Search Climate Insights Directory

The report argues that Indonesia's promotion of natural gas as a 'transitional fuel' and the continued financing of gas projects by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) lock the country into fossil fuel dependence and hinder its climate commitments. It highlights significant environmental, social, and governance risks associated with gas infrastructure, including methane emissions, corruption, and human rights violations, while calling for an immediate shift toward renewable energy.

The report argues that promoting LNG as a 'transition fuel' in Indonesia creates a long-term dependency on fossil fuels and contradicts climate commitments. It highlights that Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), including the World Bank Group and ADB, continue to support gas infrastructure through technical assistance and policy loans despite their public Paris Alignment pledges. The document details numerous negative impacts of gas projects, including corruption in LNG procurement, human rights violations in Aceh, and environmental disasters such as the PHE ONWJ oil spill in Karawang. It concludes that gas is not a clean alternative due to high methane emissions and calls for an immediate shift to truly renewable energy.

The report argues that the revision of the South Papua Provincial Spatial Plan (RTRWP) is being rushed and lacks transparency, primarily to facilitate National Strategic Projects (PSN) in food and bioenergy. This process involves the release and functional downgrading of over 700,000 hectares of forest, threatening 644,994 hectares of natural forest and 49 indigenous territories. The document highlights that bioenergy projects—including bioethanol, biofuel, and biomass—often prioritize exports over local needs and risk repeating past human rights violations. Furthermore, the plan overlaps with existing industrial forestry concessions (PBPH), suggesting a potential handover of land to corporations, and threatens High Conservation Value Areas (HCVA) essential for biodiversity and indigenous livelihoods.

The document provides examples of global climate progress to counter pessimism, citing significant emissions drops in the EU and UK, China's rapid expansion of renewables and electric vehicles, and the resilience of subnational climate policies in the United States.

The document provides examples of climate progress to counter pessimism, noting that European Union emissions fell 8% in 2023 and the UK has reduced emissions by over half since 1990. It highlights China's rapid adoption of electric vehicles and its achievement of 2030 renewable targets six years early. In the United States, the text notes that carbon-pricing programs and renewable energy mandates persist at the state level despite federal policy shifts.

The document identifies a USD 146.4 billion investment gap for Indonesia's 2030 ENDC targets, noting that private financial institutions' climate finance represents only 3% of their total investments. While new regulations like the Indonesia Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance (TKBI) and POJK 18/2023 support decarbonization, significant barriers remain, including contradictory fossil fuel subsidies and a mismatch between the long-term capital needs of climate projects and the short-term nature of commercial bank funding.

Indonesia's RUKN 2024-2060 projects a coal capacity increase of 26.8 GW by 2031, primarily driven by over 20 GW of new captive coal plants for mineral processing. This expansion is expected to push coal generation to a peak of 494 TWh in 2037, contradicting the country's Low Carbon Scenario and JETP targets. The report highlights that new captive coal is more expensive than grid-connected coal and renewables, while lacking the emissions reporting and trading requirements imposed on the grid. It recommends reassessing captive coal plans, enforcing stricter emissions standards, and accelerating renewable energy deployment to avoid carbon lock-in.

Trend Asia warns that integrating biofuels into the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Global Fuel Standard would drive catastrophic environmental and social damage. The statement highlights that food- and feed-based biofuels, particularly those promoted by Brazil, are linked to land grabbing, deforestation, and life-cycle emissions that can exceed those of fossil diesel. It calls for the IMO to instead prioritize energy efficiency, wind assistance, and demand reduction to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.

The report identifies peatland protection as an 'emergency brake' climate solution due to the high carbon density of these ecosystems, which store approximately 600 Gt of carbon. It estimates that protecting one hectare of peatland avoids between 0.92 and 13.47 t CO‚-eq/ha/yr, with the highest impact in tropical and subtropical regions. The net cost is estimated at US$1.5/ha/yr, or $0.25/t CO‚-eq avoided. While approximately 22% of global peatlands are in protected areas (PAs), the report suggests an achievable protection range of 70–90% of remaining undrained peatlands, which could reduce emissions by 1.3–1.7 Gt CO‚-eq/yr. The analysis emphasizes the critical role of Indigenous peoples' lands, which contain an additional 186 Mha of peatlands, and advocates for secure land tenure and community-led governance to ensure permanence and avoid leakage.

Climate Central analysis shows that human-caused climate change significantly increased the number of days with maximum temperatures exceeding 90°F in West Africa's cocoa belt from 2015 to 2024. The most severe impacts occurred in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, where climate change added approximately 40 days of growth-limiting heat per year. These temperature extremes, combined with shifting rainfall patterns and pests, threaten global cocoa supplies, increase chocolate prices, and endanger the health and livelihoods of small-scale farmers.

Climate change has significantly increased the number of days with temperatures above 32°C in West Africa's cocoa belt, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. This excessive heat, especially during the main crop cycle (October-March), can reduce cacao harvest quantity and quality by hindering photosynthesis and increasing water stress. In 2024, 71% of analyzed cacao-producing areas across Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria experienced at least six additional weeks of such heat. Beyond temperature, production is threatened by erratic rainfall, the cacao swollen shoot virus (CSSV), smuggling, and illegal mining.

The author contends that following the U.S. lead in abandoning the Paris climate accord would be 'economically perilous' for countries like Indonesia. He highlights the continued global acceleration of electric vehicle and solar energy growth, and cites specific policy actions in Japan and South Korea as examples of proactive decarbonization. The text argues that U.S. clean energy deployment is driven by economic sense and private sector investment, which will persist regardless of federal government policy.

Indonesia aims to deploy 2 million electric cars and 12 million electric two-wheelers by 2030 to reduce carbon emissions and leverage its nickel reserves for battery production. To achieve this, the government implemented a VAT reduction (from 11% to 1%) for EVs meeting a 40% local content requirement and a 0% import duty for foreign manufacturers who commit to building domestic factories by 2026. While these policies have increased EV sales—with BYD alone accounting for half of total EV sales following the import policy—they have created market imbalances. Established players like Hyundai, which invested in charging infrastructure and local battery production, have seen sales drop and have responded by restricting public charging stations to their own vehicles. The document warns that conflicting incentives and low local content thresholds may lead to a temporary boom of imported vehicles rather than a robust domestic ecosystem.

The report identifies a substantial investment gap of approximately USD 146.4 billion to meet Indonesia's 2030 Enhanced Nationally Determined Contribution (ENDC) targets. While the government budget provides about one-third of the necessary funding, private financial institutions' contributions remain low, representing only 3% of their total investments. Key barriers include contradictory policies, such as fossil fuel subsidies outweighing climate spending, and a financing mismatch where commercial banks rely on short-term deposits for long-term, capital-intensive climate projects. The report recommends harmonizing sustainable finance policies through the Indonesia Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance (TKBI), enabling alternative instruments like sustainability-linked loans and carbon finance, and enhancing transparency via IFRS S1 and S2 disclosure standards.

The report identifies a 'triple gap'—planning, finance, and data—in the transition of global agrifood systems. Top-down analysis estimates an annual need of USD 1.1 trillion to align with a 1.5°C pathway, while bottom-up estimates from NDCs total only USD 201.5 billion. Current annual climate finance flows of USD 28.5 billion are severely insufficient, requiring a 40-fold increase to meet top-down needs. The report highlights significant underestimations in national planning and a critical lack of granular data, particularly regarding adaptation and private finance.

The Institute for Economic Justice argues that rigid fiscal rules are an ineffective tool for managing South Africa's debt, as they often lead to 'creative' accounting, limit democratic engagement, and fail to address the root cause of the crisis: high borrowing costs. Drawing on case studies from Brazil and Indonesia, the brief suggests that economic growth is more effective than numerical constraints in improving debt dynamics. The authors recommend focusing on reducing borrowing costs through Reserve Bank intervention and capital management, increasing revenue via taxes on high-income earners and wealth, and using fiscal policy to drive structural economic transformation and growth.

The document argues that environmentally harmful subsidies (EHS) exceed USD 2 trillion annually, creating perverse incentives that drive biodiversity loss and climate change. It proposes a theory of change based on the 'Multiple Streams and Policy Windows Framework'—defining the problem, identifying solutions, and creating political support—to catalyze reform. The playbook outlines 25 specific opportunities for philanthropic engagement, ranging from independent national assessments and technical support for Global South governments to the creation of 'first-mover clubs' of governments. It emphasizes that transparency alone is insufficient and that durable reform requires the co-development of repurposing strategies to support vulnerable groups and businesses transitioning away from harmful subsidies.

The document contains technical appendices for a report on reforming environmentally harmful subsidies (EHS). It introduces a 'Fiscal Pressure' indicator to identify countries where high debt and deficits create strong incentives for subsidy reform, and provides a stakeholder analysis mapping the influence and attitudes of businesses, governments, consumers, and civil society toward EHS reform.

The document identifies significant obstacles to Colombia's thermal coal transition, including high fiscal dependence on coal exports, limited subnational institutional capacity, and insufficient environmental regulations for mine closures. It highlights the vulnerability of the Cesar and La Guajira regions, where coal represents a major share of departmental income and employment. The brief argues that a just transition requires strengthening local governance, establishing a permanent transition fund, and ensuring inclusive planning that protects marginalized groups and the civic space.

The document analyzes the economic, political, and governance challenges of phasing out coal in Indonesia, emphasizing the need for multi-level coordination, economic diversification for affected workers, and the removal of coal subsidies to enable a just energy transition.