BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

This research paper by the Center for International Environmental Law and EURONATURA proposes a two-tiered compliance regime for the Kyoto Protocol, distinguishing between a facilitative approach during the first commitment period and an enforcement phase following it. The authors argue for a system that prioritizes capacity building and 'making the climate whole' through mechanisms like a Clean Development Fund and compliance reserves to address substantive non-compliance.

• The authors propose a dual compliance structure: a managerial or facilitative approach during the commitment period to assist Annex I Parties, followed by an enforcement phase after the period ends to hold Parties accountable for their progress.
• A facilitative approach is recommended to build confidence, ensure Parties have the necessary technical and financial capacity, and encourage broader participation by demonstrating that obligations are attainable.
• To prevent non-compliance during the commitment period, the authors suggest a 'traffic light' system for cooperative mechanisms, where a facilitation body could suspend a Party's trading privileges if their participation endangers their ability to meet targets.
• The paper suggests a 'true-up' period at the end of the commitment period to allow Parties to balance emissions ledgers and avoid formal findings of non-compliance through two primary mechanisms: compliance reserves and a Clean Development Fund (CDF).
• From an environmental perspective, ex ante compliance reserves are preferred over the CDF because they consist of actual reductions achieved during the commitment period rather than future promised reductions.
• The authors distinguish between procedural and substantive non-compliance: procedural failures (e.g., failing to submit reports) should be addressed via persuasion and 'carrots and sticks,' while substantive failures should follow a strict liability approach of 'making the climate whole.'
• For Parties unable to cure substantive overages due to lack of capacity, the authors propose an appellate review mechanism to grant reprieves from trade measures and flexible payment schedules for the CDF.
• The paper suggests a 'buyer or hybrid responsibility' regime for emissions trading, particularly for transition economies like Russia, where the buyer of credits would bear some responsibility if the seller defaults due to overselling.
• The authors argue that binding economic enforcement measures, such as fines and trade restrictions, would require a formal amendment to the Kyoto Protocol under Article 18 to be legally operative.

APA

Goldberg, D., Lacasta, N., Porter, S., & Wiser, G. (n.d.). BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf

Chicago

Goldberg, Donald, Nuno Lacasta, Stephen Porter, and Glenn Wiser. BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL. Center for International Environmental Law, n.d. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Goldberg |first1=Donald |last2=Lacasta |first2=Nuno |last3=Porter |first3=Stephen |last4=Wiser |first4=Glenn |title=BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{goldbergndbuilding, author = {Goldberg, Donald and Lacasta, Nuno and Porter, Stephen and Wiser, Glenn}, title = {{BUILDING A COMPLIANCE REGIME UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/buildingacomplianceregimeunderKP.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }