Improving Nuclear Strategic Stability Through a Responsibility-Based Approach

The briefing argues that the world is entering a period without formal arms control agreements between the US and Russia, increasing the risk of nuclear miscalculation and a new arms race. To counter this, the author introduces 'Nuclear Strategic Stability' (NSS) as a metric to assess postures and capabilities, and proposes a '10-point Code of Responsible Nuclear Weapon Capable States' based on restraint, relevance, reassurance, readiness, reciprocity, and reduction. The author outlines a three-gateway (T1, T2, T3) framework to transition from current deterrents to total disarmament, emphasizing that the security of states must be ensured through conventional arms control before final nuclear elimination can occur.

• The global security environment is characterized by a decline in trust and the potential disappearance of formal nuclear and conventional arms control agreements between the United States and Russia within five years.
• Three interlocking challenges threaten stability: the risk of nuclear escalation from conventional conflict or miscalculation, an incipient arms race involving hypersonic and underwater cruise weapons, and the erosion of trust following the U.S. intent to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
• The author defines Nuclear Strategic Stability (NSS) as a metric of international relations where the risk of conflict being initiated or escalated to the nuclear level is kept as low as achievable.
• A proposed 10-point Code of Responsible Nuclear Weapon Capable States is organized around six elements: Restraint, Relevance, Reassurance, Readiness, Reciprocity, and Reduction.
• The proposed pathway to disarmament consists of three gateways: T1 (elimination of weapons most susceptible to nuclear warfighting), T2 (removal of tactical and 'delegated in conflict' weapons), and T3 (final removal of nuclear weapons).
• The author asserts that for nuclear weapons to be eliminated, nuclear weapon capable states must feel as secure without them as they do with them, which may require new formal conventional arms control agreements.

APA

Gower, J. (2019). Improving Nuclear Strategic Stability Through a Responsibility-Based Approach. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/improving-nuclear-strategic-stability-through-a-responsibility-based-approach_briefer-1_2019_01_7.pdf

Chicago

Gower, John. Improving Nuclear Strategic Stability Through a Responsibility-Based Approach. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2019. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/improving-nuclear-strategic-stability-through-a-responsibility-based-approach_briefer-1_2019_01_7.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Gower |first1=John |title=Improving Nuclear Strategic Stability Through a Responsibility-Based Approach |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=7 January 2019 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/improving-nuclear-strategic-stability-through-a-responsibility-based-approach_briefer-1_2019_01_7.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{gower2019improving, author = {Gower, John}, title = {{Improving Nuclear Strategic Stability Through a Responsibility-Based Approach}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2019}, month = jan, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/improving-nuclear-strategic-stability-through-a-responsibility-based-approach_briefer-1_2019_01_7.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }