Report to CAN on Compliance Section of Political Agreement (FCCC/CP/20001/L.7)

The document describes a new compliance system for the Kyoto Protocol featuring a two-branch committee: a facilitative branch for all Parties and an enforcement branch for Annex I Parties. Key outcomes include equitable geographical representation for committee members and specific penalties for Annex I Parties exceeding emissions targets, such as a 1.3 tonne deduction for every tonne exceeded in the next commitment period. While the agreement establishes these procedures, it notes that the 'legally binding' nature of these consequences remains unresolved as it would require a Protocol amendment under Article 18.

• The compliance system consists of two branches: a facilitative branch that acts as an "early warning system" for Annex I Parties and a judicial-like enforcement branch that determines if Annex I Parties met targets, reporting requirements, and eligibility tests.
• The membership of both the facilitative and enforcement branches is based on equitable geographical representation, a point of contention that was eventually conceded by Australia.
• Annex I Parties that exceed their emissions targets face three specific consequences: a deduction of 1.3 tonnes from their next commitment period for every tonne exceeded, the requirement to create a detailed compliance plan for review by the enforcement branch, and a prohibition on selling emissions allocations via Article 17 emissions trading.
• Decisions by the enforcement branch can be appealed to the COP/MOP, where a three-quarters majority is required to overturn the branch's decision.
• The agreement does not resolve whether non-compliance consequences are "legally binding" in the sense of an Article 18 amendment, as Japan, Russia, and Australia resisted such measures, leading to the deletion of a political commitment to establish a legally binding instrument.

APA

Wiser, G. (2001). Report to CAN on Compliance Section of Political Agreement (FCCC/CP/20001/L.7). Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/news/ciels-summary-of-the-compliance-mechanism-at-the-bonn-climate-change-conference/

Chicago

Wiser, Glenn. Report to CAN on Compliance Section of Political Agreement (FCCC/CP/20001/L.7). Center for International Environmental Law, 2001. https://www.ciel.org/news/ciels-summary-of-the-compliance-mechanism-at-the-bonn-climate-change-conference/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Wiser |first1=Glenn |title=Report to CAN on Compliance Section of Political Agreement (FCCC/CP/20001/L.7) |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=1 July 2001 |url=https://www.ciel.org/news/ciels-summary-of-the-compliance-mechanism-at-the-bonn-climate-change-conference/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{wiser2001report, author = {Wiser, Glenn}, title = {{Report to CAN on Compliance Section of Political Agreement (FCCC/CP/20001/L.7)}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2001}, month = jul, url = {https://www.ciel.org/news/ciels-summary-of-the-compliance-mechanism-at-the-bonn-climate-change-conference/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }