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The document analyzes the limitations of both shareholder engagement and full divestment in the oil and gas sector, citing recent moves by Dutch pension funds PFZW and ABP. It argues that while divestment may not provide immediate financial pressure on companies, total withdrawal removes necessary levers of influence. Reclaim Finance proposes a strategy of stopping new capital injections (specifically new bonds) while using voting rights to block 'climaticide' strategies, including voting against director re-elections and dividend distributions.

Reclaim Finance argues that neither passive engagement nor complete divestment is sufficient to force oil and gas companies to align with the Paris Agreement. Instead, it advocates for a 'third way' where investors stop purchasing new bonds but retain shareholdings to vote against directors, manager remuneration, and dividends at 2024 annual general meetings. The organization highlights that 96% of oil and gas producing companies continue to open new fields and that record profits are being prioritized for shareholder remuneration over the energy transition.

The document analyzes COP 28 outcomes for Africa, noting a gap between high-level agreements and the actual financial resources provided for adaptation and loss and damage. While it highlights the historic agreement to transition away from fossil fuels and new food system initiatives, it argues that the scale of funding remains insufficient for Africa's urgent needs.

Reclaim Finance condemns TotalEnergies for distributing US$16.6 billion to shareholders in 2023 while continuing to prioritize oil and gas expansion. The organization calls on shareholders to vote against the reelection of directors, including Patrick Pouyanné, and against dividend allocations to push for a transition toward sustainable energy and emission reductions.

The author argues that the UK's 24 GW nuclear target by 2050 is unrealistic. Key barriers include the long lead times for nuclear projects (typically 15-20 years), the lack of mature, commercially available reactor technologies, and the difficulty of securing private investment for high-cost projects. The document highlights the failure of the EPR-1 design and the financial risks shifted to consumers under the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model. It concludes that nuclear power is too slow and expensive to contribute meaningfully to the UK's electricity decarbonisation goals of 2030 or 2035.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) argues that carbon capture and storage (CCS) is indispensable for Austria to achieve climate neutrality by 2050, particularly for hard-to-abate sectors like cement, lime, and steel. The document recommends that Austria set specific deployment targets, remove legal barriers to geological CO2 storage, and develop a strategic plan for operationalising storage sites by 2035. To address the 'chicken and egg' problem of infrastructure investment, CATF suggests 'oversizing' transport networks and establishing an aggregation platform to match CO2 sources with sinks. Financially, the document proposes the use of carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs) to bridge the gap between EU ETS prices and decarbonisation costs, while advocating for long-term market demand through near-zero carbon product standards. Finally, it emphasizes the need for proactive public engagement and inclusive stakeholder dialogues to build political and social support for CCS.

In 2023, EU fossil fuel generation fell to less than a third of the electricity mix (33%) for the first time, driven by a record 26% drop in coal generation. Wind and solar combined for 27% of EU electricity, with wind surpassing gas power for the first time. While solar capacity grew by 56 GW, wind generation growth remains inconsistent and below the 15% annual increase needed for REPowerEU targets. EU electricity demand fell by 3.4% in 2023 to its lowest level since 2001, though a rise of 2-3% is projected for 2024. To support this transition, the EU requires significant grid investments—estimated at €584 billion by 2030—and an increase in storage capacity to 200 GW by 2030 to manage variable renewable energy and reduce curtailment.

The document argues that carbon capture and storage (CCS) is essential for Europe to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, particularly for hard-to-abate industrial sectors like cement and steel. It details the technical processes of capture and geological storage, asserts that leakage risks are extremely low, and outlines current project developments in the North Sea region and across the EU. The text also addresses the economic viability of CCS, noting that while costs vary by industry, the technology is often the lowest-cost path for specific industrial decarbonisation and carbon dioxide removal (CDR).

The authors identify a category of 'risks of response' where climate policies trigger security dynamics, exemplified by widespread farmer protests across Europe. These protests, driven by grievances over fuel subsidies and environmental regulations, have escalated into violence and provided opportunities for far-right parties to foment instability. The text warns that this 'green backlash' could slow the transition and increase global security risks if not managed with better risk assessments and ameliorating measures.

The document argues that large-scale deployment of CCS is essential for Europe to reach climate neutrality by 2050, yet current draft NECPs show significant gaps in targets and planning. It provides a framework for Member States to assess storage capacity, map projects, engage stakeholders, and establish financing and regional cooperation for CO2 transport and storage networks.

The document argues that clean hydrogen should be treated as a 'precious molecule' and prioritised for 'no regrets' hard-to-abate industrial sectors rather than being deployed indiscriminately. It recommends that EU Member States move beyond a sole focus on renewable ('green') hydrogen to include other low-carbon pathways, such as nuclear ('pink') and natural gas with carbon capture ('blue'), to avoid resource constraints. The guide emphasises locating production close to end-users to minimise transport inefficiencies and suggests that hydrogen in transport be limited to heavy-duty trucking, aviation, and shipping, while light-duty vehicles should prioritise electrification. Finally, it advises leveraging EU and national support mechanisms to fund 'champion' projects across the entire value chain.

The document argues that superhot rock (SHR) energy—a subset of Engineered Geothermal Systems that accesses rock temperatures exceeding 400°C—could provide a zero-carbon, firm, and energy-dense power source available globally. It notes a significant gap in current EU planning, where only one country (Italy) mentions SHR in its draft NECP, despite 20 countries planning for geothermal energy. The guide recommends that Member States fund pilot demonstrations, map national SHR resources, contribute to a centralised EU geothermal data repository, develop national geothermal strategies, and create stakeholder collaboration platforms. It highlights that SHR systems can potentially produce up to ten times the energy of conventional geothermal wells and could support the production of clean hydrogen.

The document argues that SMRs can provide 'clean firm' power to decarbonize industrial systems and bolster energy security in the EU. It identifies that while 12 countries mention SMRs in draft NECPs and 7 plan investments, significant work is needed to improve these plans. The guide outlines five key recommendation areas: developing planning competencies (including techno-economic assessments and workforce studies), strengthening regional cooperation (such as joint licensing and a Joint Procurement Platform), enhancing financial frameworks (using contracts for difference and state aid), establishing national R&D and demonstration programmes, and creating industry-informed roadmaps. It specifically highlights the need for regulators to diversify competence beyond Light Water Reactors to evaluate advanced technologies like molten salt reactors.

The 2023 update shows minimal progress in climate commitments among the 70 largest PFIs, with only two institutions setting new targets. However, an analysis of smaller PFIs in emerging markets and developing economies reveals that institutional size is not a primary barrier to climate ambition; instead, government prioritization and national climate goals are the strongest drivers of engagement. The report highlights that banks with general development mandates tend to be more climate-ambitious than those with narrow sectoral mandates, though successful examples exist in infrastructure and agriculture.

Saudi Arabia was the world's largest arms importer between 2015 and 2019, relying heavily on the US and European allies for major weapon systems. While the Kingdom has attempted to diversify ammunition sources and develop a domestic defence industry under Vision 2030, it remains constrained by the need for interoperability with NATO-standard systems and a lack of an indigenous industrial base. The brief concludes that achieving full self-reliance would take decades, leaving the Kingdom vulnerable to the policy shifts of its primary suppliers.

Reclaim Finance argues that TotalEnergies' climate strategy is insufficient for a 1.5°C target, citing continued fossil fuel expansion and inadequate low-carbon investment. The document details the financial networks supporting the company, critiques the 'laxity' of French asset managers like Amundi, and proposes a comprehensive suite of regulatory and monetary reforms to redirect financial flows away from fossil fuels.

The document analyzes Russia's strategic use of public media (RT, Sputnik, TASS) and social media to expand its influence in Africa. It highlights the use of anti-imperialist rhetoric to appeal to African audiences and the deployment of 'troll farms' and local proxies to disseminate polarizing content. Case studies on Mali, Libya, and the Central African Republic illustrate how Russia combines digital influence with on-the-ground activities, such as funding local press and sponsoring cultural events, to present itself as a viable alternative to Western partners, despite operating with a limited budget.

The document argues for a rights-based approach to communication, distinguishing between the 'right to communicate' (the ability to speak) and the 'right to communication' (equitable access to infrastructure). It examines how alternative and community media serve as tools for resistance and identity formation for marginalized groups, including indigenous peoples in Colombia and Mexico and Palestinians facing communication blackouts. The text also analyzes the impact of digital platforms, algorithmic censorship, and state control on freedom of expression, while advocating for 'communicative justice' and structural media reforms to dismantle corporate and state monopolies.

Reclaim Finance argues that Crédit Agricole's public commitment to renewable energy is insufficient without a clear plan to reduce fossil fuel financing. The organization highlights that the bank remains a top financier of TotalEnergies and continues to support fossil fuel developers, such as Eni. Reclaim Finance specifically calls for the bank to adopt a 6:1 financing ratio of sustainable to fossil energies by 2030 and to cease its advisory role in the Papua LNG project, which involves opening new gas fields.

The GCF Board's 37th meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, resulted in the approval of 15 funding proposals totaling USD 736.4 million and the adoption of the 2024 administrative budget of USD 112.4 million. Key strategic outcomes include the endorsement of the Readiness Strategy 2024–2027, which allocates USD 501.5 million to enhance country ownership and direct access, and the confirmation of USD 9.3 billion in pledges for the second formal replenishment (GCF-2). The Board also established an ad hoc Committee on Human Resources Matters to address systemic compensation and policy issues. Significant discussions occurred regarding the potential for a regional presence to reduce operational bottlenecks and the ongoing debate over the financing of results-based payments for REDD+, which was deferred to the next meeting.