Search Climate Insights Directory

The briefing analyzes the Biden Administration's 2021 climate security reports, identifying climate change as a 'shaping threat' that necessitates a reexamination of national security assumptions. It argues that climate risks are current and future, wide-ranging, and exacerbate other security concerns, particularly in competition with China. The authors propose five 2022 priorities: mainstreaming climate security in regional strategies, linking adaptation with conflict prevention, maximizing whole-of-government science collaboration, increasing support for allies, and utilizing strategic foresight for worst-case scenarios.

The U.S. Government Global Water Strategy 2022-2027 establishes a whole-of-government approach to achieve a water-secure world. It prioritizes four strategic objectives: strengthening sector governance and financing, increasing equitable access to climate-resilient water and sanitation services, improving the conservation of freshwater resources, and reducing water-related conflict. The strategy emphasizes local leadership, the needs of marginalized populations, and the integration of climate resilience. Implementation is coordinated through the Interagency Water Working Group (IWWG) and focuses on High-Priority Countries (HPCs) identified by a data-driven needs and opportunity index. Specific agency plans from USAID, the Department of State, CDC, and others detail how they will leverage technical expertise, diplomatic engagement, and financial tools to meet these goals.

The authors contend that climate change acts as a 'destabilizing force' and 'threat multiplier' that fundamentally shapes geopolitical risks, affecting U.S. interests regarding China, Russia, and other global threats. They highlight how environmental degradation drives military activity in the Arctic and allows China to gain influence in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, the text notes that climate-related disasters and heat extremes directly undermine U.S. military readiness by damaging installations and limiting training. The authors suggest that while the U.S. must remain vigilant against adversaries, climate and biodiversity cooperation could serve as a pillar for diplomatic engagement.

The report argues that the United States must shift from biological risk management to an aggressive strategy of pandemic prevention and the obsolescence of biological weapons. It proposes a "10+10 over 10" budget plan, investing $20 billion annually for ten years—split equally between biological weapons deterrence and global health security. Key recommendations include doubling the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) budget, expanding the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) to $400 million annually, and restructuring the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for greater independence. The authors emphasize a systemic approach combining pathogen-agnostic early warning systems, rapid medical countermeasure manufacturing, and robust international cooperation to deny attackers success in causing mass casualties.

Following a November 2021 phone call between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping, the Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) advocates for a shift in U.S. arms control policy toward a multilateral framework. The author suggests that progress with China can be achieved by focusing on 'strategic stability and risk reduction,' specifically proposing agreements to avoid arming cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, which would not require China to reduce its current arsenal.

The author highlights the shared history of underestimating the effects of both climate change and nuclear weapons. The text details how nuclear detonations cause immediate blast damage and long-term atmospheric disruptions, such as 'nuclear winter', which mirror the systemic risks of the climate crisis. It warns that current geopolitical instability, exacerbated by climate-driven resource scarcity, increases the risk of nuclear conflict, particularly in South Asia. The author calls for a revival of public discourse on nuclear risks to match the current momentum for climate action.

The document examines DARPA's contribution to U.S. national security through high-risk, high-reward research, specifically highlighting its role in enabling COVID-19 vaccine development via earlier mRNA investments. It identifies internal risks—such as leadership gaps in biological expertise and high personnel turnover—and proposes structural reforms. Key recommendations include lengthening Program Manager terms, creating a discretionary 'seedling' budget for innovative ideas, expanding the search for international performers, and renaming the Biological Technologies Office to the Biological Sciences Office to broaden its scope. The authors argue that DARPA must better align its aggressive timelines with the inherent constraints of biological research and improve transitions to commercial or military partners to avoid the 'Valley of Death'.

The briefing argues that nuclear risk reduction requires moving beyond general policy statements toward concrete affirmations of restraint. It suggests four types of declarations: acknowledging the futility of first use, strengthening 'last resort' promises by removing exceptions for non-nuclear states, adopting multi-person decision protocols to prevent rash individual actions, and clarifying strategic ambiguities. Additionally, the author proposes 'CATALINK', a secure, encrypted, and multipolar nuclear hotline to replace outdated bilateral links and facilitate crisis communication in a multipolar world.

The report consists of several independent briefers analyzing how climate change acts as a threat multiplier across various domains. Key analyses include the evolution of 'environmental terrorism' from a tactical to a strategic threat, the need to integrate peacebuilding with climate adaptation in fragile regions like the Sahel, and the shifting geopolitics of energy security as the world transitions to renewables. It also assesses specific vulnerabilities of U.S. Space Force infrastructure to sea-level rise and wildfires, the role of digital Earth observation technologies in anticipatory intelligence, and the gendered impacts of climate-induced resource scarcity. Regional case studies focus on the Arctic's changing geopolitical landscape and the influence of media reporting on climate-induced farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria.

The briefing analyzes Operation Warp Speed (OWS) to provide recommendations for strengthening the U.S. industrial base for medical countermeasures. It advocates for an 'ecosystem approach' that integrates platform technologies like mRNA, supports small innovative biotech companies, and maintains Advanced Development and Manufacturing (ADM) facilities. The authors propose establishing annual exercise programs to reduce development timelines and improving public-private partnerships to ensure the U.S. can design and approve vaccines within 100 days of detecting a pandemic threat.

The briefing argues that the U.S. Department of State must expand its role in addressing biological threats, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of synthetic biology. It recommends creating tailored multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as an epidemic early warning center, and leveraging AI and big data for better pathogen attribution and treaty verification. The authors also call for the appointment of a special envoy for biorisks and an increase in scientific expertise within the diplomatic corps to manage the dual-use dilemma of life sciences and counter the suspected biological weapons capabilities of nations like Russia, China, and North Korea.

The document outlines a 'layered detection' strategy for early warning of infectious disease outbreaks, focusing on the integration of metagenomic sequencing, multiplexed detection, environmental surveillance, serological testing, non-invasive wearables, point-of-person tests, and digital detection. It provides specific research and development recommendations for U.S. government agencies and other stakeholders to move these technologies from early-stage research to large-scale procurement and deployment.

The author advocates for a permanent U.S. strategy of vaccine diplomacy, combining ambitious targets for rapid vaccine development and manufacturing with the diplomatic infrastructure needed for global distribution. The text suggests that maintaining 'warm' infrastructure through annual exercises and supporting organizations like Gavi can prevent future outbreaks from reaching pandemic scale and protect U.S. interests by limiting the emergence of dangerous mutations.

The briefing assesses the role of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) in addressing global biological threats, highlighting its history of securing Soviet-era biological weapons and its role in COVID-19 detection in Thailand. It argues that BTRP is a strategic asset for countering the influence of Russia and China, improving pathogen early warning systems, and reducing risks at high-containment laboratories. The authors recommend increasing BTRP's annual budget to $400 million and expanding its operational authorities to allow for global activity.

The author contends that U.S. foreign policy fails to recognize the complex drivers of forced displacement in Central America, specifically the intersection of extreme weather events and structural poverty. The text highlights how the Central American Dry Corridor is particularly vulnerable to droughts and storms, which destroy subsistence agriculture and drive migration. It further argues that many migrants are misclassified as 'economic migrants' when they are actually fleeing climate-induced food insecurity and systemic oppression, particularly among Indigenous groups. The author calls for a shift from a 'hard security' approach to a humanitarian framework based on 'common but differentiated responsibilities' to address the asylum and refugee needs of this population.

The report assesses the intersection of climate change and national security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It projects that by 2030 and 2050, intensified extreme rainfall, sea level rise, and crop yield failures will stress the regime's ability to provide public goods, potentially leading to domestic upheaval or regional conflict. Specific risks are identified for the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, the capital city of Pyongyang, and key coastal military and commercial hubs. The authors argue that these climate stressors could lead to miscalculations in military posture, increased migration, and strained bilateral relations with China and South Korea, while suggesting that climate cooperation could offer a new avenue for diplomatic engagement.

The report analyzes the fragmentation of current biosurveillance systems and proposes a transition to a global early warning ecosystem. It highlights the role of emerging technologies like metagenomic sequencing and CRISPR-based diagnostics in reducing detection timelines. Through regional case studies and historical vignettes of outbreaks like COVID-19, SARS, and Ebola, the document identifies critical gaps in infrastructure, political will, and data interoperability, while providing a roadmap for future investments and diplomatic coordination.

The document traces the evolution of climate change within U.S. National Security Strategies from 1991 to 2017, noting a shift from viewing it as a distant foreign threat to an urgent domestic and global security risk. It argues that while the Department of Defense has led in addressing these risks, congressional funding for military installation resilience remains insufficient. The authors recommend that the next NSS expand its scope beyond the energy sector to include 'ecological security'—addressing biodiversity loss and ocean health—and incorporate non-linear planetary thresholds and sophisticated environmental monitoring to better forecast systemic risks.

The document argues that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its National Laboratories are underutilized resources in the biological risk space. It highlights the DOE's history of responding to crises—including the COVID-19 pandemic through genomics, epidemiological modeling, and supply chain support—and proposes specific initiatives to enhance biosecurity, such as establishing a Biosecurity Reserve Corps and positioning the Labs as leaders in engineering biology.

The briefing assesses the role of the 17 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories in addressing biological threats. It highlights the Labs' contributions to the 2001 anthrax attacks investigation and the COVID-19 pandemic via the National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL). The authors argue that the Labs are currently underleveraged due to a lack of clear authorities and a historical focus away from human biology. To move from a reactive to a proactive biosecurity posture, the document recommends that the DOE lead in engineering biology, establish a Biosecurity Reserve Corps for nongovernmental experts, re-establish the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP), and better integrate the Labs into the private-sector bioeconomy.