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WWF and Carbon Market Watch argue that the EU Industrial Strategy must prioritise the decarbonisation of Energy Intensive Industries (EIIs), which account for approximately 16% of the EU's annual CO2 emissions. The authors propose ten 'asks', including the creation of an Independent Observatory to monitor progress, the implementation of emission performance standards, and the phase-out of free emission allowances in the EU Emission Trading System. They emphasize that investment should be directed toward zero-carbon technologies, specifically in the chemicals, steel, and cement sectors, while limiting Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) to unavoidable process emissions.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU should replace the free allocation of emission allowances in the EU ETS with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to ensure polluters pay for their emissions. The organization asserts there is no evidence of carbon leakage and proposes that a CBAM should be used as a tool for international climate diplomacy, exempt Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, and be based on carbon performance benchmarks for sectors including steel, cement, chemicals, and power.

A coalition of European civil society organisations urges the EU to align its Industrial Strategy with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target, advocating for climate neutrality by 2040 and a 65% emissions reduction by 2030. The recommendations emphasize a transition to a circular economy, the phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies, and the prioritisation of renewable electrification over hydrogen and CCS. The authors call for a 'just transition' that protects vulnerable communities and workers through retraining and the exclusion of fossil fuel investments from the Just Transition Mechanism.

The report identifies a trend of 'carbon leakage' where EU countries import electricity from non-EU 'offshore carbon havens'—specifically Turkey, Ukraine, Morocco, and the Western Balkans—that lack carbon pricing. Net imports into EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) countries rose from 3TWh in 2017 to 21TWh in 2019, with imported electricity emitting an estimated 26 million tonnes of CO2 in 2019. The document warns that up to 57GW of new coal power could be developed in connected or soon-to-be connected non-EU countries, potentially undermining EU emissions cuts. To address this, the authors propose a border carbon adjustment (BCA) for electricity imports to level the playing field for generators, protect low-carbon investments, and incentivise neighbouring states to adopt their own carbon pricing mechanisms.

The report finds that the EU ETS region is increasingly importing electricity from non-EU neighbors with high carbon intensities, effectively importing emissions and creating 'offshore carbon havens'. In 2019, the EU ETS region imported 26 million tonnes of CO2, with a net import of 20 million tonnes. The authors argue that the disparity in carbon pricing gives a competitive advantage to high-carbon generators in countries like Turkey, Ukraine, and the Western Balkans. To combat this, the report recommends a border carbon adjustment (BCA) on gross electricity imports to protect the integrity of EU climate policy and incentivize decarbonization in neighboring states. It also warns that planned increases in interconnection capacity (31% by 2030) and new coal power projects (up to 57GW) in connected non-EU countries will exacerbate the problem.

The document details Carbon Market Watch's efforts to ensure a 'green recovery' following the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically by countering corporate lobbying and pushing for more ambitious EU climate targets. It critiques the lack of progress in global carbon market rules (Article 6) and the perceived irrelevance of the CORSIA aviation scheme. The briefing advocates for expanding the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to include international shipping and phasing out free pollution permits for heavy industry. It also assesses the inadequacy of national energy and climate plans in several EU member states and warns against the misuse of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies as a substitute for emission cuts.

The paper outlines how the UK can align its trade policy with the Paris Agreement to capitalise on a low-carbon market estimated at £1.0–1.8 trillion annually by 2030. It identifies UK strengths in offshore wind, gas turbines, and financial services, and proposes a structured approach to FTAs. The authors categorise FTA provisions into 'triple wins' (tariffs, services, and standards), 'policy coherence' (intellectual property and procurement), and 'policy cooperation' (sustainable development chapters, private standards, and environmental taxes). It concludes with a checklist for policy-makers to ensure trade deals support climate-resilient development.

The report compiles research on enhancing global climate action, focusing on innovative financing mechanisms like microfinance and debt-for-climate swaps, the role of carbon pricing in driving innovation, and the necessity of robust accountability frameworks for the Paris Agreement. It also examines specific urban water resiliency in Patna, India, and proposes a Low-Emissions Technology Commitment within the UNFCCC to accelerate energy research. The proceedings emphasize the need for a multi-level approach to adaptation and the potential for 'climate clubs' to overcome multilateral deadlock.

The document addresses the tension between the pursuit of a green economy and the existing international trade system. It argues that while Rio+20 provided general guidance, it failed to establish what constitutes 'appropriate state behaviour' regarding green industrial policies, such as subsidies and local content requirements. The author highlights a rise in trade frictions—including disputes between the U.S., China, and the EU over solar and wind technology—and asserts that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism is ill-suited to resolve these issues because they stem from a lack of international consensus on policy propriety rather than simple rule breaches. The text advocates for the creation of an institutional space, such as through UNCTAD, to evaluate the effectiveness of green tools and their impacts on trading partners, particularly developing nations, to ensure a just transition.

The report analyzes the global shift in carbon pricing dynamics away from a US-centric model toward Asia-Pacific initiatives, including Korea, Australia, and Chinese pilot schemes. It argues that while the US Federal government remains deadlocked, other industrialised nations must implement carbon pricing to avoid stranded assets and maintain international credibility. Using the EU ETS as a primary case study, the document highlights the effectiveness of cap-and-trade in delivering operational emission savings and the importance of 'easing policies' like free allocation to protect trade-exposed, carbon-intensive industries. It emphasizes that carbon pricing is a 'necessary but not sufficient' tool, requiring complementary measures such as energy efficiency programs and strategic revenue recycling to support low-carbon innovation. The author suggests that regional cooperation and the potential for 'border levelling' measures after 2020 may be necessary if global agreements fail.

The document examines the conflict between developed and developing nations regarding the integration of agriculture into climate agreements. It highlights fears from G-77 countries that internationally agreed 'good practice' standards for agricultural emissions could be used as unilateral trade barriers or non-tariff restrictions. The report also addresses concerns over food security, price increases, and opposition to market-based mitigation mechanisms, suggesting that referencing Article 3.5 of the Convention may provide a viable legal compromise to build trust and advance negotiations.

The document examines how unilateral carbon pricing creates production cost variations that may lead to 'carbon leakage'—the relocation of production to regions with less stringent environmental standards. It analyzes policy mechanisms to mitigate these risks, such as free allowances and Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), while highlighting the industry's strategic role in providing essential materials for low-carbon infrastructure. The brief argues that because the mining and metals sector is emissions-intensive and trade-exposed, policy design must account for specific commodity characteristics and long investment cycles to avoid jeopardizing economic viability and environmental integrity.

The report examines the economic and environmental impacts of carbon pricing on industrial competitiveness and the risk of carbon leakage, where emissions shift to jurisdictions with less stringent policies. It analyzes six policy options—border taxes, mandatory allowance purchases, embedded carbon product standards, aid to industry, free allowances, and sectoral approaches—concluding that while border carbon adjustments (BCAs) are theoretically more effective at reducing leakage in specific sectors, they face significant technical, administrative, and WTO legal challenges. The document emphasizes that only a small fraction of GDP (typically less than 1%) is truly at risk, primarily in energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors like cement, steel, and aluminum.

The document examines border carbon adjustments (BCAs) as a tool for OECD countries to protect domestic industries from 'unregulated' foreign competition and prevent carbon leakage. It identifies trade-exposed energy-intensive sectors—such as iron, steel, and chemicals—as the most vulnerable. The analysis highlights significant WTO legal hurdles, including national treatment and most-favoured-nation obligations, and suggests that any legal BCA would likely require a firm-by-firm carbon footprint calculation and prior attempts at multilateral agreement. Administratively, the author notes the difficulty of establishing a common metric to compare diverse climate policies and the risk of 'punishing domestic manufacturers' if only basic raw materials are covered. Geopolitically, the document argues that BCAs may conflict with the UNFCCC principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' and could provoke 'vitriolic' reactions from developing countries, potentially hindering international climate negotiations.

The document examines border carbon adjustments (BCAs) as a tool to level the playing field between domestic producers facing climate costs and foreign producers who do not. It identifies key vulnerable sectors—steel, aluminum, paper, chemicals, and cement—and analyzes the significant legal hurdles under WTO rules, specifically the national treatment and most-favoured nation principles. The author argues that for a BCA to be WTO-legal, it would require complex firm-by-firm carbon accounting and a prior good-faith effort toward multilateral agreements. Furthermore, the paper warns that BCAs could be perceived as 'eco-imperialism' and might undermine international climate negotiations, particularly with developing countries like China.

The document defines embodied carbon as the CO2 emitted throughout a product's manufacturing process and discusses the tension between production-based and consumption-based accounting in climate agreements. It evaluates measurement tools like Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) and ecological footprint analysis, noting significant data gaps and methodological challenges. The paper highlights how embodied carbon affects competitiveness and the potential for trade measures, such as border carbon adjustments, while questioning their compatibility with non-discrimination principles in multilateral trade law.

The report examines the nexus of trade and climate change, focusing on the liberalization of environmental goods, border carbon adjustments, embodied carbon, intellectual property rights, clean energy investment, and product standards. It argues that while trade policy can facilitate the diffusion of low-carbon technologies, it must be carefully aligned with development goals to avoid creating non-tariff barriers for developing nations. The document highlights the tension between protecting domestic industrial competitiveness and maintaining WTO compliance, particularly regarding processes and production methods (PPMs). It concludes that trade liberalization alone is insufficient and must be complemented by financial assistance, technology transfer, and regulatory frameworks to achieve significant emissions reductions.

The author contends that EU climate policies, including CBAM, EUDR, and maritime regulations, are unilaterally imposed and threaten African economic development. The text highlights risks such as an $11 billion annual loss for exporters under EUDR and a potential 0.91% reduction in Africa's GDP due to CBAM. It further criticizes the EU-ETS and FuelEU Maritime for increasing freight costs for African consumers and extracting USD 3–5 billion annually without reinvesting in African sustainability. The document recommends that the EU redirect revenues from CBAM and the Innovation Fund to support Africa's green transition and align maritime measures with the IMO's Net-Zero Framework.

The author argues that the FfD4 outcome document, the 'Compromiso de Sevilla', prioritises consensus over transformation and fails to provide the necessary commitments to support developing countries. Key criticisms include the weakening of trade facilitation commitments, the lack of a review mechanism for special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions, and insufficient action against unilateral trade-distorting measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment mechanism (CBAM). The text further highlights a lack of meaningful obligations for value addition in critical minerals and commodities, as well as a failure to address systemic challenges regarding technological monopolies and the need for co-development agreements to support climate-resilient development.

The report finds that while there is some progress in governance—such as the African Union's permanent seat in the G20 and a third chair for Africa on the IMF Executive Board—most substantive financial reforms are lagging. It highlights a critical gap in climate finance, noting that Africa receives only 20% of global adaptation flows despite needing US$277 billion annually. The document argues that the current GFA is 'ill-equipped' to handle Africa's debt crises and high borrowing costs, with the cost of capital in Africa being 5% or higher than in other regions. Key areas of 'no progress' include the overhaul of the G20 Common Framework for debt treatment and the reform of the IMF quota system. The report recommends prioritizing the reduction of borrowing costs, enhancing transparency in 'new and additional' climate finance, and establishing an African Credit Rating Agency to counter subjective international assessments.