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The document describes a new compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol featuring a two-branch committee: a facilitative branch for all Parties and an enforcement branch for Annex I Parties. Key outcomes include equitable geographical representation for committee members and specific penalties for Annex I Parties exceeding emissions targets, such as a 1.3 tonne deduction for every tonne exceeded in the next commitment period. While the agreement establishes these procedures, it notes that the 'legally binding' nature of these consequences remains unresolved as it would require a Protocol amendment under Article 18.

The document serves as an emergency manual for negotiators from the Global South, particularly those who are scientists or environmentalists transitioning into diplomatic roles. It details the operational structure of the climate regime, the importance of coalitions like the G-77 and China, and the specific challenges faced by developing nations, such as 'contentless mandates' and weak bargaining power. The guide offers practical strategies for drafting texts, managing informal negotiation processes, and optimizing the performance of small or single-person delegations.

The document serves as a 'survival guide' for diplomats from the Global South, addressing the systemic disadvantages they face in climate negotiations. It covers the scientific and political context of climate change, the legal structures of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, and the operational mechanics of UN conferences. A significant portion of the text is dedicated to the 'art of negotiating,' analyzing why developing nations often suffer from 'hollow mandates' and a lack of bargaining power. It offers strategic advice on forming coalitions, such as the G-77, and provides technical tips on drafting texts, using procedural motions, and managing the pressures of international diplomacy.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) proposes a hybrid liability system for the Kyoto Protocol's emissions trading to bridge the gap between pure seller and buyer liability. The proposal centers on a 'commitment period reserve' based on projected emissions trajectories. Units surplus to this reserve are traded under seller liability, while those within the reserve are traded under a 'limited buyer liability' framework. This limited approach aims to prevent a 'domino effect' of non-compliance by restricting the invalidation of units only to those originating from Parties whose verified emissions exceed their gross adjusted assigned amount, thereby maintaining market liquidity and enhancing transparency.

SGR recommends strict limits on the Kyoto Mechanisms to prevent 'hot air' loopholes and ensure industrialised nations prioritise domestic action. The statement calls for the total exclusion of nuclear fission and speculative 'climate-engineering' projects from Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), while demanding tight restrictions on forestry projects and a rigorous definition of 'sustainable development'.

CIEL argues for a comprehensive, transparent, and independent compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol, consisting of facilitative, enforcement, and eligibility branches. The organization advocates for the creation of a dynamically priced Compliance Fund to address emissions overages instead of 'borrowing' tonnes, and emphasizes the necessity of civil society participation and a negative supermajority voting rule for the COP/MOP to ensure accountability.

The document analyzes how different international treaties handle compliance, focusing on information systems (reporting and review) and response systems (initiation, determination, and measures). It compares facilitative approaches, such as those in the Montreal Protocol, with more punitive or binding systems like those of the WTO and IMF, suggesting that the Kyoto Protocol may require a comprehensive range of both to be effective.

The document argues that the Kyoto Protocol lacks a clear system for managing Annex I Parties that exceed their assigned emission amounts at the end of a commitment period. It proposes a Compliance Fund where Parties can pay a fee—based on mitigation costs plus a multiplier—to receive emissions credits that 'make the climate whole' by funding reliable GHG mitigation projects. This is presented as a superior alternative to 'borrowing' from future periods, which the authors claim merely shifts the burden to future generations. For willful non-compliance, the report suggests 'Compliance Assessments' (monetary penalties) that could be enforced through a 'Compliance Assessment Recognition Agreement,' allowing these assessments to be treated as arbitral awards enforceable in domestic courts.

SGR argues that the UK government's approach to climate change is too cautious and fails to challenge the unsustainable nature of economic growth. The organization advocates for a 'Contraction and Convergence' model for global emissions, a shift in taxation from labour to resource use, and the complete replacement of fossil fuels and nuclear power with renewables. SGR specifically criticizes the government's reliance on 'accounting tricks' for non-CO2 gases, the lack of restrictions on air travel, and the potential dangers of climate engineering technologies.

The document assesses the role of the United States in the global effort to combat climate change following the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. It argues that the U.S. has failed to lead, contributing to 27% of annual global greenhouse gas emissions while resisting binding domestic action. The authors highlight critical loopholes in the Kyoto Protocol, such as the use of surplus emissions allowances from former socialist economies and ambiguous forest activity definitions. To ensure the treaty's success, the brief recommends that the U.S. implement mandatory domestic programs, defer demands for immediate binding commitments from developing countries, and support the Global Environment Facility.

The document outlines Canada's transition from a defensive posture regarding trade-related environmental barriers to a 'maturing' policy that seeks synergies between trade and sustainable development. It details a comprehensive regulatory framework including import/export bans on hazardous wastes and ozone-depleting substances, and a commitment to the 'principle of openness' through multistakeholder advisory bodies and transparency in the Canada Gazette. Canada's international engagement is highlighted through its participation in the WTO, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), and various multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs).

The document argues that joint implementation (JI)—meeting emissions targets through actions in another country—could undermine the U.S. commitment to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. It highlights risks such as the lack of an emissions cap in developing countries, the potential for 'double counting' credits, and the risk of locking the U.S. into inefficient domestic technologies. The author recommends that JI only be used for goals beyond mere stabilization and that strict criteria, including environmental impact assessments and minimum standards for host countries, be established by the FCCC Conference of the Parties.

The authors contend that while international UNFCCC negotiations move slowly, rapid progress in domestic climate legislation—particularly in emerging economies—is shifting the center of gravity of the climate debate. They argue that national actions driven by self-interest and co-benefits, such as energy security and resource efficiency, are prerequisites for an effective international treaty.

The document argues for a dual-track compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. During the first commitment period, it advocates for a 'managerial or facilitative approach' to build capacity and confidence. Following this, it proposes an enforcement phase for substantive non-compliance, centered on the principle of 'making the climate whole' through offsets or a Clean Development Fund. The authors suggest a 'true-up' period between these phases to allow Parties to correct overages without triggering formal sanctions. For procedural non-compliance, the paper suggests a mix of 'carrots and sticks,' including financial assistance and restrictions on cooperative mechanisms. For substantive failures, it recommends strict liability measures, including trade sanctions for willful non-compliance, while proposing a hardship appeal process for countries unable to pay, specifically mentioning the risks of 'hot air' trading in transition economies like Russia.

The report uses a case study of Costa Rica's JI pilot projects to identify challenges in quantifying and verifying carbon sequestration, such as baselines and leakage. It argues that the CDM must integrate strong environmental and social safeguards, including public participation and benefit-sharing with local communities, to ensure sustainable development. The author proposes a phased evolution for the CDM, moving from project-specific credits to national baselines, and suggests limiting the use of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) to 1% of Annex I Parties' assigned amounts initially to prioritize domestic reductions.

The briefing argues for a compliance system where the enforcement branch's jurisdiction is based on the nature of a Party's commitments rather than its Annex I or Non-Annex I status. It advocates for strict limits on the facilitative branch's power, the removal of political bodies like the COP/MOP from enforcement proceedings, and the implementation of high transparency standards, including public dockets and the right for NGOs to submit information. Additionally, it proposes a Compliance Fund to help Parties cure emissions overages during the true-up period.

The document examines the allocation of responsibility for non-compliance within the Kyoto Protocol's four cooperative implementation (CI) mechanisms: joint fulfillment, joint implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and international emissions trading. It proposes a 'traffic light' (green/yellow/red) hybrid model to balance risks between buyers and sellers, arguing that this approach promotes market stability and transparency while incentivizing seller compliance. The authors analyze the specific application of this model to each CI mechanism and suggest institutional improvements to the Article 8 review process to support real-time implementation monitoring.

The document analyzes the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, detailing the scientific consensus on global warming and the diplomatic tensions between industrialized and developing nations during its creation. It highlights the lack of binding emissions targets and the complexities of the financial mechanism and technology transfer.

The document provides a framework for governments to assess how climate policies affect national budgets, focusing on the production side of fossil fuels and infrastructure. It details a five-step methodology: establishing a base case, developing scenarios, assessing policy impacts, allocating value between consumers and producers, and splitting value between government and commercial entities. The report applies this to Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Egypt, highlighting that oil assets are most sensitive to global demand shifts, while coal and gas are more influenced by regional dynamics and infrastructure. It recommends that governments reduce upfront capital commitments, adapt tax regimes, and diversify into low-carbon technologies to mitigate the risk of stranded assets.

The Climate Social Science Network has listed a group of scholars available for media consultation during COP 26. These experts, some attending in Glasgow and others available remotely, provide expertise across several key climate themes including climate finance, loss and damage, carbon markets, and the political dynamics of climate obstruction.