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The document argues that Indonesia's long-term Just Energy Transition program will require funding likely exceeding USD 200 billion over 10 to 15 years, far surpassing the USD 20 billion committed via the I-JETP. It proposes a "3+1" strategy to mobilize capital from multilateral development banks, international and domestic private capital, and the domestic public sector, including state-owned enterprises and private mining companies. While international liquidity is deemed sufficient to meet I-JETP targets, the report identifies the lack of bankable clean energy projects as the primary obstacle, calling for increased effort from the International Partners Group (IPG) and the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) to build a project pipeline.

The report estimates that annual climate finance needs will rise to USD 6.2 trillion by 2030 and USD 7.3 trillion by 2050 to achieve Net Zero, while tracked global finance only surpassed USD 1 trillion for the first time in 2022. Transport and energy systems represent the largest investment needs, requiring at least USD 3.2 trillion and USD 2.1 trillion annually, respectively. The study highlights a significant disparity in finance distribution, with 75% of global spend concentrated in East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and North America. It argues that public finance must act as a catalyst to mobilize private capital, particularly in developing economies where the cost of capital is significantly higher. While private sector commitments are growing—such as the 30 largest banks pledging USD 870 billion annually—the report notes that asset managers and owners have been slower to set quantifiable targets. Key recommendations include aligning stakeholder policies, supporting non-commercially viable technologies like CCUS and green hydrogen, and implementing just transition frameworks.

The Capital Mobilization Roadmap proposes four high-impact areas for reform to accelerate private investment in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). It suggests creating a standardized credit guarantee facility and reforming capital allocation rules to address credit risk. To mitigate currency risk, it recommends scaling the TCX market creation capacity and exploring SDR-backed guarantees via the JET-FIT proposal. For development risk, the roadmap advocates for increased funding for existing project preparation models and a shift toward more sustainable MDB financing for project development. Finally, it proposes aligning MDB staff KPIs with mobilization targets and implementing 'originate-to-distribute' models through standardized underwriting criteria.

The document highlights the role of the G20 and international financial institutions (IFIs), including multilateral development banks, in facilitating the transition to green steel in developing and emerging economies to mitigate global emissions from a growing industry.

Methane mitigation is severely underfunded, with current annual spending at only 10% of the $119 billion required to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius. The report identifies structural barriers, including a lack of donor prioritization, absence of dedicated funding windows, and a shortage of bankable project pipelines in developing countries. It recommends that development finance institutions designate methane 'champions', that donor governments increase funding for project preparation, and that developing nations create enabling policy environments to attract private investment.

The document argues that MDBs must shift from a project-by-project approach to a systemic, program-based model to address the climate crisis in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). It recommends scaling country sector platforms, deploying risk-sharing instruments like guarantees and local currency financing, and overhauling MDB business models through standardization and an 'originate-to-distribute' balance sheet strategy. The authors emphasize the need for better integration of domestic financial institutions and increased transparency in data sharing to mobilize private capital at scale.

The document argues that current climate finance flows are insufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals, with a significant gap in EMDEs and LDCs due to high capital costs and strained public finances. It proposes that G7 countries accelerate finance through blended finance, debt-for-climate swaps, and MDB reforms. Specific recommendations include establishing a global risk mitigation facility, coordinating green industrial policies to avoid protectionism, and implementing universal disaster index insurance to reduce vulnerability in emerging economies.

The briefing examines the Bridgetown Agenda's proposals to reform the global financial system, specifically the IMF and MDBs, to address the intersection of climate change and sovereign debt in the global south. It argues that current governance structures and risk-averse capital adequacy frameworks hinder the flow of climate finance to vulnerable nations. Key recommendations include the rechanneling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) through the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) and the implementation of G20 Capital Adequacy Frameworks (CAF) recommendations to increase MDB lending capacity without compromising AAA credit ratings.

The document argues for a shift in the operating models of multilateral development banks (MDBs) to move beyond project-by-project funding toward systemic, program-based facilities. It suggests three primary areas for reform: enhancing the efficacy of country and sector platforms to drive systemic shifts, scaling risk-sharing instruments to lower the cost of capital and attract private investment, and overhauling the MDB business model to reposition these institutions as "mobilizers in chief" through balance sheet optimization and process standardization.

The document argues that MDBs must shift from a project-by-project approach to coordinated country and sector platforms, utilizing 'Just Term Sheets' to standardize transition investments. It recommends scaling risk-sharing instruments, such as guarantees and local currency loans, to lower the cost of capital in EMDEs. Furthermore, it calls for a business model overhaul, transitioning from an 'originate to hold' to an 'originate to distribute' model to recycle capital and increase lending capacity. The paper also emphasizes the need for standardized KPIs, improved data sharing via entities like the GEMS risk database, and the institutionalization of crisis-response toolkits for regular climate action.

The report examines how the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and World Bank are mainstreaming climate adaptation. While global finance flows for adaptation have increased and climate risk screening has become standard, the report finds that trends at the country level in Kenya, Nepal, and Peru are less clear. It highlights a lack of transparency in project-level finance allocations and argues for more funding of discrete adaptation projects and the use of programmatic finance and innovative instruments aligned with National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

The document argues that development finance institutions (DFIs) often cause harm to communities and must strengthen Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) to provide effective remedy. It calls for DFIs without IAMs to create them through public consultation, urges DFI networks to mandate these mechanisms for membership, and asserts that States must facilitate access to remedy for DFI-funded projects.

The document argues that the World Bank Group's (WBG) proposed evolution is an 'expansion of business as usual' that fails to address systemic harms. The signatories demand an end to fossil fuel and industrial animal agriculture financing, a shift away from 'de-risking' private capital, and a democratization of governance to better serve the Global South. They specifically criticize the lack of focus on biodiversity loss, the continued use of the ICSID tribunal to protect corporate profits over climate action, and the Bank's failure to participate meaningfully in sovereign debt relief for climate-vulnerable countries.

The report evaluates how the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and World Bank integrate climate adaptation into their projects in Kenya, Nepal, and Peru. While global adaptation finance is increasing, country-level trends are mixed and often skewed by large individual projects. MDBs have largely standardized climate risk screening, though capacity gaps remain within national finance ministries. Alignment with National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is improving but remains nascent, with a need for more programmatic finance and transformational adaptation projects.

The African Climate Foundation outlines a comprehensive set of recommendations to reform the international financial system, addressing systemic imbalances that limit Africa's access to affordable funding. The report highlights a critical gap in climate finance, noting that mitigation receives over ten times the funding of adaptation. Key proposals include reforming IMF and World Bank governance, overhauling the G20 Common Framework on Debt Treatment, and establishing a Global Resilience Reserve Fund. It also emphasizes the need to address the 'risk mind-set' and biased credit ratings that impose high interest rates on African governments despite low infrastructure project default rates.

The Ninth Meeting of the San Giorgio Group convened financial sector actors to identify practical solutions for scaling climate finance. The discussions focused on three primary areas: evolving 'just energy transition' into a broader 'just transformation' through co-creation and pilot projects; reframing adaptation finance as an investment opportunity rather than solely a public finance issue; and reforming Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) operating models to move toward country-level platforms and innovative risk-sharing instruments.

The report outlines a framework for the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund, emphasizing the need for inclusive governance, simplified access for vulnerable nations, and a diverse funding base. It argues for a grant-based approach and the integration of humanitarian and non-profit sector practices to ensure funds reach the most marginalized local communities.

Between 2012 and 2021, the North Region of Brazil received R$ 30.6 billion (US$ 11.1 billion) for land transport infrastructure, representing 17% of the national total tracked. Public sources provided 78% of this funding, with the federal government as the primary source. The rail sector was the largest beneficiary in the North, receiving 55% of resources, heavily driven by the Carajás Railroad. In contrast, public budget funds in the North were overwhelmingly directed to highways (99%), primarily for maintenance and operation (79%). While private finance via incentivized debentures grew nationally, it accounted for 22% of the North's flows. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) contributed R$ 3 billion, with the New Development Bank (NDB) being the most active in the region. The report emphasizes that without improved governance and rigorous socio-environmental analysis, these investments risk driving deforestation in the Amazon.

The We Mean Business Coalition expresses disappointment that COP27 failed to include a proposal to phase down all fossil fuels, despite recognizing the 1.5°C limit. While the Coalition welcomes progress on financial support for vulnerable communities, the recognition of a just transition to renewable energy, and the role of business in the 2030 Work Program, it warns that current national commitments are insufficient to drive the necessary emissions reductions by 2030.

Recourse argues that the MDBs' COP27 Joint Statement is a disappointment because it ignores the 1.5°C warming target and obscures the fact that MDB support for fossil fuels exceeds their financing for renewables. The organization highlights a lack of transparency regarding Paris Agreement alignment methodologies and calls for the MDBs to rule out fossil gas and LNG as transition fuels.