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The policy brief examines the 'stabilisation' phase of Somalia's offensive against Al-Shabaab, highlighting how resource competition among political elites and donors creates coordination failures. It identifies tensions between federal and state governments, donor-driven top-down approaches, and the risks of rushing interim administration formation in liberated areas, recommending a centralised stabilisation fund and a central coordinating body.

The Horn of Africa is characterized by a very young population and high fertility rates, particularly in Somalia. Only Djibouti has currently reached the working-age to dependent ratio necessary to potentially realize a demographic dividend. The region is predominantly rural, with Ethiopia being the most rural and Djibouti the most urbanized. High youth populations combined with limited economic opportunities are identified as contributors to socio-political instability.

The Somalia National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Framework provides a roadmap for reducing national and local vulnerabilities to climate change. It emphasizes the integration of adaptation into the National Development Plan (NDP-9) and peacebuilding initiatives, recognizing that climate shocks exacerbate conflict and poverty. The framework outlines a whole-of-society approach, prioritizing gender-responsiveness, vertical integration between federal and state governments, and the mobilization of climate finance. It identifies the Directorate of Environment and Climate Change (DoECC) as the lead coordinator and proposes the establishment of a National Climate Fund and a dedicated monitoring and evaluation system to track progress.

Turkey has become a critical partner for the Somali Federal Government (SFG), providing significant humanitarian aid, military training, and private investment. While Turkish interventions in the Mogadishu airport and seaport have substantially increased government revenues, the briefing argues that this approach risks undermining peace by favoring specific clans and bolstering an unaccountable central government. The document highlights a tension between Turkey's goal of strengthening the state and the need for an inclusive political settlement that avoids zero-sum clan dynamics.

The report examines Turkey's transition to an 'emerging donor' through its activities in Somalia, highlighting a 'multi-actor and multi-track policy' that combines humanitarian aid, development assistance, and strategic political engagement. While praised for its rapid delivery and respect for national ownership, the Turkish approach is noted for lacking structured monitoring and evaluation and being heavily concentrated in Mogadishu.

The document examines the women's empowerment agenda in Somalia, contrasting the global Women, Peace and Security (WPS) framework with local historical and social contexts. It highlights the 'state feminism' of the Siyad Barre era (1969-1991), the disruptions caused by the civil war, and the influence of the Somali diaspora. The authors argue that international efforts focusing primarily on political quotas may overlook the substantive civic and informal leadership roles Somali women hold, potentially delegitimizing the agenda by appearing incompatible with local norms.

The report addresses the 'crisis in remittances' caused by bank de-risking in the UK-Somalia corridor due to AML/CFT compliance concerns. It proposes a 'third mile' risk management framework centered on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) system and a biometric registration process for recipients in Somalia. The TTP would track transactions, audit Money Service Businesses (MSBs), and assign risk ratings to transactions to provide UK settlement banks with greater confidence in the legitimacy of the funds flow. The authors suggest a six-month pilot starting in early 2015 involving 500 customers across two Somali locations.

The document highlights the vulnerability of sub-Saharan African port infrastructure to climate hazards such as sea level rise, storm surges, and extreme rainfall. It notes that while the industry is aware of climate change, this awareness is rarely translated into practical planning. The brief recommends establishing a close dialogue between climate scientists and port practitioners, reviewing port master plans, and providing designers with simple, quantified projections of climate variables to improve long-term resilience.

The document examines the tensions between humanitarian protection and the push for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), particularly in Somalia. It argues that return programming often relies on a flawed 'sedentary bias' and ignores the critical role of social networks and the reality of ongoing conflict. The authors warn that shifting aid from regional camps to unstable areas like south-central Somalia may serve state migration management interests rather than humanitarian needs, potentially increasing risks for returnees in environments of impunity.

The report examines the successful conclusion of Somalia's third transitional arrangement on 20 August 2012. It details the roadmap's four priority tasks—security stabilization, constitutional adoption, reconciliation, and good governance—and the role of the Technical Selection Committee (TSC) in nominating parliament members. Key success factors included international unity, clear task sequencing, and the political maturity of the outgoing leadership. However, the process faced challenges such as bribery, the marginalization of women, and perceptions of international interference. The author argues that sustaining peace requires investing in human resources, resolving constitutional ambiguities regarding sharia and federalism, and better synchronizing AU and UN operations.

On 20 August 2012, 215 parliamentarians were sworn in at Mogadishu airport, marking the first such ceremony on Somali soil in over two decades. While the event is viewed as a 'watershed moment' by the international community, the process faced delays due to disputes over the vetting of nominees by the Technical Selection Committee (TSC). Critical milestones remain, including the election of a speaker and president, which are complicated by clan dynamics and allegations of vote buying.

The briefing examines Kenya's 2011 military intervention in Somalia, 'Operation Linda Nchi', which aims to create a 100 km buffer zone to prevent Al-Shabaab incursions and protect the tourism industry. It warns that the move shifts Kenya from a victim to a target of Al-Shabaab, potentially increasing the risk of reprisal attacks and sleeper cell activity within Kenya. The author notes that while the operation responds to kidnappings and territorial threats, it faces challenges including rising economic costs, potential civilian casualties that could alienate Somalis, and the risk of the mission becoming protracted and overextending beyond its limited buffer zone goal.

The author argues that the presence of Saracen Security, a company owned by Salim Saleh (brother of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni), in Somalia risks delegitimizing the AMISOM mission. This involvement, combined with Uganda's history in the DRC, provides ideological ammunition for insurgents to claim that Uganda's military presence is driven by a desire for Somali oil. The document notes that international oil companies, such as Africa Oil (Canada), are actively pursuing exploration licenses in Puntland, further complicating the political landscape.

The document details a seminar presentation by Chief Superintendent Vance B Gariba and a response by Dr Emmanuel Kisiangani regarding the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It examines the historical context of Somalia's instability, the mandate and achievements of AMISOM—including the training of over 2,000 Somali police—and the systemic failures of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The discussion highlights critical gaps in AMISOM's mandate, such as the lack of civilian protection, and suggests that long-term stability requires transformative institutional building and potential political engagement with Al Shabaab leaders.

The document critiques the African Union's (AU) decision to increase AMISOM forces from approximately 6,300 to 8,000 troops following Al-Shabaab bombings in Kampala in July 2010. It argues that the mission lacks the resources and political support necessary to succeed, noting that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks national legitimacy. Drawing parallels to failures in Afghanistan and previous UN missions in Somalia, the authors suggest that military intervention alone cannot resolve the crisis. They recommend a holistic strategy centered on an all-inclusive political process involving Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, Puntland, and Somaliland, alongside the involvement of regional actors like Ethiopia and Eritrea, before transferring the mandate to a fully resourced UN mission.

The document analyzes the protracted conflict in Somalia, tracing its origins to colonial divisions and the subsequent collapse of the state in 1991. It examines the role of clan politics, the rise of religious fundamentalism through groups like al Shaabab, and the influence of regional actors, particularly Ethiopia. The author argues that the current Transitional Federal Government (TFG) remains militarily weak and lacks internal legitimacy, while the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is under-resourced. The paper recommends a comprehensive approach to peace that includes expanding the Djibouti process to include al Shaabab, addressing the security concerns of neighboring states, and deploying a robust UN peacekeeping force to replace AMISOM.

The briefing analyzes the rise of piracy in Somalia, specifically citing the seizure of the MV Faina, as evidence of systemic security failures. It attributes the crisis to the inability of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to provide security, the limited mandate of AMISOM, and the failure of regional bodies like IGAD. The author contends that piracy gained local legitimacy as a response to the illegal exploitation of Somali marine resources by foreign companies and argues that military solutions are insufficient without a paradigm shift toward human security and the establishment of an inclusive Somali government.

The report examines the role of the Somali diaspora in Norway in supporting political actors and peace processes in Somalia. It finds that while ideological support exists for national actors like the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the most impactful financial contributions occur at the sub-clan level to fund either conflict or reconciliation. The authors recommend that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs adopt a more proactive approach to diaspora engagement and support decentralized peacebuilding initiatives.

The document argues that the Somali conflict is driven by competition for power and resources, state repression under General Mohamed Siad Barre, and the colonial legacy of partitioning. It identifies Ethiopia's hostile policies, the lack of major-power interest, the persistence of warlords, and a lack of resources as primary obstacles to peace. The authors propose a peace-building framework involving clan-based power-sharing, the disarmament of heavy weapons, international financial support, and Islam-informed peace education to foster long-term stability.

The author argues that the common use of blanket terms like 'militia' or 'warlord' in Somalia is analytically misleading. By examining the roles of clan loyalty, economic incentives, and the emergence of 'mooryaan' (freelance gunmen), the paper distinguishes between groups that represent clan interests, those serving personal political ambitions, and those protecting commercial or religious goals. It concludes that these distinctions are essential for formulating effective security policies.