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The share of gas in the global power mix fell for the fifth consecutive year in 2025, dropping from 23.9% in 2020 to 21.8%. While absolute global gas generation has not yet peaked, its growth rate slowed from 2.9% (2016-2020) to 1.6% (2021-2025) as solar and wind met approximately 68% of global electricity demand growth over the last five years. By 2025, 61 out of 124 gas-generating economies had passed their historical gas generation peaks. In the G7, renewable power (2,544 TWh) nearly equaled gas power (2,577 TWh) in 2025. Conversely, gas remains central to the power sectors of the US and Canada, and continues to support demand in parts of North and West Africa.

The report evaluates Botswana's potential development paths up to 2043. It concludes that while the 'Current Path' provides incremental progress, it is insufficient to meet Vision 2036 goals due to persistent energy deficits and modest governance improvements. A 'Combined' scenario of integrated reforms—focusing on manufacturing, green energy, and human capital—is proposed to accelerate growth, reduce inequality, and transition the country into a high-income, inclusive society.

The report argues that the TotalEnergies-EPH joint venture (TTEP) locks Europe into fossil gas dependency, increases energy bill volatility through LNG imports, and relies on public subsidies that should be redirected toward clean energy. It highlights that the venture's 12.5 GW gas capacity will produce emissions comparable to entire countries like Ireland or Denmark over five years, while challenging the companies' claims that such assets are necessary for grid flexibility.

The report finds that by 2025, fossil fuel power generation fell below its peak in all 38 OECD member countries, driven by the rapid scaling of solar and wind energy. This trend is extending to emerging markets, with 2025 marking the first year this century (excluding 2020) that non-OECD fossil generation fell, specifically in China and India. The transition is increasingly driven by economic imperatives, as the levelized cost of solar and onshore wind is now 60% lower than combined cycle gas turbines.

The report examines a diverse array of transition mechanisms, including Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), national sectoral processes in countries like Germany and Chile, and first-mover alliances such as the Powering Past Coal Alliance. It highlights the necessity of national ownership, structured social dialogue, and blended finance to overcome political gridlock and ensure a just transition. The analysis reveals significant gaps in international support, particularly a shortfall in grants and concessional finance for Global South countries and a lack of coordinated global guidance for designing transition roadmaps.

The report positions renewable energy expansion as a national security imperative for Japan, which had an energy import dependence of 87.4% in 2024. It argues that the current 7th Strategic Energy Plan is insufficient for the 1.5°C target and proposes a more ambitious pathway to reach 80-90% clean power by 2035-2040. Key recommendations include upscaling grid capacity, fast-tracking permitting, expanding distributed energy, and using long-term offtake agreements to lower capital costs. The document highlights Japan's potential in offshore wind, agrivoltaics, and perovskite solar cells as means to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels and Chinese crystalline-silicon PV.

Indonesia is experiencing an explosive surge in captive coal power, with total operational and prospective capacity reaching nearly 31 GW. This growth is heavily concentrated in nickel hubs like Central Sulawesi and North Maluku, dwarfing the expansion of the national power grid. The report highlights significant data discrepancies in official JETP mapping and warns that regulatory loopholes in PERPRES 112/2022 allow 'national strategic projects' to bypass coal moratoriums. This trajectory is projected to cause 27,000 additional air pollution-related deaths and USD 20 billion in economic burden, while creating 'sacrifice zones' that risk Indonesia's position in global green supply chains.

Indonesia is experiencing a surge in 'captive' coal-fired power plants—industrial plants not connected to the national grid—which are growing significantly faster than on-grid capacity. Driven largely by nickel smelting in Sulawesi and North Maluku, total operational and prospective captive capacity is projected to reach 31 GW, nearly tripling 2023 levels. The report highlights critical transparency gaps in government and JETP data, regulatory loopholes for National Strategic Projects (PSN), and severe long-term economic and health costs, including an estimated 27,000 additional deaths and USD 20 billion in cumulative economic burdens if these plants are not phased out.

South Africa holds approximately 80% of global Platinum Group Metals (PGMs), which are essential catalysts for PEM electrolysers and fuel cells used in green hydrogen production. While this provides a strategic opportunity for re-industrialisation and decarbonisation, the transition faces severe constraints, including an outdated electricity grid, water scarcity in high-resource areas, and a significant skills gap. The shift also threatens the coal and internal combustion engine automotive sectors, risking large-scale job losses in regions like Mpumalanga and the Eastern Cape. Geopolitically, South Africa must navigate competition between China and Western powers, particularly as the US has withdrawn support for the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). The paper argues that for the transition to be 'just', the government must integrate mineral beneficiation with social safeguards, regional SADC integration, and comprehensive workforce reskilling.

The report examines the challenges of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), noting their tendency to prioritize donor agendas and techno-economic frameworks over local social needs. It proposes South-South cooperation (SSC) as a vital complement to address these gaps through peer learning and context-specific solutions. Using South Africa and Colombia as case studies, the document identifies specific areas for collaboration, including mine closure, green industrialization, and the integration of peace-building experiences into transition planning.

The document examines Indonesia's Just Transition (JT) agenda, primarily driven by the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP). While a comprehensive framework exists on paper, implementation is hindered by governance restructuring, a narrow focus on the energy sector, inadequate financing for social components, and significant data gaps. The author argues for expanding JT principles across all economic sectors, strengthening subnational capacity, and increasing grant-based financing to ensure an equitable shift to a low-carbon economy.

Vietnam aims for net-zero emissions by 2050, targeting a 47% renewable energy share in electricity generation by 2030. While the country has integrated Just Transition principles into national strategies and secured a USD 15.5 billion commitment via the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), it faces significant gaps in governance, social protection, and workforce reskilling. The brief recommends establishing a National Just Transition Commission and expanding international finance to cover social dimensions beyond energy infrastructure.

The Private Equity Stakeholder Project outlines five categories of climate standards for private markets investors: alignment with science-based targets, disclosure of fossil fuel exposure and emissions, the requirement for portfolio-wide energy transition plans, integration of environmental justice and community protections, and transparency regarding political spending and climate lobbying. The framework recommends specific timelines, such as phasing out coal power by 2030 and achieving a 4:1 ratio of low-carbon energy supply investments relative to fossil fuel investments by 2030.

The report outlines a methodology for financial institutions to assess the transition risks and opportunities of power companies in Southeast Asia using three analytical pillars: transition footprint mapping, investment alignment, and dependency mapping. It leverages asset-level data from Global Energy Monitor to help institutions evaluate asset bases, project pipelines, and systemic barriers to decarbonization.

The report examines the impacts of coal phase-outs in East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, South Sumatra, Central Kalimantan, and Jambi, emphasizing the need for proactive investment in high-multiplier industries and green sectors to prevent economic shocks. It advocates for a combination of quantitative modelling and qualitative community research to design social protections and reskilling programs that specifically include women, youth, and informal workers.

The document outlines a granular, asset-level process for financial institutions (FIs) to map a company's transition footprint. This process involves five key steps: assessing double materiality to prioritize business lines, gathering detailed asset-level data, identifying retrofit and retirement timelines, selecting appropriate transition benchmarks (such as NDCs or peer data), and evaluating the resulting transition exposure. The guide emphasizes that moving beyond high-level emissions disclosures to asset-specific analysis allows FIs to identify carbon lock-in, policy misalignment, and opportunities for early retirement of high-emissions assets.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that the Clean Electricity Regulations (CER) are critical for providing the long-term predictability needed by risk-averse utilities and regulators to invest in clean energy. By setting emission limits for fossil fuel-burning generation that reach zero tonnes per gigawatt hour by 2050, the CER complements industrial carbon pricing and Investment Tax Credits to lower the cost of capital for decarbonization. The author emphasizes that while the CER allows for provincial flexibility and equivalency agreements, a stable federal standard is necessary to prevent provincial rollbacks—such as Saskatchewan's decision to extend coal plant life—from undermining Canada's overall emissions targets.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that the Clean Electricity Regulations (CER) provide a critical foundation of certainty for utility providers and regulators, encouraging the massive capital investments required to decarbonize Canada's power grids. The document highlights how the CER complements other policies, such as industrial carbon pricing and investment tax credits, to lower costs for consumers and ensure a competitive advantage for industries seeking clean energy. It emphasizes that while the CER sets national goals—including a target of zero tonnes of emissions per gigawatt-hour by 2050—it maintains flexibility for provinces to implement equivalent solutions and manage their own resource planning.

Ember argues that Indonesia's energy transition requires more ambitious emissions targets and a stronger regulatory framework, particularly for the underregulated captive coal sector. The organization recommends integrating JETP investments with long-term economic diversification in coal-dependent provinces to ensure a just transition. Ember also highlights a significant gap in solar deployment, noting that Indonesia reached only 416 MW of on-grid solar capacity last year against a 2025 target of 4.1 GW, and calls for more transparent procurement processes by PLN.

Ember argues that Indonesia's JETP 2025 scenario is insufficiently ambitious, particularly regarding the captive power sector, where it suggests that integrating solar PV could significantly reduce emissions. The brief calls for the inclusion of captive power in peaking emission targets, the removal of solar quotas, and the redirection of JETP investments toward coal-producing provinces to mitigate fiscal vulnerabilities and job losses.