BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

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The document argues for a dual-track compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol. During the first commitment period, it advocates for a 'managerial or facilitative approach' to build capacity and confidence. Following this, it proposes an enforcement phase for substantive non-compliance, centered on the principle of 'making the climate whole' through offsets or a Clean Development Fund. The authors suggest a 'true-up' period between these phases to allow Parties to correct overages without triggering formal sanctions. For procedural non-compliance, the paper suggests a mix of 'carrots and sticks,' including financial assistance and restrictions on cooperative mechanisms. For substantive failures, it recommends strict liability measures, including trade sanctions for willful non-compliance, while proposing a hardship appeal process for countries unable to pay, specifically mentioning the risks of 'hot air' trading in transition economies like Russia.

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  • The authors propose a two-tiered compliance structure: a facilitative approach during the commitment period to assist Annex I Parties, followed by an enforcement phase after the period ends to hold Parties accountable.
  • A facilitative approach is recommended to build institutional, technical, and financial capacity, encourage participation, and lower resistance to future binding commitments.
  • The paper suggests a 'true-up' period at the end of the commitment period to allow Parties to balance emissions ledgers and avoid formal findings of non-compliance.
  • Two mechanisms are proposed for the true-up period: a compliance reserve funded by commissions on emissions trades (ex ante reductions) and a Clean Development Fund (CDF) to finance ex post reductions.
  • Substantive non-compliance should be addressed through a strict liability approach aimed at 'making the climate whole,' requiring the purchase of offsets or payments into the CDF.
  • Procedural non-compliance, such as failing to submit national reports or inventories, should be managed through a combination of 'carrots and sticks' to induce compliance.
  • The authors recommend that a facilitation body be empowered to suspend a Party's participation in cooperative mechanisms if such activity endangers the Party's ability to meet its targets, suggesting a 'traffic light' system (green, yellow, red).
  • For willful substantive non-compliance where capacity exists, the paper advocates for automatic economic measures, including fines and trade-related enforcement, provided they are adopted via Protocol amendment.
  • To protect transition economies like Russia from the risks of overselling 'hot air' in emissions trading, the authors propose a buyer or hybrid responsibility regime where the buyer shares the risk of the seller's default.

Cite the original document

APA
Goldberg, D., Lacasta, N., Porter, S., & Wiser, G. (n.d.). BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf
Chicago
Goldberg, Donald, Nuno Lacasta, Stephen Porter, and Glenn Wiser. BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL. Center for International Environmental Law, n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Goldberg |first1=Donald |last2=Lacasta |first2=Nuno |last3=Porter |first3=Stephen |last4=Wiser |first4=Glenn |title=BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{goldbergndbuilding, author = {Goldberg, Donald and Lacasta, Nuno and Porter, Stephen and Wiser, Glenn}, title = {{BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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