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The document argues that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries must implement coordinated national and regional strategies to decarbonise heavy industries like refining and ammonia production. It identifies four priority actions: cost-competitive policy design, targeted deployment in industrial clusters, shared financial risk schemes, and cross-border collaboration for infrastructure. The analysis highlights that CEE accounts for nearly 25% of EU hydrogen consumption, with Poland as the dominant user, and emphasizes that the lack of domestic regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage in Poland currently forces a reliance on more expensive export options.

The Clean Air Task Force outlines the EU's current reliance on Russian nuclear fuel, particularly for VVER reactors, and proposes strategies to enhance supply chain resilience through alternative suppliers, domestic production, and strategic international cooperation.

The briefing assesses the energy transition of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) region, noting that while some countries have reduced gas demand and integrated grids, Russian gas imports rose in 2024 for several members. It warns that planned expansions of LNG and pipeline capacity by 2030 risk creating stranded assets due to declining demand. The author recommends that the 10th Three Seas Summit focus on a 2027 Russian gas phase-out, the creation of a 'Transmission Highway' for clean power, and the development of regional energy hubs.

Small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) are factory-built reactors with capacities under 300 MW that offer potential for flexible, low-carbon power and industrial heat. While the Nuclear Energy Agency projects a global market of 375 GW by 2050 that could avoid 15 Gt of cumulative CO2 emissions, SMRs remain in the demonstration phase. Significant barriers include high costs—estimated by Wood Mackenzie at US$6,000 to US$8,000 per kilowatt—which far exceed those of solar and wind power, as well as regulatory hurdles, waste disposal issues, and long deployment timelines that may limit their near-term impact on the energy transition.

In 2024, global electricity generation reached new record highs for solar, wind, hydro, gas, and coal. Solar was the fastest-growing source, increasing by 474 TWh to reach a 6.9% share of the global mix, with China contributing 53% of this growth. Wind generation also hit a record of 2,494 TWh, though growth slowed due to weather conditions. Hydro rebounded to an all-time high of 4,416 TWh following 2023 droughts, largely driven by China. Nuclear generation grew by 2.5% to 2,768 TWh, but its global market share fell to a 45-year low of 9%. Gas and coal both reached record generation levels in 2024, though their shares of the global electricity mix declined to 22% and 34% respectively, as electricity demand grew faster than their production.

The report identifies a persistent presence of climate disinformation in French mainstream media, noting 128 certified cases over three months. It highlights a significant over-representation of such content in private media, particularly Sud Radio, and observes peaks in disinformation coinciding with major political events. The analysis also employs the CARDS framework to identify 373 instances of 'inaction discourse,' primarily targeting climate solutions and messengers. The authors call for increased environmental coverage, better journalist training, and stronger regulatory action by ARCOM.

The report finds that EU imports of Russian gas increased by 18% in 2024, despite a goal to phase them out by 2027. It highlights a significant misalignment between gas infrastructure expansion and stagnating demand, predicting that supply capacity will exceed demand by 131 bcm by 2030. The document argues that the EU is replacing one fossil fuel dependency with another via LNG, which exposes the region to price volatility and high emissions. It recommends legally binding phase-out targets, reduced gas demand across all sectors, and more efficient use of existing infrastructure to ensure energy security and climate alignment.

The report analyzes hydrogen consumption and production in the EU 27, finding that 84% of consumption is concentrated in refining and ammonia production. It argues that decarbonising existing industrial hydrogen production is a more immediate and necessary priority than nascent sectors like mobility. The analysis highlights that while the EU has a production capacity of 10.3 Mt/y, high energy costs and volatile gas prices have led to low utilisation rates and plant closures in the ammonia and steam cracker sectors.

The document critiques the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) for focusing on electricity infrastructure over economic diversification and worker needs. It argues that the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB) current inflation-targeting framework and operational independence hinder developmental goals. The author proposes a shift toward 'promotional' central banking, utilizing underexploited liquidity in the banking and retirement sectors—estimated at R52.41bn from banks and potentially R600bn from retirement funds via offshore limit reductions. Key recommendations include reforming the South African Green Finance Taxonomy (SAGFT), implementing mandatory climate risk disclosures, and using credit allocation tools such as targeted refinancing operations, green-differentiated capital requirements, and state investment banks.

In 2024, the EU experienced record growth in solar generation and capacity, with all member states seeing increases. However, the rapid expansion has led to more frequent zero or negative power prices and wider intraday price spreads. To manage this and maintain the trajectory toward 2030 targets, the report advocates for the accelerated rollout of clean flexibility tools, specifically battery storage, smart electrification, and grid modernization.

The document analyzes the strategic and ideological alignment between Benjamin Netanyahu's government and European far-right actors, such as Hungary's Viktor Orbán and the Netherlands' Geert Wilders. It argues that Israel uses these 'illiberal' allies to bypass EU consensus and legitimize its policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, while the European parties use the relationship to deflect accusations of antisemitism. This alliance is characterized as a 'quid-pro-quo' based on shared hostility toward Islam, multiculturalism, and international law, ultimately aiming to establish 'illiberal polypore states' that exploit democratic institutions for populist ends.

The document outlines the outcomes of a TSO roundtable held during the 2024 PCI Energy Days, focusing on the need for integrated energy hubs, increased connectivity for landlocked countries, the resolution of financing and regulatory hurdles, and the deployment of short-term flexibility tools to support the energy transition in Central and Eastern Europe.

The document outlines the structure of climate negotiations at COP29, listing various negotiating blocs such as the G77+China, EU, and AOSIS, while providing a glossary of terms and a calendar of thematic focus areas.

The document analyzes how 'plastic recycling claims'—including circular loop symbols and statements like '100% recyclable'—misrepresent the limited efficacy of plastic recycling. It highlights that 91% of global plastic waste was not recycled in 2019 and that soft plastics are particularly difficult to recycle, often ending up as fuel or incinerated. The briefing concludes that such claims deceive the 'average consumer' and undermine the waste hierarchy, urging regulators like the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) to require evidence based on 'real world conditions' to substantiate these claims.

Since 2023, Chinese firms have committed over US$100 billion in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) across at least 130 major cleantech transactions, spanning solar, wind, batteries, and new energy vehicles (NEVs). This 'going global' strategy is driven by domestic overcapacity, which has caused solar module prices to drop 60% and battery prices 50% year-on-year, and a need to circumvent trade barriers from the US and EU. The report highlights China's dominance in the global battery supply chain, where it holds over 80% of manufacturing capacity, and its expansion into markets like Morocco, Brazil, and Thailand. For Australia, the report notes that Chinese OFDI reached a multi-decade low of US$613 million in 2023, and argues that Australia should clarify its foreign investment rules to attract Chinese private capital for onshore value-adding in critical minerals and renewable energy infrastructure.

The EU is experiencing a surge in solar and wind power, which frequently exceeds demand during peak hours, leading to price volatility and negative electricity prices. While renewables are growing, the lack of system flexibility—such as battery storage and interconnectors—forces a continued reliance on fossil fuels during evenings and early mornings. The report highlights that by 2030, excess wind and solar power could reach 183 TWh across the EU, potentially saving €9 billion in annual gas costs if shifted effectively. It specifically notes Germany's role as a leader in battery capacity and suggests that further additions could significantly displace hard coal and gas. The document recommends removing regulatory barriers to co-location, implementing national flexibility strategies in National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), and establishing a comprehensive EU strategy for clean flexibility.

An attribution study on the September 2024 Central European floods finds that human-induced climate change roughly doubled the likelihood of such an event and increased its intensity by 7%. While improved forecasting and emergency management reduced fatalities compared to the 1997 and 2002 floods, the scale of the event overwhelmed infrastructure in several urban centres, causing damages estimated at several billion Euros.

The author contends that traditional engineering solutions like levees and dams are insufficient against increasing extreme rainfall and sea-level rise in Europe. The text highlights the failure of 'maladaptive responses' and advocates for nature-based solutions, such as floodplain restoration, while acknowledging the economic and systemic barriers to transitioning away from concrete-based infrastructure.

The document is a letter to the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture calling for a precautionary, ecosystem-based approach to setting 2025 fishing limits. The NGOs argue that the EU has failed its legal obligation to end overfishing by 2020 and that current scientific advice does not fully account for ecosystem integrity. They demand catch limits below ICES and STECF advice, full implementation of the western Mediterranean multiannual plan, the elimination of bycatch and discards, and increased transparency in decision-making to ensure long-term ocean health and climate mitigation capacity.

Agri-PV, the simultaneous use of land for food production and solar electricity, offers significant potential for Central Europe to increase renewable energy generation and improve farmer livelihoods. Analysis shows that Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia could deploy 180 GW of agri-PV, potentially tripling the region's annual renewable electricity production. While agri-PV can increase yields for certain crops like berries by up to 16%, it can also offset yield losses in shade-sensitive crops like wheat through electricity revenues. Despite this, Czechia is currently the only country in the region with agri-PV legislation, and the report recommends that other Central European governments introduce regulations to secure CAP subsidies and incentivize the transition.