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The Institute for Economic Justice argues against the National Treasury's proposal for a binding fiscal rule in South Africa, claiming it misdiagnoses the debt problem by focusing on the quantum of debt rather than the cost of borrowing. Drawing on case studies from Brazil and Indonesia, the paper asserts that fiscal rules often lead to 'creative accounting', inappropriate budget cuts to social services, and reduced flexibility during crises, without necessarily lowering borrowing costs. The authors suggest that sustainable public finances can only be achieved through economic expansion, progressive revenue mobilization, and direct interventions to lower interest rates.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, first established in 1998, is likely to end by March 2026. This expiration could lead to a fragmented global regulatory landscape, increased costs for consumers and businesses, and a shift toward regional trade agreements. While developing nations argue that the moratorium limits their policy space and public revenue, the authors suggest that the lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions' complicates the transition and that a multilateral agreement remains the most stable path for digital trade.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, in place since 1998, is likely to end by March 2026 due to opposition from developing countries seeking to recover lost tax revenues and maintain policy space for national industrialization. The authors argue that the end of this global rule would lead to a fragmented 'mosaic' of regional and bilateral trade agreements with inconsistent definitions of 'electronic transmissions,' potentially increasing costs for consumers and creating barriers for digital service providers. While some members argue that the moratorium hinders their ability to support domestic digital industries, the authors suggest that alternative taxes, such as VAT, could generate revenue without the trade-distorting effects of customs duties. The document highlights a critical lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions,' which has led to divergent revenue loss estimates—ranging from 280 million USD globally (OECD) to nearly 10 billion USD annually for developing countries (UNCTAD).

The report examines how Chile, Indonesia, and South Africa integrate mining sector decarbonization into their climate commitments. It finds that while mining is economically vital and essential for the energy transition, it is often not explicitly identified in NDCs, making cross-country comparison difficult. Chile is highlighted as a benchmark with sector-specific targets, whereas Indonesia and South Africa largely aggregate mining emissions within broader energy or industrial categories.

Reclaim Finance identifies persistent problematic financing of the coal sector by BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, and BPCE/Natixis between 2021 and 2023. Despite overall funding decreases, the report finds that these banks supported 26 problematic groups, including coal developers and companies without climate-aligned exit dates. The analysis highlights four major policy loopholes—exclusion at the subsidiary level rather than the group level, minority ownership thresholds, the treatment of 'captive' industrial power plants, and reliance on confidential internal documents—which the report argues may constitute greenwashing and financial risk mismanagement.

Reclaim Finance analyzed transactions from 2021 to 2023 and found that four major French banks supported 26 problematic coal groups despite having policies to exit the sector. The report identifies four primary loopholes: exclusion only at the subsidiary level, lack of exclusion for minority stakes under 50%, exclusion of 'captive' coal plants at industrial sites, and reliance on confidential internal documents to justify financing companies without public exit dates. The author argues these practices are misleading to investors and regulators, urging the AMF and ACPR to sanction such 'greenwashing' and demand full transparency.

The document identifies significant obstacles to Colombia's transition from thermal coal, including heavy fiscal dependence on coal royalties, weak subnational institutional capacities, and long-term environmental liabilities. It emphasizes that while the national government has made commitments, local regions like Cesar and La Guajira face severe risks from unplanned mine closures and a lack of diversified economic alternatives. The brief recommends establishing a permanent transition fund, strengthening local government competencies, and ensuring inclusive planning that protects the rights of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

The document examines the economic, political, and governance challenges hindering Indonesia's transition away from coal, emphasizing the need for multi-level governance and social protections. It highlights the role of artificial price caps and political 'lock-in' as primary barriers, while noting a significant gap in planning capacity between national and subnational governments. The brief recommends establishing a Just Energy Transition Support Facility under Bappenas, implementing economic diversification for coal-dependent workers, and reforming electricity markets to eliminate coal subsidies and facilitate renewable energy integration.

The document examines the socio-economic and political challenges of phasing out coal in Indonesia, highlighting the role of artificial price caps, political 'revolving doors', and limited government planning capacity. It proposes the creation of a Just Energy Transition Support Facility under Bappenas to coordinate governance, finance, and economic diversification, while advocating for the removal of coal subsidies and the reform of the electricity market to favor renewable energy.

The document provides an overview of three types of carbon markets: compliance-based, voluntary, and multilateral-based (Article 6 of the Paris Agreement). It highlights the growth of government-led markets, which generated $104 billion in 2023, while noting the severe integrity crisis and subsequent investment decline in voluntary carbon markets. The author discusses how countries manage competitiveness through tools like free allowances and output-based pricing, and details the emerging landscape of Article 6 bilateral agreements. For developing countries, the report identifies a tension between the need for climate finance and the risks of 'greenwashing' and fiscal instability.

The report argues that the global push to triple renewable energy capacity must prioritize the quality of investments over quantity to avoid 'green extractivism'. It introduces three core criteria for public finance: driving a 100% renewable future by phasing out fossil fuels, ensuring democratic energy systems through grants and decentralization, and centering human rights and nature. The document criticizes multilateral development banks (MDBs) for continuing to fund fossil gas and relying on debt-creating loans rather than grants. Through case studies in India, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Indonesia, it contrasts the harms of large-scale, profit-driven projects with the benefits of community-led, small-scale renewable energy solutions.

The Net Zero Stocktake 2024 finds that while net zero target-setting is increasing among companies, cities, and subnational governments, very few (5% or less) meet all minimum integrity criteria. The report highlights a significant rise in target-setting by Asian companies and notes that while national targets often act as an ambition 'ceiling', some subnational governments in countries like Australia, Germany, and India have set more ambitious targets than their national governments.

The EU CRMA and UK CMS aim to reduce dependence on China and secure supplies for the green transition, but their domestic focus may hinder African industrialization. While the EU targets 10% domestic mining and 40% processing by 2030, its international partnerships are criticized as extractivist. The brief highlights a misalignment in 'criticality' definitions, where African states prioritize regional industrialization and specific minerals like gold or coal, which may conflict with Western climate goals or sanctions. It concludes that without a shift toward supporting in-country processing and reducing certification costs for local firms, these strategies will fail to create mutually beneficial partnerships.

The document identifies a rapid increase in climate lawsuits against major fossil fuel producers, noting that annual filings nearly tripled since 2015. It categorizes these cases into primary types—most notably compensation for climate damages, misleading advertising, and emissions reductions—and highlights emerging trends such as criminal liability claims and challenges to project permitting. The analysis emphasizes the role of attribution science in quantifying corporate liability and the potential for landmark rulings, such as the one against Shell in the Netherlands, to set global precedents.

In 2023, Global Witness documented 196 murders of land and environmental defenders, contributing to a total of 2,106 since 2012. Latin America remains the most dangerous region, accounting for 85% of 2023 cases, with Colombia recording the highest number of killings (79). The report highlights a systemic pattern of violence including forced disappearances in Mexico and judicial harassment in Asia. Mining is identified as the primary industrial driver of these killings. The document argues that indigenous peoples, who protect 80% of the world's remaining biodiversity, are disproportionately targeted. It calls for the implementation of the Escazú Agreement and greater inclusion of indigenous knowledge in global climate negotiations.

The document examines the systemic under-supply of funding for global public goods (GPGs), such as climate mitigation and pandemic preparedness, relative to the trillions of dollars required. It analyzes current G20 initiatives and the roles of the IMF and World Bank, while discussing a proposal from the Indian Council for Research in International Economic Relations (ICRIER) to create a consolidated GPG bank. The author provides recommendations for the South African G20 presidency to lead on consolidating funding windows, establishing equitable governance, and exploring global taxes to bridge the financing gap.

The document analyzes the 'stabilized text' of the JSI e-commerce agreement, which aims to establish a global benchmark for digital trade rules. It details enabling regulatory obligations, a moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, and specific flexibilities for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs), such as extended implementation timelines and technical assistance. The author highlights significant challenges, including the low participation of LDCs and African nations, disagreements among key members like the US and China, and a broader legal debate over whether plurilateral agreements can be formally incorporated into the WTO's consensus-based treaty system.

The policy brief outlines how South Africa can leverage its 2025 G20 presidency and the African Union's (AU) G20 membership to promote the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) and the AfCFTA Protocol on Digital Trade. It suggests aligning these African initiatives with the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments to improve the speed, cost, and transparency of international transactions. The author recommends that South Africa champion PAPSS adoption, foster collaboration between African central banks and Afreximbank, and utilize public-private partnerships to secure funding and technical assistance from organizations like the IMF and World Bank.

The briefing examines the role of deep sea mining in providing minerals like cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese for clean energy technologies. It concludes that deep sea mining is unlikely to solve immediate supply crunches because the necessary technology for commercial extraction and processing is not yet available, and the steepest growth in mineral demand is expected before 2035. The document highlights significant environmental risks, regulatory uncertainty surrounding the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and the potential for alternatives such as sustainable land mining, recycling, and material substitution to meet demand.

The Net Zero Stocktake 2024 reveals a consolidation of net zero targets across countries, cities, and companies, but highlights a critical gap in integrity. While national targets now cover 87% of global GHG emissions, fewer than 5% of non-state entities meet all minimum procedural and substantive integrity criteria. The report emphasizes that national targets often act as a 'ceiling' for subnational ambition, though some regions in countries like Australia and Japan have historically pushed national goals forward. It also notes that members of the Race to Zero campaign generally outperform non-members on integrity measures, although absolute performance remains low.