Joint implementation Under the Climate Convention: Promises and Problems

The document argues that joint implementation (JI)—meeting emissions targets through actions in another country—could undermine the U.S. commitment to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. It highlights risks such as the lack of an emissions cap in developing countries, the potential for 'double counting' credits, and the risk of locking the U.S. into inefficient domestic technologies. The author recommends that JI only be used for goals beyond mere stabilization and that strict criteria, including environmental impact assessments and minimum standards for host countries, be established by the FCCC Conference of the Parties.

• Joint implementation may prevent the United States from actually returning its domestic greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, potentially signaling to developing countries that the U.S. is not serious about control.
• The cost-effectiveness of joint implementation is not guaranteed because early projects may be 'inframarginal,' and relying on them could lock the U.S. into inefficient technologies that increase the cost of future abatement.
• Joint implementation could create perverse incentives for developing countries to maintain lax environmental standards to attract more projects and ensure more emissions are available for sale.
• There is a risk that joint implementation will discourage developed countries from contributing to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), as JI allows donor countries to receive credit for projects that GEF contributions do not.
• Using forest protection or enhancement as a sink for offsets is prone to 'shell games,' where a host country protects one area while shifting logging to another, and risks replacing primary forests with mono-culture tree farms.
• To ensure true cost-effectiveness, joint implementation projects must account for externalities such as health problems from air pollution and the costs of reliance on foreign oil.

APA

Goldberg, D. M. (1993). Joint implementation Under the Climate Convention: Promises and Problems. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JointImp_CC_Jun1993.pdf

Chicago

Goldberg, Donald M. Joint implementation Under the Climate Convention: Promises and Problems. Center for International Environmental Law, 1993. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JointImp_CC_Jun1993.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Goldberg |first1=Donald M. |title=Joint implementation Under the Climate Convention: Promises and Problems |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=April 1993 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JointImp_CC_Jun1993.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{goldberg1993joint, author = {Goldberg, Donald M.}, title = {{Joint implementation Under the Climate Convention: Promises and Problems}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {1993}, month = apr, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/JointImp_CC_Jun1993.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }