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The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) aims to reduce the EU's role in global deforestation by requiring sustainable sourcing of commodities like cattle, cocoa, and wood. However, the regulation has faced strong opposition from producer nations in the Global South, who describe it as 'regulatory imperialism' and a 'discriminatory and punitive unilateral benchmarking system'. These countries argue that the EUDR ignores national laws and shifts the financial burden of compliance onto producers, with Brazil estimating risks to exports worth 15 billion dollars and Indonesia facing potential losses of seven billion dollars. Internal EU political pressure has led to the regulation's postponement to the end of 2025 and the introduction of a 'no-risk' category, which critics warn could create loopholes for deforestation-linked products. The document further notes that some countries are redirecting exports to markets with less stringent requirements, such as China and Africa. It concludes that the EU must involve affected nations in policy drafting and prioritize reducing domestic consumption of high-impact products to achieve genuine sustainability.

Analysis of data from the Global Trade Alert database indicates that climate-related industrial policies in major trading economies often trigger 'echo' effects, where subsidy awards and import restrictions by one nation lead to similar responses from others within 6 to 24 months. The study finds that the EU-27 reacts almost every time to Chinese and US moves in net-zero sectors, while Chinese industrial policy support most frequently elicits import curb reactions from both the EU-27 and the USA. These patterns raise concerns regarding tit-for-tat trade conflicts and market access risks, suggesting a need for greater international alignment and transparency in supply-side interventions for the low-carbon transition.

ClientEarth asserts that the EU-Mercosur Partnership Agreement undermines the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) by allowing Mercosur countries to influence EU law enforcement and by creating a dispute settlement mechanism that could be used to challenge EUDR implementation. The organization warns that these concessions may force EU Member States to act inconsistently with their legal obligations to ensure deforestation-free imports.

The document discusses the need for lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) and low-income countries (LICs) to optimize their limited public spending on food and agriculture. It highlights that many sub-Saharan African nations fail to meet the Maputo goal of allocating 10% of national budgets to these sectors and often employ trade policies that implicitly penalize farmers to protect poor consumers. To address this, the FAO's Policy Monitoring and Analysis of Food and Agriculture (SAPAA) program uses a Pareto-optimality tool to help governments reallocate budgets across measures such as irrigation, seed subsidies, and rural electrification. A study of six sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda) suggests that optimizing budgets for 2025-2030 could create nearly one million non-farm rural jobs, lift 2.8 million people out of poverty, and enable 16 million more people to afford a healthy diet by 2030 without increasing total spending.

The paper examines India's agricultural subsidy regime, highlighting the role of the Minimum Support Price (MSP) and the Public Distribution System (PDS) in ensuring food security for millions. It details the growth of input subsidies for fertilizers, electricity, and irrigation, which reached USD 48 billion in 2022-2023. While acknowledging criticisms regarding market distortion, budget pressure, and environmental degradation, the author argues that these subsidies are vital for small farmers and rural stability, especially given the pressures of global trade and the limitations of current banking infrastructure for direct income transfers.

The document argues that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is essential for reversing the marginalisation of African countries in global trade, with the potential to generate $450 billion in additional income by 2035 and lift 30 million people out of absolute poverty. However, full implementation has been delayed since January 2021 due to resource constraints, debt distress in over 50% of African countries, and fears of tariff revenue losses. To address this, the AfCFTA Secretariat introduced the AfCFTA Implementation Review Mechanism (AFIRM) in July 2024. The author suggests that AFIRM should move away from a narrow focus on compliance and instead adopt the broader, transparency-based approach of the WTO's Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). The TPRM is credited with enhancing adherence through peer pressure and factual reporting without being a tool for dispute settlement, a model that could reduce resistance among AfCFTA state parties.

The document argues that Africa-EU and Africa-Germany relations are still defined by 'coloniality', manifesting as power imbalances that marginalise African agency. It critiques the EU's security-development nexus and the 'Samoa Agreement' for prioritising European interests, and examines German development aid through the GIZ as often intrusive or tokenistic. The author highlights the exploitation of raw materials and the use of intelligence services to acquire indigenous medicines as contemporary colonial practices. To decolonise, the paper recommends respecting African demands on trade and resource beneficiation, ending the 'Europeanisation' of security missions, and shifting from development aid to industrialisation projects.

Trase's co-directors criticize proposed EPP amendments to the EUDR, specifically the introduction of a "no risk" country category. They argue that the criteria for this category—such as stable net forest area—are scientifically flawed and could mask significant deforestation, create legal uncertainty regarding WTO rules, and introduce loopholes that undermine the regulation's effectiveness.

The document argues that the EU's Circular Material Use Rate has stagnated, increasing only from 10.7% in 2010 to 11.5% in 2022, necessitating a shift from waste management to direct resource-use reduction. It calls for the appointment of a dedicated European Commissioner for Circular Economy to oversee binding resource-use targets, fiscal shifts from labour to raw material extraction, and the integration of circular criteria into trade policies like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. The authors advocate for a 'Circular Single Market' to reduce geopolitical vulnerabilities and dependence on primary materials, alongside strengthened Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) frameworks and the use of public procurement as an accelerator for circularity. Additionally, the letter emphasizes the role of local and regional authorities, who are responsible for over 70% of Green Deal implementation, and the need to align funding with the top tiers of the waste hierarchy: prevention, re-use, and recycling.

The document asserts that LDCs require increased investment in agriculture to enhance productivity and food security. It identifies that current WTO rules, specifically the Agreement on Agriculture's Article 6.2 (Development Box), the Green Box, and the Amber Box, provide policy space for public investment. Furthermore, it suggests that new rules—such as commitments from developed and large developing countries to reduce trade-distorting Amber Box support for products like cotton and rice—could attract private investment and improve LDCs' access to international agri-food markets.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, first established in 1998, is likely to end by March 2026. This expiration could lead to a fragmented global regulatory landscape, increased costs for consumers and businesses, and a shift toward regional trade agreements. While developing nations argue that the moratorium limits their policy space and public revenue, the authors suggest that the lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions' complicates the transition and that a multilateral agreement remains the most stable path for digital trade.

The WTO's moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, in place since 1998, is likely to end by March 2026 due to opposition from developing countries seeking to recover lost tax revenues and maintain policy space for national industrialization. The authors argue that the end of this global rule would lead to a fragmented 'mosaic' of regional and bilateral trade agreements with inconsistent definitions of 'electronic transmissions,' potentially increasing costs for consumers and creating barriers for digital service providers. While some members argue that the moratorium hinders their ability to support domestic digital industries, the authors suggest that alternative taxes, such as VAT, could generate revenue without the trade-distorting effects of customs duties. The document highlights a critical lack of a common definition for 'electronic transmissions,' which has led to divergent revenue loss estimates—ranging from 280 million USD globally (OECD) to nearly 10 billion USD annually for developing countries (UNCTAD).

The research paper argues that German-African industrial relations are underperforming due to a skewed German perception of Africa as a crisis-ridden region rather than a diverse set of economic opportunities. It highlights the growth of several African economies and the potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), while noting that German business engagement remains low and government strategies are often uncoordinated and paternalistic. The authors recommend that Germany replace aid with trade and investment, particularly in green hydrogen, and that African governments increase transparency and infrastructure to attract foreign direct investment.

The document highlights the tension between global trade and agricultural sustainability, noting that while trade is essential for food security, it can exacerbate deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions. It argues that while individual governments can implement sustainable trade tools, collective action through the WTO would increase effectiveness. The author suggests several avenues for this cooperation, including reinvigorating existing committees, utilizing the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD), or adopting a dedicated dialogue proposed by Brazil.

The document analyzes the 'stabilized text' of the JSI e-commerce agreement, which aims to establish a global benchmark for digital trade rules. It details enabling regulatory obligations, a moratorium on customs duties for electronic transmissions, and specific flexibilities for developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs), such as extended implementation timelines and technical assistance. The author highlights significant challenges, including the low participation of LDCs and African nations, disagreements among key members like the US and China, and a broader legal debate over whether plurilateral agreements can be formally incorporated into the WTO's consensus-based treaty system.

In a speech delivered on 4 July 2024, WTO Deputy Director-General Jean-Marie Paugam outlines the evolving relationship between the WTO and environmental protection. He notes a paradigm shift where climate change is now actively disrupting trade, citing examples like the Panama Canal drought. While the WTO has made progress through the 2022 Ministerial Declaration and the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement, Paugam warns that uncoordinated national actions—such as the nearly 70 carbon tax schemes in development and varying green steel standards—risk fragmenting world trade. He advocates for a "reglobalization" approach that combines green industrialization with trade cooperation, suggesting the WTO may need to adopt new rule-making models, including plurilateral commitments or non-binding frameworks similar to the Paris Agreement, to remain relevant.

The report outlines ten considerations for the design of trade-related circular economy policies and measures (TrCEMs), emphasizing the need for international cooperation to avoid regulatory fragmentation. It highlights the role of the WTO, ISO, and multilateral environmental agreements in aligning definitions and standards. The document specifically addresses the challenges faced by developing countries, such as the need for technical assistance and the risk of a 'circular divide,' and suggests mechanisms like extended producer responsibility (EPR) fee transfers to manage end-of-life products in importing nations.

The document examines how the competition between the US, China, and Russia affects African states, noting a shift toward non-alignment and the diversification of international relations to avoid becoming geopolitical pawns. It argues that African agency can be strengthened by empowering the African Union (AU), leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and demanding partnerships based on mutual benefit rather than great-power rivalry. The Lobito Corridor is cited as a model where competing interests can coexist to provide tangible regional benefits.

The research paper examines the role of vertical industrial policies in Africa, contrasting them with horizontal policies and global value chain (GVC) theories. It highlights how Nigeria and Morocco successfully developed their cement sectors through targeted government interventions, while noting that replicating these specific tools in other sectors, such as sugar and tomato paste in Nigeria, has failed due to different raw material coordination needs.

The report examines the strategic importance of critical raw materials (CRMs) for OACPS member states, highlighting their significant global production shares in minerals like cobalt, platinum-group metals, and manganese. It identifies a critical gap in local beneficiation capacities, noting that most CRMs are exported as raw ores, which results in lost economic value. The document analyzes the impact of new industrial policies from the US, EU, and China—such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act—which emphasize reshoring and 'friendshoring' and may conflict with OACPS industrialization goals. It concludes that OACPS countries must move beyond extractive 'pit-to-port' models through regional cooperation, strategic partnerships, and robust regulatory frameworks to maximize socio-economic benefits while managing environmental and social risks.