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The document critiques the African Union's (AU) decision to increase AMISOM forces from approximately 6,300 to 8,000 troops following Al-Shabaab bombings in Kampala in July 2010. It argues that the mission lacks the resources and political support necessary to succeed, noting that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) lacks national legitimacy. Drawing parallels to failures in Afghanistan and previous UN missions in Somalia, the authors suggest that military intervention alone cannot resolve the crisis. They recommend a holistic strategy centered on an all-inclusive political process involving Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, Puntland, and Somaliland, alongside the involvement of regional actors like Ethiopia and Eritrea, before transferring the mandate to a fully resourced UN mission.

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  • The AU's decision to reinforce AMISOM by nearly 2,000 troops—increasing the force from around 6,300 to the 8,000 mandated in 2007—was primarily triggered by the timing and location of Al-Shabaab suicide bombings in Kampala on 11 July 2010.
  • AMISOM's mandate is considered unachievable because the force lacks sufficient resources and substantive political support from regional and international actors, which contradicts UN peacekeeping principles established by the Brahimi Panel.
  • The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is described as weak and lacking national legitimacy, which limits the effectiveness of AMISOM's efforts to protect it as an embryonic government.
  • The document argues that increasing troop levels without a coherent political process is a mistaken strategy, citing the example of Afghanistan where surges in US and NATO forces led to increased attacks and undermined 'hearts and minds' efforts.
  • A lasting solution requires an all-inclusive political process involving not just the TFG, but also Al-Shabaab, Hizbul-Islam, Puntland, and Somaliland, as previous externally imposed peace processes have failed.
  • The authors suggest that the international community should avoid treating the conflict primarily as part of the 'war on terror' and should instead focus on African leadership and the involvement of Ethiopia and Eritrea to resolve regional security concerns.

Cite the original document

APA
Cilliers, J., Boshoff, H., & Aboagye, F. B. (2010). Somalia: the intervention dilemma. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No20Aug2010Somalia.pdf
Chicago
Cilliers, Jakkie, Henri Boshoff, and Festus B. Aboagye. Somalia: the intervention dilemma. Institute for Security Studies, 2010. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No20Aug2010Somalia.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Cilliers |first1=Jakkie |last2=Boshoff |first2=Henri |last3=Aboagye |first3=Festus B. |title=Somalia: the intervention dilemma |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=August 2010 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No20Aug2010Somalia.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{cilliers2010somalia, author = {Cilliers, Jakkie and Boshoff, Henri and Aboagye, Festus B.}, title = {{Somalia: the intervention dilemma}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2010}, month = aug, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No20Aug2010Somalia.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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