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The paper analyzes the technical and political requirements for linking cap-and-trade systems in North America, specifically focusing on the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. It argues that while linking reduces overall carbon costs and GDP impacts, it may not significantly mitigate production leakage. The authors identify critical design elements requiring harmonization—such as cap type, offset limits, and enforcement quality—and conclude that divergent national interests make a fully integrated system unlikely, with a minimal U.S.-Canada link and a more significant U.S.-Mexico link being the most probable outcome.

The paper argues that climate change is a global public bad requiring coordinated public-sector intervention. It posits that 'knowledge communities'—groups of experts who produce and share scientific information—are essential for driving the paradigm shifts and technological adoption needed for mitigation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is highlighted as a primary catalyst for this global learning process. The authors also analyze economic instruments for emission reduction, such as the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), taxes, and standards, while noting the difficulties of international cooperation under frameworks like the Kyoto Protocol.

The document analyzes the 'boom and bust' pattern of carbon prices in emissions trading schemes, attributing it to fixed supply facing highly uncertain demand and asymmetric information. It argues that price collapses undermine low-carbon investment and economic efficiency. While rejecting carbon taxation as a viable alternative due to political and implementation hurdles, the author proposes several policy options to stabilize markets, highlighting reserve price auctions in the EU ETS as a feasible, low-complexity mechanism to reduce supply automatically if prices fall too low.

The report details the progress of the UNFCCC negotiations at COP 14 in Poznan, highlighting the operationalization of the Adaptation Fund and the agreement to enter 'full negotiating mode' for 2009. It examines the work of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP, noting a lack of breakthroughs on global emission goals and a divide between developed and developing nations regarding mitigation commitments. The document concludes by outlining the critical issues and deadlines remaining for the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen.

The document analyzes the constraints and opportunities facing the U.S. and China ahead of COP15. It argues that while the U.S. is limited by domestic legislative gridlock in the Senate, China is cautious about assuming an international leadership role despite increasing domestic climate ambition. The authors suggest that a bilateral U.S.-China understanding and the EU's role as a mediator could unlock progress, emphasizing that a pragmatic, incremental agreement is preferable to failure.

The document examines the role of carbon offsets within a cap-and-trade system, specifically focusing on the challenges of certifying reductions from forestry and agriculture. It argues that while offsets can lower compliance costs for capped entities, the rigorous requirements for offsets—being real, additional, verifiable, permanent, and enforceable—can create high transaction costs for certain project types. The authors suggest that instead of forcing all uncapped reductions into an offset framework, policymakers should use a mix of offsets, direct regulations, and incentive payments to achieve the lowest overall cost to the economy.

The document presents a portfolio of 2008 research by Climate Strategies, focusing on the EU ETS, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and G8 climate opportunities. Key analyses include the risks of carbon leakage in industrial sectors, the underperformance of CDM projects in terms of certified emission reductions, and the economic rationale for transitioning from free allowance allocation to auctioning in the EU ETS. It also includes the Eliasch Review on financing global forests and a study on the development of mandatory emissions trading in Japan.

The report details a workshop on border adjustment mechanisms (BAMs) as a tool to combat carbon leakage and transition from free allowance allocation to full auctioning of carbon permits. It argues that BAMs should be limited to a narrow set of carbon-intensive commodities (1-2% of GDP) to avoid becoming protectionist 'sticks' or non-tariff trade barriers. The discussion explores implementation options, such as basing adjustments on 'best available technology' or 'average domestic production', and suggests international coordination to define eligible products, harmonise procedures, and provide flexibility for least developed countries.

The Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs) framework argues that an emergency climate stabilization program is only possible if the international effort-sharing impasse is broken by protecting developmental equity. It proposes a 'development threshold'—set indicatively at $7,500 per person per year (PPP)—below which individuals are exempt from the costs of climate mitigation and adaptation. National obligations are then calculated using a Responsibility and Capacity Indicator (RCI), which combines cumulative emissions since 1990 (responsibility) and income above the threshold (capacity), accounting for intra-national inequality. The report suggests that the United States and European Union bear the largest shares of the global burden, and that wealthy nations must fulfill a 'dual obligation' of aggressive domestic cuts and funding for international reductions to enable the South to decarbonize. To overcome North-South distrust, the authors propose a trust-building period until 2015 characterized by voluntary southern action and legally binding northern commitments.

The report argues that auctioning emissions allowances in the EU ETS is superior to free allocation because it removes price signal distortions, prevents windfall profits, and generates public revenue for climate action and social compensation. While carbon leakage is a primary concern for a small number of energy-intensive manufacturing sub-sectors, the authors find that leakage in the power sector is unlikely due to limited interconnection capacity and long investment cycles. The report recommends a simple, high-frequency, uniform-price auction design and suggests that leakage be addressed through targeted State Aid or border adjustments rather than broad free allocation. Additionally, it highlights that auction revenues can mitigate the regressive nature of carbon pricing by supporting low-income households.

The document examines the economic rationale for auctioning emissions allowances in the EU ETS, arguing that free allocation distorts carbon price signals and creates windfall profits. It suggests that auctioning provides a more transparent framework for low-carbon investment and generates public revenue to support poor households and innovation. While acknowledging carbon leakage as a concern, the report asserts it affects only a narrow range of sectors and can be addressed through targeted State Aid or border adjustments rather than broad free allocation. For the power sector, the report finds no serious leakage concerns and recommends full auctioning. It proposes a simple auction design using single-round, sealed-bid auctions with a uniform market-clearing price.

The report analyzes 43 proposed post-2012 climate regimes, categorizing them into five types: targets with flexibility mechanisms, targets with emissions trading only, policy and sectoral approaches, technology approaches, and other approaches. It argues that while the current project-based CDM is compatible with some regimes, an 'expanded CDM'—incorporating programmatic, policy-based, or sectoral crediting—could vastly increase the volume of greenhouse gas reductions but risks swamping the carbon market if not matched by ambitious developed-country targets. The authors emphasize the 'development dividend'—benefits beyond GHG reductions—and suggest that graduating large emitters (like the BRICSAM nations) from the CDM could improve regional equity for least developed countries (LDCs).

The report analyzes two primary competitiveness concerns: the 'non-Party problem,' where firms in non-participating nations gain an advantage, and the 'implementation problem,' where domestic policy choices create uneven playing fields. It concludes that while some sectors—particularly energy-intensive ones like aluminium—are vulnerable, overall impacts are often moderate. The report also details the complex interface between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO, evaluating the legality of border tax adjustments, energy standards, and subsidies, suggesting that most conflicts arise from the design of specific measures rather than inherent treaty contradictions.

The document examines Russia's progress in meeting Kyoto Protocol compliance requirements and the delays in establishing a domestic Joint Implementation (JI) approval system. It highlights a general lack of political priority for climate change within Russia, where the regime is often viewed as a tool for wealth redistribution. While institutional compliance is nearing completion, inter-ministerial conflict and uncertainties over property rights hinder the launch of JI projects. The paper also notes that domestic debate on post-2012 climate positions has not yet begun, despite Russia's role as the world's third-largest emitter.

The Russian Federation proposed a two-track approach to climate targets: a 'Kyoto track' to simplify the bureaucratic process for countries joining Annex B, and a 'Convention track' to recognize and incentivize voluntary targets by Non-Annex I countries through finance and technology transfer. While Annex B parties generally supported the simplification of accession procedures, Non-Annex I countries expressed skepticism, fearing that voluntary targets could eventually be converted into binding commitments. The report notes that the proposal lacked detail on the allocation of emitting rights for new Annex B members and suggests the initiative may have been driven by internal Russian agency competition.

The letter argues that UK climate action is ineffective unless integrated into a global framework that includes major emitters like the USA, China, and India. It proposes the 'Contraction and Convergence' principle to fairly distribute emissions quotas based on population. The authors advocate for lifestyle changes to curb road and air travel, increased funding for renewable energy—potentially redirected from military R&D—and the use of WTO rules or international law to pressure non-compliant nations.

The document argues that a lasting global climate solution post-2030 must integrate a cap-and-trade scheme, technology development agreements, and assistance for developing countries. It contrasts a "Cap First" strategy, which prioritizes binding emissions targets, with an "Empower First" strategy, which emphasizes creating an enabling environment through technology and development cooperation. The authors suggest that while the Kyoto Protocol established a market value for carbon, future success depends on overcoming political stalemates, re-engaging the US through flexible compliance mechanisms, and implementing equitable target-setting based on countries' levels of development.

The document outlines the causes and consequences of global climate change, highlighting the role of greenhouse gas emissions and the influence of the fossil fuel lobby. It categorizes career paths for scientists and engineers into four areas of positive contribution: understanding the problem, technological solutions, economic solutions, and social/political solutions, while warning against the influence of vested interests.

The Kyoto Protocol establishes a compliance system for Annex I nations that is more robust than typical multilateral environmental agreements, featuring a two-branch Compliance Committee. While the legal binding nature of consequences remains a point of contention among some nations, the system includes specific penalties for exceeding emissions targets, such as a 1.3-ton deduction for every excess ton in the next period and restrictions on emissions trading. The system relies on Article 8 expert review teams to monitor reporting and a quasi-judicial enforcement branch to determine noncompliance.

The report details the compliance framework of the Marrakech Accords, which includes a two-branch compliance committee (facilitative and enforcement) and specific penalties for Annex I Parties that exceed emissions targets. It highlights the tension between the European Union, G-77, and China, who sought a strong regime, and the Umbrella Group (Japan, Canada, Russia, and Australia), who pushed for concessions. A key unresolved issue is whether non-compliance consequences are 'legally binding' under Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, though the author argues the established procedures represent a robust achievement for multilateral environmental agreements.