TOWARD A GLOBAL PATHOGEN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: BUILDING ON THE LANDSCAPE OF BIOSURVEILLANCE TODAY

The report analyzes the fragmentation of current biosurveillance systems and proposes a transition to a global early warning ecosystem. It highlights the role of emerging technologies like metagenomic sequencing and CRISPR-based diagnostics in reducing detection timelines. Through regional case studies and historical vignettes of outbreaks like COVID-19, SARS, and Ebola, the document identifies critical gaps in infrastructure, political will, and data interoperability, while providing a roadmap for future investments and diplomatic coordination.

• Current biosurveillance systems are often insufficient for halting novel pathogens quickly enough to prevent massive damage, as evidenced by the COVID-19 pandemic where delays contributed to over 4 million deaths and 187 million infections.
• A global early warning system must prioritize high-risk nodes, including large areas with high zoonotic crossover, hospitals with significant lab capacities, high-volume transportation hubs, and laboratories containing biosafety level 3 and 4 specimens.
• Metagenomic sequencing can significantly reduce the time between human-to-human transmission and diagnostic confirmation to less than one day upon clinical presentation, though it is not yet widely used.
• CRISPR-based diagnostics offer a 'massively multiplexed' approach capable of testing for hundreds or thousands of pathogens simultaneously on a single sample, though they are currently less effective at detecting entirely novel pathogens.
• Biosurveillance in the United States is characterized by significant fragmentation; for example, syndromic surveillance varies considerably across and within states, and many counties provide insufficient data for effective early warning.
• Southeast Asia demonstrates the necessity of a 'One Health' approach that integrates human, animal, and agricultural biosurveillance, particularly because most emerging infections in the region are zoonoses.
• In Central Asia and the Caucuses, a strong foundation for early warning exists due to decades of biosurveillance and health lab development, often leveraging former Soviet-era infrastructure.
• Africa is experiencing a significant influx of investment in genomic surveillance and metagenomic sequencing, which may allow some areas to leapfrog to advanced capabilities, though sustainability and infrastructure (like electricity) remain challenges.
• The Middle East currently lacks coordination across nations for biological threats, suggesting that small-scale trust-building measures, such as information sharing among non-governmental experts, are required first.
• India's progress in pathogen early warning is fragile and fragmented, with significant disparities in wealth and technology between states and regions, which contributed to the severity of its second COVID-19 wave.
• Latin America shows increasing regional cooperation, such as the PAHO COVID-19 Genomic Surveillance Regional Network and alliances to digitize health systems across several nations.
• The 2004 SARS lab accidents in Beijing highlight the risk that increased research into a pathogen can lead to accidental releases, emphasizing the need for strict monitoring of lab personnel.
• The H5N1 avian influenza experience in Thailand demonstrates that 100% market-value compensation for farmers is critical to incentivize the reporting of sick animals and ensure effective culling.
• Ebola outbreaks in the DRC illustrate how ongoing conflict and misinformation can severely impede early warning and response, as contact tracing and vaccinations may be suspended due to fighting.
• Mosquito-borne disease surveillance is currently too reliant on 'case counting' after infections occur; effective early warning requires integrating climate data (rainfall, humidity, temperature) and vector surveillance.

APA

Bajema, D. N. E., Beaver, W., Parthemore, C., Atanda, D. A., Horn, D. J., Manheim, D. D., Regan, D. D., M.D., S. S., Swett, D. J., & Teran, D. N. (2021). TOWARD A GLOBAL PATHOGEN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: BUILDING ON THE LANDSCAPE OF BIOSURVEILLANCE TODAY. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Toward-A-Global-Pathogen-Early-Warning-System_2021_07_20-1.pdf

Chicago

Bajema, Dr. Natasha E., William Beaver, Christine Parthemore, Dr. Adejare Atanda, Dr. Joanne Horn, Dr. David Manheim, Dr. Daniel Regan, et al. TOWARD A GLOBAL PATHOGEN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: BUILDING ON THE LANDSCAPE OF BIOSURVEILLANCE TODAY. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Toward-A-Global-Pathogen-Early-Warning-System_2021_07_20-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

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BibTeX

@techreport{bajema2021toward, author = {Bajema, Dr. Natasha E. and Beaver, William and Parthemore, Christine and Atanda, Dr. Adejare and Horn, Dr. Joanne and Manheim, Dr. David and Regan, Dr. Daniel and M.D., Sid Sharma and Swett, Dr. Jacob and Teran, Dr. Nikki}, title = {{TOWARD A GLOBAL PATHOGEN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: BUILDING ON THE LANDSCAPE OF BIOSURVEILLANCE TODAY}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = jul, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Toward-A-Global-Pathogen-Early-Warning-System_2021_07_20-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }