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The Russian Federation proposed a two-track approach to climate targets: a 'Kyoto track' to simplify the bureaucratic process for countries joining Annex B, and a 'Convention track' to recognize and incentivize voluntary targets by Non-Annex I countries through finance and technology transfer. While Annex B parties generally supported the simplification of accession procedures, Non-Annex I countries expressed skepticism, fearing that voluntary targets could eventually be converted into binding commitments. The report notes that the proposal lacked detail on the allocation of emitting rights for new Annex B members and suggests the initiative may have been driven by internal Russian agency competition.

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  • The Russian proposal consists of two components: the 'Kyoto track', which seeks to simplify the process for countries not currently in Annex B to join, and the 'Convention track', which proposes a framework for voluntary targets supported by financial and technological incentives.
  • Under the Kyoto track, Russia argues that the current process for joining Annex B is too bureaucratic and suggests replacing the requirement for ratification by 75% of Parties with a COP/MOP decision.
  • The Convention track focuses on Non-Annex I countries, suggesting that voluntary commitments—such as absolute targets, relative targets, or technology targets—should be encouraged via incentives rather than penalties, with no compliance regime.
  • Reactions to the proposal were split: Annex B parties and countries like Japan, the EU, and Canada were generally positive, whereas Non-Annex I countries, including China, India, and Saudi Arabia, were skeptical, viewing the proposal as potentially leading to future binding targets for developing nations.
  • The report's analysis highlights a critical omission in the Russian proposal: it does not address how emitting rights would be allocated to countries joining Annex B, which could significantly increase the Kyoto cap (e.g., Belarus adding 34.6 Mt CO2e per year).

Cite the original document

APA
Korppoo, A. (2007). WORKSHOP REPORT: RUSSIAN VOLUNTARY TARGETS PROPOSAL. Climate Strategies. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/voluntary-targets-workshop-report.pdf
Chicago
Korppoo, Anna. WORKSHOP REPORT: RUSSIAN VOLUNTARY TARGETS PROPOSAL. Climate Strategies, 2007. https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/voluntary-targets-workshop-report.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Korppoo |first1=Anna |title=WORKSHOP REPORT: RUSSIAN VOLUNTARY TARGETS PROPOSAL |publisher=Climate Strategies |date=2007 |url=https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/voluntary-targets-workshop-report.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{korppoo2007workshop, author = {Korppoo, Anna}, title = {{WORKSHOP REPORT: RUSSIAN VOLUNTARY TARGETS PROPOSAL}}, institution = {Climate Strategies}, year = {2007}, url = {https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/voluntary-targets-workshop-report.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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