Médias russes et africains : l’exercice du « Soft Power »

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The document analyzes Russia's strategic use of public media (RT, Sputnik, TASS) and social media to expand its influence in Africa. It highlights the use of anti-imperialist rhetoric to appeal to African audiences and the deployment of 'troll farms' and local proxies to disseminate polarizing content. Case studies on Mali, Libya, and the Central African Republic illustrate how Russia combines digital influence with on-the-ground activities, such as funding local press and sponsoring cultural events, to present itself as a viable alternative to Western partners, despite operating with a limited budget.

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  • Russia utilizes state-funded media outlets, specifically Sputnik, RT, and TASS, to position itself as an alternative information source in Africa, leveraging anti-imperialist rhetoric to counter Western narratives.
  • The Kremlin has adapted to the digital age by using social media to sow doubt and polarize audiences, often collaborating with local African actors to hide the origin of its influence operations.
  • In the Central African Republic, Russia employs a 'hybrid' approach, combining digital campaigns with physical soft power tools such as the production of the film 'Touriste', funding local press, and sponsoring social events like the 'Miss Bangui' beauty pageant.
  • Russia has 'franchised' its disinformation model by using local proxies, as evidenced by a Russian-linked troll farm discovered in Accra, Ghana, which created accounts pretending to be based in the United States to influence global audiences.
  • Russian influence operations in Mali and Libya have focused on delegitimizing Western presence, specifically targeting France in Mali and the UN-backed government in Libya.
  • Despite its strategic efforts, Russia's actual financial commitment to Africa is low; for instance, of the 62.1 million dollars Russia gave in 2020, only 4 million dollars went to Africa.

Cite the original document

APA
Clifford, C., & Gruzd, S. (2024). Médias russes et africains : l’exercice du « Soft Power ». South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SAIIA_PI_150_Medias-russes-et-africains-Soft-Power.pdf
Chicago
Clifford, Cayley, and Steven Gruzd. Médias russes et africains : l’exercice du « Soft Power ». South African Institute of International Affairs, 2024. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SAIIA_PI_150_Medias-russes-et-africains-Soft-Power.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Clifford |first1=Cayley |last2=Gruzd |first2=Steven |title=Médias russes et africains : l’exercice du « Soft Power » |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=February 2024 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SAIIA_PI_150_Medias-russes-et-africains-Soft-Power.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{clifford2024mdias, author = {Clifford, Cayley and Gruzd, Steven}, title = {{Médias russes et africains : l’exercice du « Soft Power »}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2024}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/SAIIA_PI_150_Medias-russes-et-africains-Soft-Power.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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