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The report details the 'destructive power' of the nickel industry in North Maluku, specifically across Weda Bay, Gebe Island, Buli Bay, Subaim-Wasile, and Obi Island. It highlights a paradox where the province's economic growth exceeds 20% due to nickel exports, while poverty increases and local livelihoods—such as fishing and farming—are destroyed. Key impacts include severe deforestation, water contamination with heavy metals (hexavalent chromium, nickel, and copper), and a surge in Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) cases near coal-fired power plants. The document also records numerous industrial accidents at PT IWIP and the criminalization of residents resisting mining. It concludes that the 'clean energy transition' via electric vehicle batteries is built on an 'unclean and unjust' production chain.

The report details the destructive effects of nickel mining in North Maluku, highlighting severe deforestation, water pollution, and health crises. It contrasts high GDP growth driven by nickel exports with rising poverty and the loss of traditional livelihoods in farming and fishing. Specific case studies in Teluk Weda, Pulau Gebe, Teluk Buli, Subaim-Wasile, and Pulau Obi illustrate a pattern of corporate negligence, labor accidents, and state-backed land seizures.

The briefing highlights the negative environmental and social impacts of critical mineral extraction in Argentina, Indonesia, and Guinea, arguing that the UN Secretary-General's Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals must center the voices of affected communities to avoid 'green extractivism'. It documents issues such as the violation of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in lithium mining, pollution and labor abuses in nickel downstreaming, and the loss of agricultural land in bauxite mining. The document concludes with recommendations for governments and companies to protect indigenous rights, ensure transparency in GHG emissions, and end the criminalization of environmental defenders.

The document reveals that between 2015 and 2023, the Indonesian government distributed approximately Rp179 trillion in biodiesel subsidies to 29 companies across 15 corporate groups, with a heavy concentration of funds among a few large entities. It identifies 17 Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)—including former high-ranking police, military, and judicial officials—within the ownership or management structures of these groups, specifically highlighting Jhonlin Group, Sinar Mas, and Wilmar. The report argues that the presence of PEPs may influence the allocation of subsidies and suggests a lack of transparency in the mandatory biodiesel program, while noting that the industry remains dominated by large palm oil corporations despite the subsidies being funded by export levies from the broader palm oil sector.

Between 2015 and 2021, Indonesia's financial sector committed USD 41.7 billion in climate-aligned investments, representing 15% of the country's total climate finance needs. Public and private financial institutions contributed nearly equal annual averages (USD 3.5 billion and USD 3.4 billion, respectively), though private contributions represent only 3% of their total investments. While public finance is dominated by Development Finance Institutions targeting renewable energy, private finance is concentrated in the AFOLU sector, particularly certified sustainable palm oil. To meet 2030 targets, Indonesia faces a climate finance gap of approximately USD 145 billion, requiring climate-aligned investment to scale by at least 4.5x this decade.

The document argues that industrialisation is essential for improving living standards and creating youth employment in Africa, but notes a lack of focus on this goal during the 2022 and 2023 G20 summits. It identifies a productivity gap where large firms fail to generate sufficient employment and small firms lack productivity. The author recommends that the G20 adopt a unifying theme of industrialisation to support structural transformation, agricultural productivity, and the integration of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) into global value chains.

The document outlines ten principles for coal retirement mechanisms (CRMs), emphasizing the immediate cessation of coal expansion, the replacement of lost power with sustainable renewables, and the use of concessional financing in developing countries. It argues that CRMs must avoid emissions leakage, carbon offsets, and retrofitting delays while ensuring transparency and the remediation of social and environmental harms.

The policy brief argues that existing coal retirement mechanisms (CRMs) in Asia and Africa are failing to translate pledges into funding and effective plant closures. It identifies barriers such as the prevalence of non-concessional loans, the risk of 'emission leakage,' and the moral hazard of incentivizing new coal build-out. To address these, Reclaim Finance and 11 partner organizations propose ten principles, which include an immediate stop to coal expansion finance, the replacement of coal with renewables rather than gas, the prohibition of tradeable carbon offsets, and the requirement for transparent, auction-based retirement processes.

The policy brief argues that existing coal retirement mechanisms (CRMs) in Asia and Africa, such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), are failing due to insufficient funding, reliance on non-concessional loans, and lack of transparency. To address these failures, the authors propose ten principles. These include aligning phaseouts with 1.5°C pathways, immediately stopping all coal expansion finance, replacing coal only with sustainable renewables, and prohibiting the use of tradeable carbon offsets. The brief emphasizes that financing must be concessional to avoid increasing national debt and that the process must include social and environmental remediation for affected communities and workers.

The report finds that climate-related financial cooperation between MDBs and NDBs is currently limited, with approximately USD 7 billion in tracked flows from 2015 to 2022. There is significant divergence in how these institutions approach Paris alignment, with MDBs generally possessing more standardised targets and dedicated energy policies, while NDBs often anchor their goals in national NDCs. Key barriers to increased cooperation include currency risks, differing institutional mandates, and gaps in technical capacity. The authors recommend that MDBs optimise on-lending models, promote local currency instruments, and share expertise through platforms like Finance in Common to scale up climate investment.

Indonesia requires approximately USD 285 billion in climate-aligned investment to meet its Enhanced NDC, but current funding is insufficient. The government budget covers 34% of this need, while the financial sector (public and private) contributes 15%. Between 2015 and 2021, public and private financial institutions provided roughly equal amounts of climate-aligned investment, totaling USD 41.7 billion. Private investment is notably low, with only 3% of total private investment being climate-aligned, and much of this concentrated in land use. In the power sector, 58% of the USD 35.6 billion invested went to renewables, with a significant drop in coal finance since 2016. Future investment trends are expected to be driven by government policy signals such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) and the Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM).

The report identifies 22 systemic barriers to net zero carbon buildings, categorized as financial, investment risk/opportunity, market readiness, and regulatory. Using network analysis, it establishes that financial barriers are the most critical from a demand perspective but are often dependent on the mitigation of regulatory and market readiness barriers. The authors map 31 policy and 44 financial instruments, categorizing them into fundamental inputs (such as capacity development and fiscal instruments) and dependent inputs (such as debt instruments and asset finance models). The report highlights five high-impact pathways for cities: phasing out fossil-fuel appliances, implementing energy efficiency building codes, deploying results-based grants for cooling, using skills development for embodied carbon reduction, and publishing climate risk data for adaptation. It emphasizes that mandates are central to the transition, as they enable the development of new financial mechanisms.

The paper argues that the dominant 'Billions to Trillions' agenda, which prioritises private sector mobilisation and de-risking, often conflicts with international human rights standards. It evaluates this architecture through five principle clusters: national responsibilities, national sovereignty, procedural fairness, responsibilities of financial investment, and obligations during crises. The author contends that this model commodifies public goods, undermines state policy autonomy through investment treaties, and lacks transparency. Using South Africa's Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) as a case study, the report highlights gaps in public transport funding and the risks of private-sector dominance. It concludes by proposing a research agenda to bridge the gap between human rights norms and the actual implementation of climate investment plans.

The December 2023 update finds that global warming projections have stalled, with current policies leading to 2.7°C of warming by 2100. Even the most optimistic scenario, including all announced targets, results in 1.8°C, exceeding the 1.5°C Paris Agreement goal. The report highlights a growing implementation gap and warns that reliance on carbon capture and storage (CCS), e-fuels, and carbon offsets are 'false solutions' that delay necessary deep emission cuts. It urges governments to submit 1.5°C-aligned 2035 targets by February 2025 and to commit to a complete phase-out of fossil fuels.

The document outlines how every phase of the offshore oil and gas lifecycle—exploration, production, transport, and decommissioning—adversely impacts small-scale fisheries. It highlights specific threats such as seismic noise reducing fish catches, well blowouts causing oil spills, and the creation of exclusion zones. Additionally, it links offshore fossil fuel activity to broader climate impacts like ocean acidification and sea level rise, which further jeopardize food production. The signatories urge the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food to recommend that States conduct thorough impact assessments and suspend projects that deprive fisherfolk of their fundamental human rights.

The report finds that global coal mine methane (CMM) emissions may be up to twice as high as government figures reported to the UNFCCC. It highlights a systemic failure in measurement, noting that 97% of reported emissions rely on generic emission factors rather than direct measurement. The analysis identifies 22 countries that may be underreporting emissions by more than 100%, with severe discrepancies noted in South Africa, Indonesia, and Germany. Ember recommends mandatory direct measurement for all mines, the use of satellite verification, and international financial support for low-income countries to implement these standards.

Ember's analysis reveals that 97% of reported coal mine methane (CMM) emissions are based on emission factors rather than direct measurements, leading to widespread underreporting. The report finds that 22 countries may have more than double the emissions they officially report, with extreme discrepancies noted in South Africa, Indonesia, and Germany. Only 44 countries published CMM data for 2021, and many major producers, including China and India, have not reported recently.

The report highlights a significant gap between government rhetoric and action regarding fossil fuel subsidies, noting that world governments provided a record USD 1.3 trillion in such subsidies in 2022. It critiques current UNFCCC commitments for lacking deadlines and clear definitions of "inefficient" subsidies. The authors propose several pathways for action at COP 28 and beyond, including the adoption of a 'cover decision', integrating subsidy reform into the first global stocktake, and requiring more ambitious, time-bound commitments in updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The document also suggests leveraging climate finance discussions, such as the 'net climate finance' concept and the new collective quantified goal (NCQG), to address public financial flows to fossil fuels.

The Community Resilience Partnership Program (CRPP) is a regional initiative managed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to strengthen the climate resilience of approximately 3.2 million poor and vulnerable people in Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and Vanuatu. The program is structured into two components: a Trust Fund (TF) for upstream capacity building and knowledge generation, and an Investment Fund (IF) for downstream implementation of adaptation measures. The IF focuses on three primary outputs: improving climate risk information systems, implementing climate-resilient pro-poor livelihoods, and constructing pro-poor climate adaptation infrastructure. The program emphasizes transformational adaptation, gender equality, and the use of nature-based solutions to address the disproportionate impacts of climate change on marginalized populations.

The report finds that while current national targets collectively aim for a doubling of renewable capacity by 2030, they often underestimate the actual pace of deployment. A global tripling to 11,000 GW is considered achievable if governments update targets to reflect recent growth and maintain a 17% annual increase in additions. The analysis identifies specific countries with high potential to increase ambition, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UAE, while noting that others like India and Saudi Arabia already have targets that aim for a tripling of their 2022 capacity.