The Benefits of Further Declarations of Restraint from the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The briefing argues that nuclear risk reduction requires moving beyond general policy statements toward concrete affirmations of restraint. It suggests four types of declarations: acknowledging the futility of first use, strengthening 'last resort' promises by removing exceptions for non-nuclear states, adopting multi-person decision protocols to prevent rash individual actions, and clarifying strategic ambiguities. Additionally, the author proposes 'CATALINK', a secure, encrypted, and multipolar nuclear hotline to replace outdated bilateral links and facilitate crisis communication in a multipolar world.

• The 'Reagan-Gorbachev Principle', which asserts that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, was renewed in a joint statement by U.S. President Biden and Russian President Putin on June 21, 2021.
• Current 'last resort' declarations are weakened by exceptions, such as the United Kingdom's policy of denying security assurances to states breaching Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations or those with significant chemical or biological weapons capabilities.
• To prevent rash nuclear decisions by a single political leader, the author suggests 'restrained decision protocols' where a head of state would only consider nuclear use if a group of senior officials agreed it was necessary.
• While strategic ambiguity is often used to preserve freedom of action and complicate an adversary's calculus, excessive ambiguity can confuse deterrence signaling and weaken the assurances provided to allies and non-nuclear states.
• Existing nuclear hotlines are insufficient for a multipolar world because they are often bilateral, lack interoperability, suffer from technical issues, and are not universal.
• The proposed CATALINK system aims to provide a secure, encrypted, and dependable multipolar communication framework designed without 'back doors' to facilitate conflict de-escalation.
• The risk of nuclear conflict is increasingly driven by potential escalation following miscalculation or misinterpretation, exacerbated by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, deepfakes, and cyber weapons.

APA

Gower, J. (2021). The Benefits of Further Declarations of Restraint from the Use of Nuclear Weapons. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/The-Benefits-of-Further-Declarations-of-Restraint-from-the-Use-of-Nuclear-Weapons_BRIEFER-26_2021_10_05.pdf

Chicago

Gower, John. The Benefits of Further Declarations of Restraint from the Use of Nuclear Weapons. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/The-Benefits-of-Further-Declarations-of-Restraint-from-the-Use-of-Nuclear-Weapons_BRIEFER-26_2021_10_05.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Gower |first1=John |title=The Benefits of Further Declarations of Restraint from the Use of Nuclear Weapons |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=5 October 2021 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/The-Benefits-of-Further-Declarations-of-Restraint-from-the-Use-of-Nuclear-Weapons_BRIEFER-26_2021_10_05.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{gower2021benefits, author = {Gower, John}, title = {{The Benefits of Further Declarations of Restraint from the Use of Nuclear Weapons}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = oct, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/The-Benefits-of-Further-Declarations-of-Restraint-from-the-Use-of-Nuclear-Weapons_BRIEFER-26_2021_10_05.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }