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Reclaim Finance is calling on ArcelorMittal shareholders to escalate engagement at the 2025 AGM by voting against management-proposed resolutions. The organization argues that the company is backtracking on climate goals, delaying direct reduced iron (DRI) projects, and allocating insufficient capital to decarbonization, with only US$0.3-0.4 billion of planned 2025 capital expenditures dedicated to such projects.

Reclaim Finance criticizes ENGIE's 2025 climate plan for its lack of a fossil gas phase-out date and continued investment in gas infrastructure. While the company increased its 2030 renewable energy target to 95 GW, the analysis finds that ENGIE's decarbonization target of 2045 is incompatible with IEA Net Zero scenarios. The report highlights that CAPEX for fossil fuel technologies remains nearly unchanged and recommends that shareholders vote against the 'Say on Climate' presentation and the reelection of CEO Catherine MacGregor.

The UK government has announced a new subsidy package for Drax Power Station for 2027-2031 that is expected to reduce its electricity generation by 55% and lower its annual emissions to approximately 5.8 MtCO2e. While the strike price for the new Contract for Difference (CfD) mechanism increases to £113/MWh, the overall subsidy is estimated to fall to around £1.2 million per day. The report highlights that Drax remains the UK's largest emitting power station and relies heavily on imported wood pellets, primarily from North America. It argues that delivering 'Clean Power 2030' through wind, solar, and energy storage will further reduce the need for biomass and mitigate the risks associated with delayed and expensive Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) projects.

Enhanced rock weathering is identified as a scientifically sound carbon removal method that accelerates the natural breakdown of rocks like basalt and olivine to capture CO2. While it offers potential for large-scale deployment and soil improvement, it is currently deemed not ready for large-scale use due to high costs, unpredictable effectiveness, and complex monitoring requirements.

The U.S. steel industry is already less carbon-intensive than other major regions due to a high reliance on electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which account for 70% of production. However, the remaining 30% relies on integrated blast furnace/basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) routes to produce high-quality steel. Decarbonization requires transitioning these integrated mills to direct reduced iron (DRI) and submerged arc furnaces (SAF) or implementing carbon capture and storage (CCS). While clean electricity offers a 'quick win' for EAFs, deep decarbonization is hindered by the high cost of green hydrogen and the need for extensive CCS infrastructure. The report argues that because steel is a low-margin commodity, government policy—including carbon taxes, border adjustment mechanisms, and demand-side incentives—is essential to offset the increased costs of low-carbon production.

The document reports a decline in Chinese crude oil consumption and LNG imports, alongside significant economic and regulatory volatility in the US oil and gas sector. It highlights corporate shifts at Shell and BP, the risk of USD 2.3 trillion in stranded fossil fuel assets, and various international developments in LNG and carbon capture.

The policy brief asserts that energy tax credits are critical for commercializing diverse energy technologies to meet rising demand from AI and data centers, while lowering costs for households and strengthening local economies. It highlights specific credits—including 45Y, 48E, 45Q, 45V, and 45X—as vital for the development of baseload power (advanced nuclear, geothermal, fusion), carbon capture, hydrogen, and critical mineral manufacturing. The author warns that repealing these credits or shortening their eligibility would increase energy prices, threaten jobs, and undermine U.S. leadership in global markets, particularly against competitors like China. Additionally, the brief emphasizes that mechanisms like direct pay and transferability are necessary for tax-exempt entities and high-cost projects, such as advanced nuclear, to monetize these incentives.

Reclaim Finance contends that ENGIE's strategy of signing long-term LNG import contracts facilitates the construction of new export terminals and the exploitation of new gas fields, specifically in the US Permian Basin. The document highlights that these contracts, some extending beyond 2040, contradict IEA Net Zero scenarios and European decarbonization goals, potentially creating stranded assets or shifting carbon risks to Asia. It specifically cites the Port Arthur LNG and Rio Grande LNG projects as examples of high-emission infrastructure supported by ENGIE, and calls for shareholders to vote against CEO Catherine MacGregor and the company's "Say on Climate" proposal.

Reclaim Finance claims that ENGIE's long-term LNG import contracts, particularly those from the United States, drive the development of new export terminals and gas fields, contradicting decarbonization scenarios. The document highlights that these contracts lock in carbon-intensive trajectories for decades and risk creating stranded assets as European gas demand declines. It specifically cites contracts linked to the Port Arthur LNG terminal and the Rio Grande LNG project, the latter of which saw its carbon capture and sequestration project abandoned. Consequently, Reclaim Finance calls on shareholders to vote against the re-election of CEO Catherine MacGregor and the 'Say on Climate' proposal.

ClientEarth's response to the CISAF consultation emphasizes the need for horizontal integration of the 'Do No Significant Harm' (DNSH) principle and the removal of aid for fossil gas in industrial decarbonisation. The organization warns that proposed 36-month project completion deadlines may compromise environmental permitting and public participation. It further advocates for stricter conditions on carbon capture and hydrogen aid, suggesting that support be limited to 100% renewable hydrogen and hard-to-abate sectors.

The report analyzes the emergence of 'hydrogen readiness'—the declared ability of infrastructure to use hydrogen in the future—within EU law, private finance, and national policies. It argues that the concept is often used as a 'Trojan horse' to justify the continued construction and subsidization of fossil gas assets. The author identifies significant risks, including carbon lock-in, price volatility, and external energy dependencies, and concludes that the term should be abandoned unless assets can use 100% hydrogen from the outset.

The report outlines a systematic approach to estimating top-down climate finance needs, distinguishing them from bottom-up needs derived from Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). CPI's methodology involves collecting data from nearly 100 reports, standardizing sector classifications using its Global Landscape of Climate Finance (GLCF) taxonomy, and harmonizing timeframes, currencies, and value types. The document emphasizes that annual climate finance flows must increase significantly, reaching USD 7.5 trillion per year by 2030 and over USD 8.8 trillion per year from 2031 to 2050. It also addresses data gaps in sectors like aviation and wastewater, the inclusion of non-climate solutions like fossil fuel deployment, and the necessity of redirecting capital from high-carbon activities to meet net-zero targets.

The report examines Indonesia's energy transition through a lens of national interest, highlighting a significant gap between the high investment needs for Net Zero Emissions (NZE) and the limited availability of domestic and international funding. It argues that foreign climate finance often arrives as debt rather than grants, potentially exacerbating Indonesia's chronic fiscal deficits and public debt. The document analyzes the capacity of the Indonesian banking sector to fund renewable energy projects, finding that while capital adequacy is generally high, systemic bottlenecks in foreign exchange liquidity and long-term stable funding persist. It also evaluates the nascent Indonesian carbon market, noting a lack of clear emission caps (PTBAE) and low carbon prices. The authors propose 'The Indonesian Way,' a strategy focusing on eight action paths, including the dekarbonization of transport and electricity, targeted subsidies, and the development of a domestic green manufacturing ecosystem to reduce technological dependency.

The report examines Indonesia's path toward net-zero emissions by 2060, highlighting a significant gap between current investment levels and the estimated annual need of USD 73–76 billion. It argues that foreign climate finance is often debt-heavy and unreliable, urging a shift toward domestic funding and structural reforms. The analysis covers the banking sector's limited capacity to finance renewable energy, the underperformance of the national carbon market, and the socioeconomic disparities in energy access. It proposes an "Indonesian Way" consisting of eight strategic actions, including targeted subsidies and the development of a domestic clean-tech ecosystem, to ensure a just and sovereign transition.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

Southeast Asia is facing a potential surge in gas production, with 14 projects potentially reaching final investment decisions (FIDs) in 2025. If approved, these would add over 20 bcm/y of capacity, an 18% increase over current output. However, many projects have a history of delays, and the expansion threatens ecologically sensitive areas like the Coral Triangle and Mekong Delta. The report highlights contradictions between these extraction plans and the net-zero commitments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei.