. Beyond cost, the system is vulnerable to saturation by multiple simultaneous missile launches and to ground-based anti-satellite weapons. Furthermore, the document warns that such a system would escalate tensions with Russia and China, as interceptors could be perceived as threats to vital military and economic satellites in various orbits, potentially triggering an arms race or military conflict.

The document examines the fallout of the US withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), noting that the decision ignored findings from the International Atomic Energy Agency and US intelligence. It highlights a broader decline in international cooperation, as evidenced by a Council of Councils report that downgraded the effectiveness of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear war from a B- to D-.

A statement by national organizations urging the U.S. Senate to reject Mike Pompeo's nomination for Secretary of State, citing his climate change denial, hawkish foreign policy views, and record on human rights.

The document examines the BRICS grouping's attempt to reshape the global order amid US isolationism, noting that while the group promotes equality and consensus, it is dominated by China, which accounts for nearly 66% of the projected 2017 BRICS GDP. It highlights internal tensions, such as the India-China rivalry in Doklam, and argues for the promotion of fairer trade and the upholding of global agreements like the Paris accord. The text concludes that BRICS must navigate growing rivalries in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia to avoid 20th-century great power conflicts, with South Africa intending to prioritize peace and security during its 2018 chairmanship.

The German G20 presidency focused on 'Shaping an Interconnected World' through initiatives like the Compact with Africa and the Marshall Plan for Africa, aimed at reducing investment risks and addressing migration root causes. However, the 2017 Hamburg summit faced significant tension due to US President Donald Trump's protectionist agenda and withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Agreement. The author suggests that a broad G20 agenda—covering everything from tax cooperation to the 2030 Agenda—may help Chancellor Merkel find common ground with the US despite deep disagreements on trade and climate.