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The report evaluates the integration of gender perspectives in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) globally, noting a shift from viewing women solely as vulnerable groups to recognizing them as agents of change. It highlights improvements in the use of gender analysis, institutional coordination involving gender ministries, and the development of gender-specific capacities. Practical examples from countries like Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Suriname illustrate the application of visual storytelling, formal inter-ministerial agreements, and gender-disaggregated monitoring systems to ensure equitable climate resilience.

The report evaluates the integration of gender considerations in National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) globally, noting an increase in the use of gender-responsive language, gender analysis, and the inclusion of gender ministries in institutional frameworks. It highlights specific progress in capacity building and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), while providing case studies from countries like the Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Marshall Islands, and Suriname to illustrate best practices in gender-responsive climate adaptation.

The AfCFTA has the potential to generate USD 3.4 trillion in GDP and lift over 100 million people out of poverty by 2040, with primary gains expected in manufacturing and services. However, significant disparities in factor markets—including labour skills, technology adoption, and financial capacity—exist across the continent, with Eastern and Southern Africa generally possessing higher capacities than Central and Western Africa. The document highlights risks associated with heavy reliance on non-African financing, such as the EU-funded Africa Trade Observatory, and urges member states to leverage domestic capital markets and sovereign wealth funds. It further emphasizes that political stability and the empowerment of regional bodies are essential to protect private sector investment in cross-border infrastructure, which the World Bank estimates requires USD 47.6 billion annually.

The report argues that subsidiarity in the African Union (AU) is currently used as a political tool rather than a clear legal principle, leading to competition and inconsistency between the AU and regional mechanisms (RMs). It highlights that the lack of operational definitions and contradictory legal frameworks—such as the 2007 MoU and the PSC Protocol—creates confusion in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The authors suggest shifting the focus from a division of competences to a model of complementarity, where regions act as 'first responders' while the AU remains the 'primary actor'. Key recommendations include establishing a comprehensive legal, policy, and financial framework, utilizing the AU Peace Fund for alignment, and creating operational liaison offices between the AU Commission and RMs.

The document analyzes the resurgent roles of China and Russia in Africa since 2000. China's influence is primarily economic, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative and long-term infrastructure investments, while Russia's approach is more opportunistic, focusing on mining, arms exports, and the deployment of private military contractors in fragile states. While the two powers coordinate on challenging Western norms and supporting non-interference in the UN Security Council, they maintain a 'competitive partnership' characterized by limited strategic coordination in security and economics, and occasional competition for commercial contracts in countries like Zimbabwe.

Russia is attempting to leverage historical Soviet-era ties and new institutional frameworks, such as the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum, to increase its presence in Zambia and Tanzania. While there is significant high-level political engagement and cooperation in nuclear energy and military sales, the report finds that Russia's economic footprint remains limited compared to China and other global powers. Key efforts include the promotion of nuclear research centers in Zambia and the use of 'debt-for-development' schemes, though the latter have seen little success in these two countries. The report also notes the use of the COVID-19 pandemic for geopolitical gain through vaccine diplomacy and targeted tourism to Zanzibar.

The report examines the challenges in operationalizing the AU Peace Fund, specifically disagreements over contribution scales among member states. It warns against the increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group in Africa, citing human rights risks. Additionally, it advocates for a revamp of the AU's PCRD approach to better address post-authoritarian transitions and the role of women in peacebuilding, using The Gambia as a model for small, expert-led deployments.

The document investigates whether Russia exerts significant influence over African states in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by analyzing voting patterns between 2014 and 2020. It argues that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as statistical evidence shows that African member states remain more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) and are largely independent of Russian vetoes and abstentions. While the A3 have increasingly sought to present unified positions on African peace and security issues, their voting behavior on non-African files shows a declining coincidence with Russian positions over time.

The document investigates whether Russia exerts significant influence over African states in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by analyzing voting patterns between 2014 and 2020. It argues that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as statistical evidence shows little coordination and a trend of increasing divergence. While the A3 are increasingly presenting unified positions on African issues, their voting behavior remains more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) than with Russia. The brief concludes that Russia's role as a 'loud dissenter' has not translated into a strategic alliance with the African grouping.

The P-REC Aggregation Fund monetizes Peace Renewable Energy Credits (P-RECs)—a high-quality type of International Renewable Energy Certificate (I-REC) with peacebuilding co-benefits—to provide upfront capital to renewable energy developers in fragile states. By aggregating these certificates and selling them to impact-seeking corporations (such as RE100 members), the Fund aims to provide developers with approximately 10% of construction costs, thereby unlocking further infrastructure finance. The report models a 13-year proof-of-concept phase with a USD 10.25 million fund size, projecting the generation of 812,116 P-RECs and the avoidance of approximately 658,000 tCO2e of emissions.

The report examines the crisis of missing persons in Africa, documenting nearly 44,000 cases through the ICRC as of 2020. It identifies armed conflict, other situations of violence, and migration as primary drivers, noting that men and children are disproportionately affected. Families face severe psychosocial trauma, economic hardship, and legal hurdles due to a lack of domestic frameworks for declaring absence. The document advocates for the establishment of national information bureaus, improved medico-legal capacity for body identification, and the integration of missing persons into transitional justice processes.

The authors contend that environmental degradation and climate change are fundamental drivers of food insecurity and conflict. They highlight how resource competition in regions like the Sahel and Yemen fuels violence and extremism, while pointing to natural farming successes in India as a model for resilience. The document recommends that international security institutions acknowledge climate security risks to effectively address stability and displacement.

The report argues that the Central African Republic remains trapped in a cycle of violence despite numerous peace agreements, most recently the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation. It finds that the 2019 agreement is untenable because key provisions, such as the creation of mixed special security units (MSSUs) and an inclusive government, have failed to deter armed groups from continuing violence and controlling territory. The author highlights a 'war economy' where armed groups and some government officials benefit from instability and the illicit exploitation of resources. Furthermore, the report suggests that heavy reliance on international humanitarian aid has inadvertently reduced state responsibility and created local resentment. It recommends a comprehensive plan involving the African Union, ECCAS, and the UN that focuses on rebuilding the economic fabric, securing borders through regional cooperation with Chad, Sudan, and South Sudan, and establishing time-bound objectives for self-reliance.

The report argues that preventing future pandemics requires a systems-based approach to stop zoonotic spillover at its source. It identifies the 'wildlife value chain'—from tropical deforestation frontiers to urban markets—as the primary driver of risk, where human, livestock, and wildlife interactions facilitate pathogen mutation and transmission. The framework proposes a 'Planetary Health Agenda' that integrates conservation, public health, and sustainable food systems, with specific action plans for Southeast Asia, Central Africa, and South America to mitigate both current and emerging risks.

The transition to low-carbon technologies is highly mineral-intensive, requiring an estimated 3 billion tons of minerals and metals to achieve a below 2°C future. This demand increases the risk of deforestation and fragmentation of intact forest landscapes (IFLs), particularly in the Amazon and Congo Basin. In the Amazon, mining contributes up to 9% of IFL area loss, while in the Congo Basin, the demand for cobalt for batteries drives exploration in high-forest-cover areas. Analysis shows a gap in corporate and government governance, with only a minority of assessed companies adopting specific forest-related commitments and 78% of state and regional governments lacking forest management plans that directly address mining-related deforestation.

The document argues that the creation of the African Union's Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (DPAPS) was primarily a financial cost-cutting exercise rather than a strategic move toward integrated crisis response. It identifies critical gaps in coordination between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), noting a risk that military and reactive approaches will continue to be prioritized over political and preventive diplomacy. The authors recommend establishing standard operating procedures, creating a strategic coordination unit (possibly a Chief of Staff), and harmonizing funding instruments to ensure sustainable support for conflict prevention. Politically, the brief emphasizes the need for a clear legal definition of subsidiarity between the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and increased engagement of the AUC Chairperson in Peace and Security Council (PSC) proceedings.

The NAP Global Network's 2020-2021 report highlights a shift toward short-term technical assistance via its Country Support Hub and a focus on transitioning from adaptation planning to implementation. Key achievements include supporting 20 countries with their first Adaptation Communications (ADCOMs), facilitating peer learning on gender-responsive action and conflict-sensitive planning, and developing knowledge products on climate and disaster risk finance and insurance (CDRFI). The Network's 2025 strategy emphasizes enhancing monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) systems and elevating underrepresented voices, particularly women, in adaptation decision-making.

The report analyzes Sweden's 2017–2018 term on the UN Security Council, examining how a small state can influence the body's outcomes regarding Women, Peace and Security (WPS). It details Sweden's strategic approach—rooted in its feminist foreign policy—to move WPS from a thematic 'add-on' to 'core Council business' by integrating actionable language into regular resolutions, particularly those concerning peacekeeping and political mission mandates. The authors provide a framework for assessing the impact of elected members (E10) through criteria of frequency, clarity, and priority of resolution language, while outlining the tactical maneuvering required to navigate P5 power dynamics and UNSC working methods.

The report identifies 24 deforestation fronts across Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania, where over 43 million hectares of forest were lost between 2004 and 2017. It argues that while commercial agriculture remains the dominant direct driver, indirect pressures such as population growth, dietary shifts toward meat, and weak governance amplify forest loss. The analysis evaluates a range of responses, from area-based protections and indigenous land rights to commodity-specific certifications and REDD+ frameworks, concluding that no single approach is sufficient and that integrated, context-specific solutions are required to halt deforestation.

The document finds that African LICs' economic responses to COVID-19 were modest and suboptimal compared to developed nations, primarily due to pre-pandemic structural weaknesses such as high debt, inflation, and limited fiscal space. While expansionary monetary policy was the most common tool, fiscal stimulus was generally low (1% to 2% of GDP), with exceptions like Senegal, Niger, and Mozambique. The brief highlights a significant financing gap in donor support and argues that recovery requires a shift toward data-driven policy, increased digital and financial inclusion, and the independence of monetary and debt management authorities.