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The briefing assesses the role of the 17 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories in addressing biological threats. It highlights the Labs' contributions to the 2001 anthrax attacks investigation and the COVID-19 pandemic via the National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL). The authors argue that the Labs are currently underleveraged due to a lack of clear authorities and a historical focus away from human biology. To move from a reactive to a proactive biosecurity posture, the document recommends that the DOE lead in engineering biology, establish a Biosecurity Reserve Corps for nongovernmental experts, re-establish the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP), and better integrate the Labs into the private-sector bioeconomy.

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  • The DOE National Laboratories possess critical infrastructure and capabilities for biological analysis, including x-ray light sources, neutron sources, supercomputers, and cryo-electron microscope equipment, as well as genomic sequencing capabilities derived from the Human Genome Project.
  • During the 2001 anthrax attacks, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) developed the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), which reduced pathogen detection time from days or weeks to under 24 hours. Additionally, LLNL's Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry used carbon dating to determine the age of anthrax spores.
  • In response to COVID-19, the National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) integrated Lab facilities to provide epidemiological modeling using supercomputers, address medical supply chain bottlenecks via additive manufacturing, and research therapeutics through artificial intelligence and nanoscience.
  • The DOE and its Labs face systemic barriers to biosecurity leadership, including a historical premise that human biology is not a DOE mission and a lack of clear authorities, evidenced by the DOE not being an original primary member of the Biodefense Steering Committee established by NSPM-14 in 2018.
  • The authors recommend the creation of a Biosecurity Reserve Corps to allow pre-credentialed nongovernmental experts to collaborate with Labs and surge into service during biological threats, which would also help the Labs compete with the private sector for talent.
  • The document proposes re-establishing the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP) within the DOE, noting that the original 1997 program was moved to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, resulting in a loss of DOE input in biosecurity.

Cite the original document

APA
Fall, C., Lim, Y.-B., & Parthemore, C. (2021). Key U.S. Initiatives for Addressing Biological Threats. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Key-U.S.-Initiatives-for-Addressing-Biological-Threats-Part-2-The-U.S.-Department-of-Energy-National-Laboratories_BRIEFER-20_2021_06_22.pdf
Chicago
Fall, Chris, Yong-Bee Lim, and Christine Parthemore. Key U.S. Initiatives for Addressing Biological Threats. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Key-U.S.-Initiatives-for-Addressing-Biological-Threats-Part-2-The-U.S.-Department-of-Energy-National-Laboratories_BRIEFER-20_2021_06_22.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Fall |first1=Chris |last2=Lim |first2=Yong-Bee |last3=Parthemore |first3=Christine |title=Key U.S. Initiatives for Addressing Biological Threats |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=22 June 2021 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Key-U.S.-Initiatives-for-Addressing-Biological-Threats-Part-2-The-U.S.-Department-of-Energy-National-Laboratories_BRIEFER-20_2021_06_22.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{fall2021key, author = {Fall, Chris and Lim, Yong-Bee and Parthemore, Christine}, title = {{Key U.S. Initiatives for Addressing Biological Threats}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = jun, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Key-U.S.-Initiatives-for-Addressing-Biological-Threats-Part-2-The-U.S.-Department-of-Energy-National-Laboratories_BRIEFER-20_2021_06_22.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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