Comments on Selected Portions of the JWGC Co-Chairs’ “Elements” Paper

CIEL argues for a comprehensive, transparent, and independent compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol, consisting of facilitative, enforcement, and eligibility branches. The organization advocates for the creation of a dynamically priced Compliance Fund to address emissions overages instead of 'borrowing' tonnes, and emphasizes the necessity of civil society participation and a negative supermajority voting rule for the COP/MOP to ensure accountability.

• The compliance system should be comprehensive, applying to all Kyoto Protocol commitments to prevent the "balkanization" of the Protocol, where different rules and bodies handle different issues.
• CIEL proposes a compliance body divided into three distinct branches with different memberships to avoid conflicts of interest: a facilitative branch focused on cooperation and technical skills, an enforcement branch based on automaticity and legal expertise, and an eligibility branch to evaluate the technical capacity of Parties to participate in Kyoto mechanisms.
• To ensure impartiality, members of the compliance body should be recognized experts serving in their personal capacities rather than as representatives of their national governments, particularly within the enforcement branch.
• The compliance process must be transparent and open to civil society, allowing non-state actors to submit information on their own initiative to trigger reviews, contrasting with the "closed procedures" of the World Trade Organization.
• CIEL recommends that the COP/MOP adopt decisions of the compliance body via a negative supermajority (e.g., two-thirds or three-fourths) to prevent a single Party, including one subject to an adverse ruling, from blocking the decision through a consensus requirement.
• The document rejects "borrowing" (subtraction of tonnes) as an effective remedy for non-compliance, arguing it has low deterrent value, may lead to inflated future budgets, and risks permanent atmospheric GHG accumulation.
• CIEL advocates for a dynamically priced Compliance Fund to replace borrowing; this fund would underwrite reliable GHG mitigation projects and allow Parties to return to compliance by paying fees based on actual mitigation costs plus a surcharge.
• Financial penalties should not be fixed per-tonne rates, as this could create a "price cap" that disincentivizes domestic reductions; instead, they should be tied to the dynamic costs of Compliance Fund units.
• The compliance system should be distinct from Article 19's dispute settlement provisions; while the former enforces obligations to the global community, the latter should be reserved for specific bilateral claims of direct harm and damages.

APA

Center for International Environmental Law (2000). Comments on Selected Portions of the JWGC Co-Chairs’ “Elements” Paper. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/compliancecomments1.pdf

Chicago

Center for International Environmental Law. Comments on Selected Portions of the JWGC Co-Chairs’ “Elements” Paper. 2000. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/compliancecomments1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite press release |author=Center for International Environmental Law |title=Comments on Selected Portions of the JWGC Co-Chairs’ “Elements” Paper |date=31 January 2000 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/compliancecomments1.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@misc{centerforinternationalenvironmentallaw2000comments, author = {{Center for International Environmental Law}}, title = {{Comments on Selected Portions of the JWGC Co-Chairs’ “Elements” Paper}}, publisher = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2000}, month = jan, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/compliancecomments1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }