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The report finds that while agrarian reform settlements occupy only 8% of the Amazon biome, they accounted for 24% of its forest loss in 2023. Deforestation is highly concentrated, with 5% of settlements responsible for 65% of the deforested area between 2017 and 2023. Evidence suggests that forest loss is driven by external actors rather than resident settlers, as 75% of vegetation loss in these areas involves plots larger than 6.25 hectares, a pattern inconsistent with small-scale family farming. The report highlights that three INCRA regional superintendencies—Santarém, Amazonas, and Southern Pará—account for 63% of deforestation in settled areas. It recommends that the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA), IBAMA, and INCRA implement targeted action plans for these priority settlements to enhance conservation effectiveness.

The report analyzes the employment opportunities arising from Jharkhand's energy transition, projecting significant job growth in green molecules, clean power, and clean mobility. It presents two scenarios: an Ambitious Policy Scenario (APS) and an Accelerated Green Transition Scenario (AGTS), estimating that by 2030, the state could create between 392,742 and 630,096 total direct and indirect green jobs. The document emphasizes the need for private investment and specialized skilling to transition a workforce currently heavily reliant on the solid fossil fuel mining sector.

Climate finance for land use in Brazil averaged R$ 88.1 billion annually from 2021 to 2023, a 145% increase over the 2015-2020 period. Domestic sources provided 97% of these funds, with rural credit serving as the primary instrument (58% of total flows). While mitigation remains the dominant climate use (57%), there was a significant surge in 'loss and damage' payments, which grew 357% between 2021 and 2023 due to government indemnities for extreme weather events. The report highlights a heavy reliance on self-declared sustainable practices in rural credit and a decline in thematic bonds, while noting the critical role of the federal budget in supporting native forests.

In 2023, IDFC members committed $199 billion in green finance, a 31% decrease from 2022, largely due to currency depreciation in East Asia and the Pacific and the adoption of more conservative tracking methodologies. Climate finance dominated at 98% of total green finance, with mitigation accounting for 89% of that amount. Adaptation finance fell significantly to $10.5 billion, while biodiversity finance reached its lowest level since 2020 at $8.2 billion. The report emphasizes the role of public development banks (PDBs) in providing transformative finance and calls for the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) to integrate 'transformational criteria' to better catalyze private investment.

In 2021/22, Nigeria received USD 2.5 billion in climate finance, a 32% increase from 2019/20, yet this remains far below the estimated annual need of USD 29.7 billion. Public actors provided 70% of the funding, led by multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs), while private finance accounted for 30%, primarily driven by corporate investments in solar PV. Mitigation efforts, particularly in energy systems, dominated the landscape, while adaptation finance reached only USD 735 million, covering just 6% of annual needs. The report highlights a heavy reliance on debt-based financing, which is concerning given Nigeria's high debt-servicing costs. Key barriers include the high cost of capital, a lack of bankable projects, and data gaps. The authors recommend operationalizing the National Climate Change Fund, prioritizing anticipatory adaptation, and pursuing innovative financing such as green bonds and debt-for-climate swaps.

The report finds a positive trend in European pension funds' commitment to sustainable investing, with significant growth in the adoption of mitigation targets and climate risk management. However, a persistent gap remains between these commitments and actual real-economy impact, as pension funds rarely invest directly in projects and often hold fragmented indirect ownership. The analysis highlights that larger funds, those in net-zero coalitions, and funds in countries with strong regulatory frameworks—such as the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and France—are leading the transition. Key challenges include the gap between asset ownership and management, the difficulty of transitioning passive investments, and limited capital flow to emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs).

The report identifies a significant 'charging access gap' for U.S. residents in multifamily housing (MFH), who often lack on-site charging and must rely on public infrastructure. Analyzing 69 cities, the study found that no city achieved a 'best in class' ranking, with many cities—particularly in the Upper Midwest and Texas—showing high ratios of MFH units per public charger. The authors argue that this lack of reliable charging is a critical barrier to equitable EV adoption, especially for lower-income and non-white drivers. To address this, the report recommends a combination of EV-ready building codes, right-to-charge laws, curbside charging expansions, and streamlined utility interconnection rules.

The report finds that Australia, Canada, and the UK (the "Big Three") have historically and currently dominated fossil fuel extraction emissions within the Commonwealth. While these wealthy nations have the highest emissions, they are the least economically dependent on fossil fuel rents. In contrast, lower- and middle-income countries like Nigeria and Papua New Guinea are more exposed to financial risks from carbon liabilities. The report concludes that Commonwealth production plans are inconsistent with the 1.5°C goal, with the Big Three's share of the gap between Business as Usual and Net Zero scenarios exceeding 50%.

Since 2023, Chinese firms have committed over US$100 billion in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) across at least 130 major cleantech transactions, spanning solar, wind, batteries, and new energy vehicles (NEVs). This 'going global' strategy is driven by domestic overcapacity, which has caused solar module prices to drop 60% and battery prices 50% year-on-year, and a need to circumvent trade barriers from the US and EU. The report highlights China's dominance in the global battery supply chain, where it holds over 80% of manufacturing capacity, and its expansion into markets like Morocco, Brazil, and Thailand. For Australia, the report notes that Chinese OFDI reached a multi-decade low of US$613 million in 2023, and argues that Australia should clarify its foreign investment rules to attract Chinese private capital for onshore value-adding in critical minerals and renewable energy infrastructure.

The Institute for Economic Justice argues against the National Treasury's proposal for a binding fiscal rule in South Africa, claiming it misdiagnoses the debt problem by focusing on the quantum of debt rather than the cost of borrowing. Drawing on case studies from Brazil and Indonesia, the paper asserts that fiscal rules often lead to 'creative accounting', inappropriate budget cuts to social services, and reduced flexibility during crises, without necessarily lowering borrowing costs. The authors suggest that sustainable public finances can only be achieved through economic expansion, progressive revenue mobilization, and direct interventions to lower interest rates.

The document argues that claiming climate credits for LNG exports is likely impossible and environmentally unsound. It highlights the difficulty of proving 'additionality'—that exports actually cause a switch from coal to gas—and warns that such a mechanism could lead to overstated emissions reductions. The author concludes that any feasible route to these credits would require costly subsidies that would violate Canada's own policies and lock in fossil fuel infrastructure.

The report finds that the majority of Lloyd's managing agents lack formal policies to stop underwriting new fossil fuel projects, contradicting the market's net-zero goals. While some have restricted coal, very few have restricted oil and gas, and none have restricted LNG export terminals. The analysis identifies specific deals where Lloyd's syndicates provided coverage for major US coal mines, Arctic oil and gas assets, and US LNG terminals.

The document identifies significant obstacles to Colombia's transition from thermal coal, including heavy fiscal dependence on coal royalties, weak subnational institutional capacities, and long-term environmental liabilities. It emphasizes that while the national government has made commitments, local regions like Cesar and La Guajira face severe risks from unplanned mine closures and a lack of diversified economic alternatives. The brief recommends establishing a permanent transition fund, strengthening local government competencies, and ensuring inclusive planning that protects the rights of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities.

The report examines the gap between high-integrity net zero standards—such as those from the UN High-Level Expert Group (HLEG)—and the actual practices of corporations and financial institutions (FIs). It identifies significant shortcomings in target coverage, fossil fuel phase-out policies, and the credibility of transition plans. The authors argue that voluntary commitments are often unrealistic without government intervention and propose a 'road to regulation' consisting of an 'accountability lane' for oversight and an 'ambition lane' to translate voluntary pledges into economy-wide policy mandates.

The report argues that the global push to triple renewable energy capacity must prioritize the quality of investments over quantity to avoid 'green extractivism'. It introduces three core criteria for public finance: driving a 100% renewable future by phasing out fossil fuels, ensuring democratic energy systems through grants and decentralization, and centering human rights and nature. The document criticizes multilateral development banks (MDBs) for continuing to fund fossil gas and relying on debt-creating loans rather than grants. Through case studies in India, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Indonesia, it contrasts the harms of large-scale, profit-driven projects with the benefits of community-led, small-scale renewable energy solutions.

The document evaluates three industry-proposed methods for reducing carbon emissions from gas plants: hydrogen cofiring, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and biomethane. It concludes that these approaches often fail to achieve targeted emissions reductions when full life cycle impacts—such as upstream methane leakage, energy penalties, and production emissions—are considered. Furthermore, the brief argues that these technologies perpetuate environmental and social inequities by maintaining the operation of gas plants. In contrast, the report finds that transitioning to renewable energy sources like wind and solar provides superior reductions in carbon, air, and water pollution while offering lower costs and fewer land-use impacts.

G20 governments provided at least USD 168 billion in public financial support for renewable power in 2023, which is less than one third of the USD 535 billion provided in fossil fuel subsidies that same year. Advanced G20 economies and China provided 95% of this support, primarily targeting solar and wind energy. To achieve the COP 28 goal of tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030, annual public support may need to double to approximately USD 336 billion.

The document details a conference focused on the marginalization of Africa within the global economic system, specifically regarding the legacy of structural adjustment and the current lack of representative governance in international financial institutions. It identifies critical barriers to African development, including inflated risk premiums that cost the continent over $74 billion annually and the failure of the Global North to deliver over $1 trillion in promised climate financing. The report proposes a tiered reform agenda: short-term priorities include debt cancellation and increased access to Special Drawing Rights; medium-term goals focus on improving credit ratings through better data and combating illicit financial flows; and long-term goals aim for greater representation in the IMF and World Bank. Additionally, it explores the potential for Africa to leverage its natural capital and critical minerals for the energy transition, while cautioning against new dependencies on China as the world shifts toward a multipolar order.

Reclaim Finance analyzed the decarbonization targets of 30 major banks, finding that most are overly complex and fail to link target achievement with actual corporate emission reductions. The report specifically criticizes the use of financed or facilitated emissions, which can be influenced by corporate value changes rather than emissions, and recommends shifting toward targets based on reduced finance for fossil fuel companies, physical intensity for industrial sectors, and absolute emissions without value-based attribution.

Ember's briefing evaluates the EU's current grid policy framework, which includes the Grid Action Plan and revised Electricity Market Design. While identifying over 80 action points for implementation, the analysis highlights risks regarding the lack of target dates for many Commission-led actions and underutilised funding for Distribution System Operators (DSOs). To address these gaps, Ember recommends establishing a "Future Grids" Task Force for coordination, a one-stop-shop to simplify access to financing, and a Technical Toolbox to accelerate the digitalisation of distribution grids.