Timing Matters: The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability

The research analyzes 259 autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2008 to determine if the predictability of election dates influences regime durability. The author posits that regular election cycles create focal points for dissident collective action and prevent incumbents from 'surfing' favorable political or economic conditions. Statistical analysis indicates that regimes with more regular electoral cycles have a significantly higher probability of failure. The study suggests that manipulating the electoral calendar—through snap elections or delays—serves as a survival strategy to stymie challengers and optimize the use of state violence.

• Autocratic regimes that adhere to a more regular election cycle are more likely to experience regime breakdown compared to those with irregular cycles.
• Regimes with the most regular electoral cycles face a probability of failure approximately five times higher than that of an average regime.
• Regular election dates act as focal points that simplify the coordination of anti-regime protests and collective action for dissidents.
• Dictators use 'opportunistic electoral surfing' to time elections during periods of high regime popularity or opposition weakness to reduce the risk of protests.
• Manipulating the electoral calendar allows regimes to better plan and execute the use of violence to ensure victory.
• The destabilizing effect of electoral regularity is more pronounced in parliamentary-based autocratic regimes and younger regimes.
• The findings remain robust when controlling for variables such as GDP per capita, natural resource dependence, military size, and the level of democracy.
• Some highly repressive regimes, such as North Korea, can survive despite regular election cycles because their control systems are robust enough to withstand the associated risks.

APA

Nyg˚ard, H. M. (2020). Timing Matters: The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/bdd35f78-a412-4070-8a68-5bcceafbf22d/Timing Matters The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Nyg˚ard, H˚avard Mokleiv. Timing Matters: The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2020. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/bdd35f78-a412-4070-8a68-5bcceafbf22d/Timing Matters The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Nyg˚ard |first1=H˚avard Mokleiv |title=Timing Matters: The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=28 May 2020 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/bdd35f78-a412-4070-8a68-5bcceafbf22d/Timing Matters The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{nygard2020timing, author = {Nyg˚ard, H˚avard Mokleiv}, title = {{Timing Matters: The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2020}, month = may, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/bdd35f78-a412-4070-8a68-5bcceafbf22d/Timing Matters The Impact of Regularity of Election Cycles on Autocratic Stability.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }