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The submission argues that voluntary measures are insufficient for industrial decarbonisation and proposes a phased transition to mandatory embodied emissions reporting by 2029. It recommends a life-cycle assessment (LCA) based methodology, the integration of green procurement into Government Buying Standards, and a 'twin-track' expansion strategy prioritising construction-related sectors for immediate action while developing frameworks for complex sectors like chemicals.

The report argues that interconnectors are critical for European energy security, having prevented three major blackouts in the last five years and providing a lifeline to Ukraine and Moldova during Russian aggression. It highlights that 55% of Europe's power system remains at risk due to limited import options, with Spain, Ireland, and Finland being particularly exposed. The document also details the vulnerability of infrastructure to sabotage, citing nine incidents in the Baltic Sea, and calls for accelerated deployment of new capacity and strengthened security measures to protect the grid from hybrid warfare.

Reclaim Finance reports that asset managers are bypassing European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) guidelines on ESG fund naming to continue investing in fossil fuel developers. Analysis of 190 French-domiciled or managed funds shows nearly half changed names to avoid regulatory constraints. The document attributes these loopholes to lobbying by firms like BlackRock and Amundi and warns that similar gaps may be introduced into the revised Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR).

Reclaim Finance reports that asset managers are using regulatory loopholes in ESMA's fund-naming guidelines to avoid excluding fossil fuel investments while retaining ESG-related names. The organization highlights that major financial firms lobbied for less stringent criteria and warns that similar lobbying regarding the SFDR regulation could institutionalize greenwashing. Reclaim Finance demands a strict ban on investments in new fossil fuel projects for any fund claiming to be sustainable, ESG, or transition-focused.

The document argues that common myths about renewable energy are outdated and unsupported by evidence. It provides data showing that solar and wind are now the cheapest sources of new power generation, with costs falling up to 90% since 2010. It asserts that modern grids can manage intermittency through storage and diversification, and that renewables have significantly lower impacts on wildlife, public health, and waste compared to fossil fuels. Specific case studies, such as the April 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout, are used to demonstrate that grid instability is often caused by technical planning issues rather than the presence of renewables.

Between June and August 2025, human-induced climate change significantly increased global temperatures, with at least 22% of the global population experiencing temperatures at Climate Shift Index (CSI) level 2 or higher every day. Nearly 955 million people faced 30 or more 'risky heat days' added by climate change, with the highest impact seen in Asia. The report also documents severe climate-driven events, including record rainfall and flooding in China, India, Pakistan, and the U.S., as well as historic wildfires in Europe and Canada.

The global economy consumes approximately 100 billion metric tons of resources annually, with 75% coming from non-renewable sources. While the European Union leads in circular economy policy, global resource productivity has stalled since 2000, and the world must reduce per capita material consumption from 12.6 metric tons in 2022 to below 5 metric tons by 2050 to ensure sustainability. Significant disparities exist in consumption, with the top 25% of the population using 52% of the world's resources. Despite some progress in municipal waste recycling—averaging 35% across OECD countries—and the regulation of single-use products in 75 countries, systemic changes in product design and corporate monitoring are required to decouple economic growth from resource extraction.

The report argues that major steel companies, including ArcelorMittal, Nippon Steel, and POSCO, overlook methane emissions from coal mining in their Scope 3 disclosures. It highlights that these emissions, particularly from 'gassiest' Australian mines, significantly increase the climate impact of blast furnace-based steelmaking and are not mitigated by downstream technologies like hydrogen injection or CCUS.

The report 'Methane Unmasked' by Changing Markets Foundation examines methane leakages at biogas plants in Denmark, focusing on the Nature Energy (Shell) plant in Videbæk and the Tønder plant. Using optical gas imaging and trace gas analysers, the investigation found significant methane releases at the Videbæk plant, including suspected intentional venting from a compressor unit stack. It also identified high methane concentrations near the Tønder plant, though the exact source could not be pinpointed. The report argues that methane leakage is a systemic problem in the biogas industry that can negate climate benefits, and it calls for stronger EU-wide regulations as current Danish third-party audits are deemed inadequate.

ClientEarth argues that CSOs in the EU, particularly those focused on environment and climate, face a deteriorating environment characterized by shrinking civic space, legal harassment (SLAPPs), and financial insecurity. The document criticizes the European Commission for restricting public access to documents and prioritizing corporate interests in 'strategic dialogues' over civil society. It calls for a binding framework for civil dialogue, systemic consultation at all legislative stages, and increased funding for protection mechanisms like the Aarhus Rapid Response Mechanism. Specific national examples of repression are cited in Poland, France, Italy, Germany, and Hungary, while Finland and Denmark are noted for positive engagement models.

The briefing details the 2024 revisions to the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED), focusing on expanding access to justice, strengthening non-compliance and suspension mechanisms, increasing penalties, and introducing a new compensation right for health damages. It emphasizes alignment with the Aarhus Convention and provides recommendations for Member States to ensure these provisions are effective and dissuasive in practice.

The document examines Nigeria's vulnerability to global energy transitions due to its heavy reliance on oil and gas exports, high production costs, and limited economic diversification. It highlights the risks of reduced government revenue and job losses while identifying opportunities in critical minerals, natural gas as a transition fuel, and non-oil sector growth.

The briefing argues that nuclear power is an impractical solution for near-term climate targets in Europe and Australia due to systemic delays, high costs, and a high rate of project cancellations. In Europe, utility-scale wind and solar capacity under construction or in pre-construction outweighs nuclear by fourteen to one, and solar generation surpassed nuclear in the EU for the first time in mid-2025. In Australia, the document concludes that nuclear is unlikely to replace coal by 2038 because construction timelines—estimated by CSIRO to be at least five years longer than the global average—would require groundbreaking by the end of 2025. Globally, the Global Nuclear Power Tracker indicates that 38% of all proposed nuclear capacity (566 GW) has been cancelled.

The Clean Air Task Force urges the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to remove its funding ban on nuclear energy to help Asia-Pacific economies meet rising energy demands with clean, firm power. The document highlights that while countries like China and South Korea have successfully used nuclear energy for industrialization, other emerging economies in the region have failed to implement programs due to financing and expertise gaps. It specifically identifies the Ninh Thuận projects in Vietnam and the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant in the Philippines as immediate opportunities for ADB intervention. The author recommends that ADB lift its ban, build internal expertise, create dedicated funds for large and small modular reactors, and prioritize risk-sharing with private and government investors.

International climate finance for Brazil grew by 84% between the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 biennia, reaching an average of US$ 5.1 billion per year. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and was characterized by a shift toward commercial financing instruments. While Western Europe, led by France, was the largest regional provider, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions—received only 11% of the total finance. Public institutions provided 58% of the funds, with multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) playing a dominant role, while private finance grew fourfold to reach 42% of the total.

The document outlines the existential risk posed by the approximately 12,000 nuclear warheads held by nine nations. It explains the physics of fission and fusion weapons and analyzes the catastrophic effects of detonations, ranging from immediate blast and radiation deaths in urban centers to global climate disruption. The guide highlights the instability of 'launch on warning' postures and the potential for 'nuclear winter' and ozone depletion, arguing that even regional conflicts would cause global famine and societal collapse.

International climate finance for Brazil averaged US$ 5.1 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from the 2019–2020 period. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, particularly solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private capital from commercial financial institutions. While Western Europe was the largest regional provider, the report highlights a stark imbalance in sectoral allocation: the AFOLU sector, responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions, received only 11% of total finance. The majority of funds were earmarked for mitigation (80%) and delivered via commercial debt and equity, while grants and concessional finance declined by 43%.

International climate finance to Brazil averaged R$ 26.6 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from 2019–2020. Growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private commercial financing. While Western Europe, led by France, was the primary source, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's emissions—received only 11% of total funding, mostly through public multilateral sources.

The report examines how G20 nations, which generate approximately two-thirds of global plastic waste, can utilize extended producer responsibility (EPR) to combat marine plastic pollution. Through a scoping review of 100 sources, it identifies a disparity in effectiveness between mandatory and voluntary EPR schemes, noting that mandatory systems generally achieve higher recycling collection rates. The document provides a detailed mapping of EPR regulations across G20 members and proposes a multi-level approach combining legislative strengthening, market incentives for recycled plastics, technological innovation in ecodesign, and the formal integration of informal waste workers to prevent plastic leakage into the oceans.

Two years after the COP28 agreement to triple global renewable capacity by 2030, national targets remain largely stagnant. As of July 2025, the global sum of national targets has increased by only 2% since COP28, reaching 7.4 TW, which is significantly below the 11 TW required to meet the tripling goal. Only 22 countries have updated their targets, with the majority of these being EU member states revising plans through the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) process. Most non-EU updates occurred through routine planning cycles rather than as a direct response to COP pledges. Major electricity markets, including the US, Russia, and Canada, have either not set explicit targets or are unlikely to update them in 2025.