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The report finds that US financial institutions are primary drivers of global LNG expansion, providing billions in financing and investments despite climate pledges. Between 2021 and 2023, 85 US banks provided US$51.2 billion to LNG expansion, with six major banks accounting for 80% of this total. US investors held US$179.6 billion in assets of top LNG developers as of May 2024. The document highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero commitments and their actual policies, which lack restrictions on LNG. It warns that new LNG infrastructure risks creating stranded assets, particularly in Europe, and contributes to substantial greenhouse gas emissions, including high levels of methane leakage from US shale gas fields.

The report finds that French financial institutions are among the top global supporters of LNG expansion, with four banks providing nearly all of the US$14 billion in financing between 2021 and 2023. It highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero pledges and their continued funding of LNG export and import terminals, including support for TotalEnergies. The document argues that current sector policies are insufficient due to loopholes regarding corporate financing and import terminals, and calls for a comprehensive end to financial services for new LNG projects.

The report argues that the US can significantly reduce its reliance on newly mined minerals for electric vehicle (EV) batteries by prioritizing energy efficiency, right-sizing battery range, and implementing robust recycling policies. Through a 'Very Low Demand Scenario,' the authors demonstrate that newly mined lithium needs could be reduced by 48% from 2025 to 2050, saving 1.5 million metric tons of material. The analysis emphasizes that while electrification is essential for decarbonization, a systems-wide approach—including investments in public transit and rail to reduce vehicle miles traveled (VMT)—is necessary to create a sustainable and just supply chain.

The report finds a significant gap between renewable energy targets and actual projects in development across the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region. While six CCA countries have targets totaling 43 GW of renewable additions by 2030–2040, only 30 GW are in development, leaving a 13 GW deficit. Fossil fuel expansion remains dominant, with more than three times as much fossil capacity under construction (11.8 GW of oil and gas plus coal) as wind and utility-scale solar (3.5 GW). Azerbaijan, the COP29 host, is highlighted for limited ambition, with no wind or solar projects in development beyond 2027, calling into question its commitment to a 30% renewable share by 2030.

The We Mean Business Coalition describes the COP29 finance deal as insufficient, noting that the $300bn figure falls short of developing countries' needs. While the coalition views the 'Baku to Belém Roadmap' as a positive step for scaling public finance, it argues that the final agreement missed a leadership opportunity by omitting specific language on transitioning from fossil fuels. The coalition highlights that the global market for clean technologies is projected to exceed $2 trillion by 2035 and calls for 1.5°C-aligned Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mobilize private investment.

COP 29 concluded with a new climate finance goal of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing countries, though this remains below their identified needs. The conference saw a lack of progress on the COP 28 energy package, including the rejection of proposals for annual progress reports on transitioning away from fossil fuels and a failure to reiterate calls to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. While the national adaptation plan (NAP) assessment was delayed to 2025, agreements were reached on indicators for the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience and the establishment of the Baku Adaptation Road Map. Additionally, the Lima work programme on gender was extended by 10 years, but the document notes a failure to explicitly address human rights and gender-responsive finance in the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) decision.

The document outlines the role of supply-side policies in accelerating the transition to zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) by influencing manufacturers to increase the production and sale of compliant vehicles. It highlights a broader analysis of ZEV policies in eight specific markets—Australia, Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, the United States, and South Africa—to identify policy gaps and the link between policy design and the mobilization of financing.

The World Resources Institute warns that proposed amendments to the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) risk 'defanging' the law through the creation of a 'no-risk' country category, the use of an outdated 1990 reference year for forest assessments, and ambiguous language that creates uncertainty for stakeholders and potential trade disputes.

As of October 2024, there are 12,241 committed electric school buses in the U.S., with nearly 5,000 already delivered or operating. Adoption is heavily driven by the EPA's Clean School Bus Program, which funds 67% of all commitments and prioritizes high-poverty, rural, and tribal districts. While California leads in absolute numbers, the Northeast and Midwest have seen significant percentage increases. Seven states have enacted statutory zero-emission transition requirements, and WRI projects that 62% of all school bus sales will be electric by 2032 following revised EPA greenhouse gas emission standards.

Global warming projections for 2100 have remained stagnant since 2021, with current policies leading to a median estimate of 2.7°C of warming. While clean energy investments now double those for fossil fuels, record-high fossil fuel subsidies and funding for prolonging projects are preventing the steep emissions decline required by the Paris Agreement. The briefing emphasizes that seven large emitters and the COP Troika countries, responsible for 63% of 2022 global emissions, must set more ambitious 2030 and 2035 targets to align with 1.5°C.

The Oil & Gas Decarbonization Charter, launched at COP28 by 50 companies, is criticized for focusing on upstream operational emissions while ignoring the larger impact of burning produced fuels. Analysis shows that between January and September 2024, Charter members approved 68 new oil and gas fields containing 14 billion barrels of oil equivalent, which could release nearly 5 billion metric tonnes of CO2. Ten companies, including ADNOC, Saudi Aramco, Petrobras, TotalEnergies, and Shell, are responsible for over 90 percent of these new reserves. These projects represent a commitment of nearly USD 250 billion in expenditure. While the IEA's 1.5ºC pathway requires global production to decline by nearly 20 percent by 2030, Charter companies are projected to increase their production by 17 percent by 2030.

The report finds that 10 major international oil companies (IOCs) are responsible for 7% of global gas flaring on an equity-weighted basis, with a significant portion occurring at non-operated assets. In 2023, total global upstream flaring was 145 billion cubic meters (bcm), with an average intensity of 5.0 m³/bbl. The analysis highlights a gap between corporate commitments to the World Bank's Zero Routine Flaring (ZRF) initiative and actual performance, noting that non-routine flaring remains largely unabated and that no analyzed company meets the IEA's Net Zero Emissions scenario target of 0.3 m³/bbl by 2030. The report argues that IOCs have a broader influence on up to 40% of global flaring through their partnerships with national oil companies (NOCs) and recommends extending emissions targets to non-operated assets and implementing stricter regulatory and financial levers.

The document argues that green bonds are an under-utilised tool that could help Africa meet its estimated USD 2.8 trillion climate finance need by 2030. While the global green bond market reached approximately USD 2.8 trillion in 2023, Africa's share is less than 1%, representing only USD 5.1 billion. The paper highlights successful issuances in South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia, while identifying key barriers such as low liquidity, inadequate regulation, and high transaction costs. It calls for stronger public-private collaboration and international support at COP29 to create enabling environments for green bond proliferation in Africa.

The report details Brazil's recent efforts to institutionalize the bioeconomy under President Lula da Silva, highlighted by the creation of the National Secretariat of Bioeconomy (SNB) and the 2024 National Bioeconomy Strategy. It analyzes the bioeconomy through three lenses: biotechnological, bioresources, and bioecological, noting that the current national strategy primarily aligns with the bioecological vision. The document maps the roles of multiple ministries—including the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change (MMA), the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services (MDIC), and the Ministry of Finance (MF)—in implementing this framework. It also identifies complementary regulations such as the Fuel of the Future Law and the Productive Forests National Program, while emphasizing the upcoming National Bioeconomy Development Plan (PNDBIO) as a key opportunity for cross-sectoral coordination.

Non-CO2 emissions account for approximately 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions, yet they are frequently overlooked in NDCs, which often lack gas-specific quantitative targets. While some countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Japan provide good practice examples of quantitative targets, major emitters including China, Russia, India, and Brazil generally only include non-CO2 gases as part of overall GHG targets. China, whose current NDC covers only CO2 despite non-CO2 gases making up 18% of its national emissions, has indicated it will include these gases in its updated NDC. The brief argues that the 2025 NDC update cycle is a critical opportunity for major emitters, particularly China, to adopt sector-specific targets and align with international initiatives like the Global Methane Pledge and the Kigali Amendment to maintain the 1.5°C warming limit.

The report evaluates several major global climate pledges, finding that most are currently off-track. While there are isolated successes—such as the UK closing its last coal plant and growth in electric car sales—critical goals like tripling renewable energy by 2030 and halting deforestation are not being met. The document highlights a significant gap between high-level commitments and implementation, particularly in the financial sector where net-zero plans are deemed insufficient and fossil fuel subsidies have reached record highs. It calls for a shift from loose networks to platforms of accountability as countries develop their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025.

The report finds that while some progress has been made since 2015, the EU and UK failed to meet the 2020 deadline to end overfishing. Nearly one quarter of assessed TACs for 2024 still exceed scientific advice, with particularly poor compliance for bycatch and data-limited stocks. The report highlights a lack of transparency in negotiations and calls for a genuine ecosystem-based approach to TAC-setting for 2025 and beyond.

The report analyzes private climate finance for Brazil's land use sector, focusing on thematic bonds, CBIOs, and BNDES operations. It finds that bioenergy and biofuels are the primary recipients of these flows, though thematic bond issuance for land use declined sharply between 2021 and 2023. The BNDES remains a central actor through direct credit, blended finance pilots, and the management of the Amazon and Climate Funds.

The Union of Concerned Scientists is launching a national campaign to protect government scientists and scientific research from political attacks, specifically citing the Project 2025 agenda as a source of intensified threats. The organization intends to combat disinformation, hold corporate actors accountable, and advance clean energy and democracy goals at the state level to mitigate federal-level risks to climate progress, transportation, and global security.

The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) is a financial market infrastructure designed to enable instant cross-border payments across Africa using local currencies, reducing reliance on foreign currencies like the US dollar and Euro. While supported by the AU and AfCFTA, the system faces significant hurdles, including low awareness—with 39% of business leaders unaware of it—and fragmented regulatory frameworks. Despite these challenges, as of May 2024, 13 African central banks, over 115 commercial banks, and 10 payment switches have connected to the system. The report recommends harmonizing regulations, investing in digital infrastructure, and improving data transparency to unlock the system's potential for economic integration.