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The document argues that carbon markets are 'false climate solutions' that allow major polluters to continue emitting greenhouse gases through 'greenwashing' while causing harm to Indigenous Peoples and local communities. It describes how carbon credits are generated from projects—including nature-based solutions and technological patches—and warns that these often lead to land grabbing, human rights violations, and the failure to actually reduce global emissions. The guide provides a framework for communities to identify predatory contracts, demand Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), and organize international solidarity to oppose the financialization of nature.

The paper analyzes how South Africa and Brazil utilize climate financing to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, highlighting the differences between South Africa's coal-dominant economy and Brazil's land-use-driven emissions. It evaluates national mechanisms such as South Africa's carbon tax and Brazil's proposed Emissions Trading Scheme, while advocating for the reform of multilateral development banks to lower the cost of capital for the Global South. The author emphasizes the importance of green taxonomies and central bank risk management in mobilizing private investment and ensuring financial stability during the energy transition.

The Energizing Healthcare 2025 conference addressed the energy access gap affecting 1 billion people served by health facilities with unreliable or no electricity. The report highlights the need for approximately USD 5 billion in funding by 2030 to close this gap. Key discussions centered on moving beyond simple connections to focus on energy consumption, sustainable operations and maintenance (O&M), and the adoption of innovative financing models like Energy-as-a-Service and blended finance. The event also emphasized the integration of healthcare electrification into national climate plans and the critical need for energy-efficient medical equipment, noting that up to 70% of such equipment in developing countries is currently unused due to power issues.

Russia used COP29 to promote fossil fuels and present revised GHG emission data based on a 'sovereign methodology' that claims a 34% reduction in emissions through forest carbon absorption. The document highlights that Russia's 'climate projects' are inconsistent with Paris Agreement standards on additionality and transparency, often serving to prolong fossil fuel use. Despite these issues, Russia has begun selling carbon credits to foreign buyers, such as the Arab Investment Fund, and seeks to expand these practices through BRICS+ and other business associations.

The document evaluates four public-private partnership models for restoring Brazil's public lands: forestry concessions, ordinary tenders, common public service concessions, and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). While forestry concessions are the current standard due to the Public Forest Management Law (LGFP), they are limited by strict contractual requirements and high risk for the private sector. The report suggests that ordinary tenders could be effective for planting in fully protected areas, while common concessions and PPPs could offer better risk-sharing and flexibility if forest restoration is legally classified as a public service. The authors recommend legally designating restoration as a public service, improving risk management training for public agencies, and creating a specialized entity to manage environmental assets like carbon credits.

The document evaluates four legal frameworks for public-private partnerships in forest restoration: forest concessions, common tenders, common public service concessions, and Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). While forest concessions are the current standard due to the Law on Public Forest Management (LGFP), the report argues that their rigid risk distribution and land category restrictions may hinder large-scale restoration. It proposes that common tenders are suitable for planting in strictly protected Conservation Units, while PPPs offer the most flexibility in risk sharing and financial support, especially for security and monitoring in high-risk Amazonian regions. The report emphasizes the need to legally characterize restoration as a public service to enable these alternative models and stresses the necessity of socio-environmental safeguards for Traditional Peoples and Communities.

The report analyzes private climate finance for Brazil's land use sector, focusing on thematic bonds, CBIOs, and BNDES operations. It finds that bioenergy and biofuels are the primary recipients of these flows, though thematic bond issuance for land use declined sharply between 2021 and 2023. The BNDES remains a central actor through direct credit, blended finance pilots, and the management of the Amazon and Climate Funds.

The document analyzes the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, focusing on the distinctions between the bilateral/multilateral trades of Article 6.2 and the UN-overseen global market of Article 6.4. It highlights critical loopholes, including the risk of double counting in aviation offsetting (CORSIA), the lack of oversight for Article 6.2 trades, and the potential for 'junk' credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to transition into the new system. The author argues for stricter authorization processes, mandatory transparency, and a 'firewall' between carbon markets and the new climate finance package being negotiated at COP29.

The report argues that a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty can catalyze the financing necessary for a global just transition by establishing new funding regimes, creating state obligations, and supporting parallel financial reforms. It categorizes potential solutions into three clusters: debt management, new forms of finance and investment, and the replacement of fossil fuel revenues. The authors emphasize that wealthy nations must assume historical responsibility by ending extraction first and providing financial support to low and middle-income countries (LMICs) to diversify their economies.

The document details the operational and structural differences between Article 6.2 (bilateral/multilateral agreements), Article 6.4 (a UN-overseen global carbon market), and Article 6.8 (non-market approaches). It highlights the role of 'corresponding adjustments' in preventing double-counting and the specific financial contributions required under Article 6.4, such as the Share of Proceeds for the Adaptation Fund and the Overall Mitigation of Global Emissions. The author emphasizes that establishing high standards for credit quality and transparency is essential for the success of these markets at COP29.

The declaration from the III Assembly “Amazon free of fossil fuels and all forms of extractivism” asserts that the Amazon must not be a "sacrifice zone for external interests." The signatories demand respect for indigenous self-determination and the right to consent, rejecting the "false promise of development" associated with oil and gold extraction. They highlight the destructive impact of oil spills and the criminalization of environmental defenders, while arguing that fossil fuel exploitation deepens the global climate crisis. The group rejects carbon credits as "false solutions" and calls for a "just and popular energy transition" and the remediation of ecological damages, specifically citing victories in Yasuní, Ecuador, and among the Achuar and Zio'bain peoples.

ASEAN's electricity demand grew by 3.6% in 2023, a rise entirely met by fossil fuels, leading to a 6.6% increase in power sector emissions. While solar and wind costs are falling, the region remains heavily dependent on coal and gas, and hydropower has become less reliable due to climate-induced droughts. The report argues that scaling renewable capacity by 3-5x by 2035, implementing direct power purchase agreements, and expanding the ASEAN Power Grid are essential to meet rising demand and climate goals. It also highlights the potential for a regional compliance carbon market and the importance of a just transition to secure social acceptance.

The document explores the 'climate-crime nexus,' detailing how environmental stresses drive rural petty crime, urban violence, drug use, gender-based violence, hate crimes, trafficking, and white-collar crime. It highlights how climate-induced economic collapse and extreme heat increase desperation and aggression, while the green transition creates new opportunities for organized crime and corruption.

The document identifies operational, financial, and market barriers to gas-capture projects and proposes a framework for the EU's 'You Collect We Buy' initiative to overcome them through better data, risk-sharing financing, and a credible certification system.

The author contends that temporary carbon sequestration, such as carbon farming, is unsuitable for market-based mechanisms because it cannot store CO2 for the century-long timeframe required to meet Paris Agreement goals. The text criticizes the EU's proposed Carbon Removal Certification Framework for failing to exclude offsetting and double counting, while highlighting the technical inaccuracies of current monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) techniques. Instead of 'nature credits', the document proposes rewarding sustainable land management through a reformed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a dedicated EU fund for nature restoration.

The report identifies a significant funding gap in China's agri-food climate transition, noting that global climate finance for the sector is only one-seventh of what is required. It argues that while public funds currently dominate, mobilising private capital through transition finance—including sustainability-linked loans, bonds, and blended finance—is essential. The document highlights barriers such as inadequate GHG emission disclosure among Chinese agri-food companies and a lack of credible transition plans. It recommends that regulators establish standardised accounting for agri-food emissions, support the development of entity-level transition plans, and align agricultural subsidies with climate goals to ensure a just transition for smallholders and SMEs.

The global bioeconomy, currently valued at US$4-5 trillion with potential growth to US$30 trillion by 2050, is presented as a critical complement to clean tech for achieving a just transition. The document identifies significant financing barriers, including perverse fossil fuel subsidies and limited risk capital in the Global South, while proposing a suite of sustainable finance instruments—such as nature credits and sustainability-linked financing—to bridge these gaps. It advocates for an integrated approach combining national strategies with international cooperation, specifically through the G20, to establish common principles, measurement standards, and trade rules that protect biodiversity and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities.

Carbon Market Watch criticizes VCMI's revised Scope 3 Framework, asserting that it allows companies to pollute up to 25% beyond their annual scope 3 decarbonisation targets until 2038. The organization argues this flexibility undermines the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C goal and creates a 'green fig leaf' for climate laggards, particularly in sectors that are easier to decarbonise than the hard-to-abate industries the framework was intended for.

The NewClimate Institute opposes VCMI's revised Scope 3 Claim, which would allow companies to use carbon credits for up to 24% of their target emission levels until 2038. The Institute argues this mechanism risks enabling 'business-as-usual' scenarios, allowing companies to increase short-term emissions while maintaining ambitious-sounding targets, and disadvantaging 'front-runner' companies that invest in genuine value chain decarbonization. The document asserts that this proposal contradicts the direction of the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) and the recommendations of the UN High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities.

The Net Zero Stocktake 2024 reveals a consolidation of net zero targets across countries, cities, and companies, but highlights a critical gap in integrity. While national targets now cover 87% of global GHG emissions, fewer than 5% of non-state entities meet all minimum procedural and substantive integrity criteria. The report emphasizes that national targets often act as a 'ceiling' for subnational ambition, though some regions in countries like Australia and Japan have historically pushed national goals forward. It also notes that members of the Race to Zero campaign generally outperform non-members on integrity measures, although absolute performance remains low.