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Between 2010 and 2014, Tonga received US$67.4 million in grant-equivalent finance specifically targeting climate change, with a majority (59.7%) supporting mitigation. The primary contributors were Japan and the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), with significant funding directed toward renewable energy and environmental policy. Additionally, Tonga was allocated US$2.64 million from the Global Environment Facility for a renewable energy project between January 2015 and September 2016.

Between 2010 and 2014, Tuvalu received US$37.9 million in grant-equivalent finance specifically targeting climate change, with a significant portion dedicated to renewable energy. Major contributors during this period included New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates, and the Global Environment Facility. Additionally, between January 2015 and September 2016, Tuvalu was allocated US$36 million from the Green Climate Fund for coastal adaptation and US$2.64 million from the Global Environment Facility for national energy targets.

Between 2010 and 2014, Vanuatu received US$49.4 million in grant-equivalent finance specifically targeting climate change, with a majority supporting mitigation. The primary sources of this funding were the Global Environment Facility, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates, focusing on environmental policy, renewables, and disaster preparedness. Additionally, between January 2015 and September 2016, Vanuatu received further allocations from the Green Climate Fund, the LDCF, and the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program.

Between 2010 and 2014, Samoa received US$98.2 million in grant-equivalent finance specifically targeting climate change, with 68.5% dedicated to adaptation and 30% to mitigation. The largest funding sources were the Climate Investment Funds and the Global Environment Facility, with primary sectoral allocations going toward environmental policy, renewable energy, and road transport. Additionally, Samoa was allocated US$6.1 million from the Global Environment Facility between January 2015 and September 2016 for renewable energy system improvements.

The statement warns that non-transparent land-use accounting in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) can allow countries to meet targets while carbon pollution increases. It highlights specific examples in Russia and New Zealand and advocates for separating land-use credits from other sectors to ensure the 1.5°C target is met through essential decarbonisation.

The report finds that Canada's comprehensive wealth grew by only 0.19% annually from 1980 to 2013, significantly lagging behind real per capita consumption growth of 1.36%. While produced capital grew by 1.68% annually, this was heavily concentrated in housing and oil and gas extraction. Conversely, market natural capital declined by 0.93% annually, and human capital—the largest component of wealth—remained flat. The authors argue that this divergence suggests underinvestment in the asset base and a risky reliance on natural resource depletion, recommending that Statistics Canada begin regular reporting of comprehensive wealth to guide sustainable policy.

This executive summary argues that Canada's reliance on GDP masks a lack of long-term sustainability in its comprehensive wealth portfolio. Between 1980 and 2013, real per capita comprehensive wealth grew by only 7%, while individual consumption grew by 54%. This divergence was driven by a 25% decline in market natural capital and stagnant human capital, with produced capital growth heavily concentrated in housing and oil and gas extraction. The report recommends that the federal government fund Statistics Canada to regularly measure comprehensive wealth, with a priority on human, social, and non-market natural capital, to guide a transition toward a diversified, low-carbon economy.

One year after the Paris Agreement's adoption, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) finds that national climate policies have made little progress. If NDCs are fully implemented, global warming by 2100 is estimated at 2.8°C, while current policies would lead to 3.6°C. A significant emissions gap remains for 2025 and 2030. The report highlights specific national trajectories, noting that most assessed NDCs are inadequate or medium in ambition, with particular concerns regarding the US, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, while noting positive renewable energy growth in India.

The document outlines the risks associated with bulk marine sediment mining in South Africa, specifically the use of Trailing Suction Hopper-Dredge technology. It highlights severe ecological threats, the absence of a legal governance framework, and the potential for devastating impacts on shared fish stocks and food security. The text notes that other countries, including Namibia, New Zealand, Mexico, and Australia, have refused such operations or implemented moratoria due to these risks.

The report analyzes the compatibility of Carbon Market Clubs (CMCs)—networks of emissions trading schemes (ETSs) sharing rules and services—with various 'climate clubs' consisting of governments, cities, and businesses. It explores whether standardized CMC services, such as mitigation value assessments and international asset reserves, can reduce transaction costs and political barriers to linking diverse carbon markets. While the Paris Agreement's Article 6.2 encourages voluntary cooperation, the report finds that political concerns over sovereignty, environmental integrity, and the 'not invented here' syndrome often outweigh technical efficiencies. Case studies of the EU ETS, WCI, RGGI, and ICAO illustrate the tension between the desire for centralized control and the economic benefits of networked markets.

The policy brief argues that G20 countries should accelerate the phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies by adopting a clear timetable, increasing transparency through peer reviews, and ensuring targeted support for the poor. It highlights the success of voluntary peer review processes in APEC and the G20, and notes a growing international consensus—including commitments from G-7 countries to phase out such subsidies by 2025—to align fiscal policies with climate objectives.

The report details a December 2015 workshop in Paris focused on 'low carbon clubs' or multijurisdictional cooperative approaches (MCAs). Participants argued that these clubs should aim to increase emissions reduction ambition and could use carbon pricing to fund technological innovation in sectors like gas, electricity, oil, and mining. The discussion highlighted the potential for linking diverse carbon markets through initiatives like the World Bank's Networked Carbon Markets (NCM) and emphasized the need for non-pricing incentives—such as technology transfer and capacity building—to encourage participation from developing nations and the Alliance of Small Island States.

The document examines the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and its ancillary agreements, such as the Madrid Protocol, which prohibit mineral exploitation until at least 2048. It analyzes how emerging powers like China, India, and Brazil are increasing their scientific presence to gain political influence. The paper details South Africa's historical role as a founding member and its current focus on science, while arguing that South Africa should integrate its Antarctic activities more deeply into its broader foreign policy and the 'Africa Agenda' to promote a more inclusive global governance regime.

The document consists of several articles analyzing how mainstream media often perpetuate negative stereotypes of Muslims and Islam, contributing to Islamophobia in Europe, North America, and New Zealand. It also discusses the erosion of democratic governance in India due to corruption and intolerance, and critiques the 'corporate village' of transnational media that marginalizes local cultures and restricts the 'right to communicate'.

The document is a declaration calling for the end of fossil fuel exploration and extraction to address the climate crisis and mass extinction. It demands a just transition to a democratized, 100% renewable energy system, the removal of fossil fuel industry influence from policymaking, and the recognition of the rights of Indigenous and frontline communities.

The document outlines critical areas for climate finance at COP 21, emphasizing the need for developed countries to meet the $100 billion annual goal by 2020, increasing funding for adaptation, and improving transparency in reporting finance flows. It highlights recent pledges from various nations and argues for a shift in trillions of dollars from high-emissions to low-emissions activities.

The briefing argues that carbon markets have historically failed to increase climate commitments and have often undermined emissions reductions through 'hot air' loopholes. It recommends that the Paris agreement prevent double counting, ensure that international trading is supplementary to ambitious domestic action, and restrict market mechanisms to countries with adequate carbon budgets. The text notes a shift from a single global UN-led market toward a fragmented landscape of national and regional initiatives, while advocating for a transition from carbon offsets toward direct financial support for climate actions in developing countries.

The document examines the risks of using agricultural soil carbon sequestration as carbon offsets. It highlights technical failures in measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV), the non-permanence of biological carbon compared to fossil carbon, and social risks such as land grabbing and the marginalization of small-scale farmers. The author argues that 'Climate Smart Agriculture' often serves as greenwashing for agribusiness corporations. Instead of carbon markets, the report recommends using National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) to prioritize food security, tenure rights, and sustainable rural livelihoods.

The report examines the fragmentation of watershed data collection in Canada, where varying methodologies across municipal, provincial, and international borders hinder a coherent understanding of watershed health. Through webinars and workshops conducted by the Canadian Sustainability Indicators Network (CSIN) in 2014–2015, the report identifies key obstacles such as imbalanced institutional capacities and the lack of standardized guidance for indicator selection. It provides recommendations for improving indicator frameworks, including the integration of social and economic data, the use of metadata to enhance comparability, and the adoption of staggered reporting to make information more digestible. The document also notes a tension between the desire for national consistency and the risk of using a 'least common denominator' approach that may sacrifice local data resolution.

The report evaluates a wide array of in-lake remediation techniques to combat eutrophication, emphasizing that these methods are generally only effective if external nutrient loads are simultaneously reduced. It categorizes treatments into biological engineering (e.g., biomanipulation, floating wetlands), physical engineering (e.g., hypolimnetic withdrawal, dredging, artificial circulation), and chemical applications (e.g., alum, Phoslock, algicides). The document provides detailed case studies from North America and Europe, analyzing the effectiveness, longevity, and costs of each method, while highlighting the critical role of internal phosphorus loading in delaying lake recovery.