Report on the Compliance Section of the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol
Summary
The report details the compliance framework of the Marrakech Accords, which includes a two-branch compliance committee (facilitative and enforcement) and specific penalties for Annex I Parties that exceed emissions targets. It highlights the tension between the European Union, G-77, and China, who sought a strong regime, and the Umbrella Group (Japan, Canada, Russia, and Australia), who pushed for concessions. A key unresolved issue is whether non-compliance consequences are 'legally binding' under Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, though the author argues the established procedures represent a robust achievement for multilateral environmental agreements.
Key insights
- The compliance system consists of a compliance committee divided into two branches: a facilitative branch that assists all Parties and acts as an "early warning system" for Annex I Parties, and an enforcement branch that functions as a "judicial-like forum" to determine if Annex I Parties met targets, reporting requirements, and eligibility tests.
- Membership of the compliance committee is based on equitable geographical representation, and decisions are made via double majority voting, requiring approval from both Annex I and non-Annex I member blocs.
- Annex I Parties that exceed their emissions targets face three specific consequences: a deduction of 1.3 tonnes from their subsequent commitment period's assigned amount for every tonne of excess emissions, the requirement to prepare a detailed compliance plan for review by the enforcement branch, and a prohibition on selling emissions allocations via Article 17 emissions trading.
- The report identifies a continuing legal ambiguity regarding whether non-compliance consequences are "legally binding" under Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol, noting that the Umbrella Group successfully added language stating it is the "prerogative" of the COP/MOP to decide the legal form of compliance procedures.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Wiser, G. (2001). Report on the Compliance Section of the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol. Center for International Environmental Law. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Marrakech_Accords_Dec01.pdf
- Chicago
- Wiser, Glenn. Report on the Compliance Section of the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol. Center for International Environmental Law, 2001. https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Marrakech_Accords_Dec01.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Wiser |first1=Glenn |title=Report on the Compliance Section of the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol |publisher=Center for International Environmental Law |date=7 December 2001 |url=https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Marrakech_Accords_Dec01.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{wiser2001report, author = {Wiser, Glenn}, title = {{Report on the Compliance Section of the Marrakech Accords to the Kyoto Protocol}}, institution = {Center for International Environmental Law}, year = {2001}, month = dec, url = {https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Marrakech_Accords_Dec01.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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