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The document examines the critical role of National Governing Councils (NGCs) as the link between political leadership and technical research in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It identifies significant inconsistencies in NGC size, composition, and legal status across participating states, which hinder the consistency and legitimacy of Country Self-Assessment Reports (CSAR). The brief argues that meaningful independence from government, clear legal mandates, and robust technical support from the APRM Secretariat are essential for the mechanism's success. It recommends that the Secretariat develop coherent guidelines and that civil society organisations (CSOs) hold governments accountable for the composition of these councils.

The report estimates that making Uganda's infrastructure climate-resilient will cost between US$52-66 million annually by 2020, rising to US$638-1,157 million by 2050. Residential buildings are the most affected sector, accounting for approximately half of all adaptation costs. The study also projects that annual damages from extreme events, if frequency doubles every 25 years, could reach US$738-3,294 million by 2050. Key adaptation priorities include climate-proofing public buildings and developing resilient transport standards.

The report uses the Water Evaluation and Planning (WEAP) tool to project that Uganda's total water demand will increase from 408 million cubic meters per year (MCM/y) in 2010 to 3,963 MCM/y by 2050. Under a 'business as usual' scenario, total unmet demand is expected to rise from 3.7 MCM/y to 1,651 MCM/y. The estimated economic cost of these shortages in 2050 is 14,558 billion shillings (US$5.5 billion), though this could be ten times higher if income elasticity is considered. The most significant losses are anticipated in the Lake Victoria, Albert Nile, and Lake Kyoga watersheds. The report also highlights the impact of extreme events, noting that droughts in 2005-06 and 2010-11 caused losses of US$250 million and US$1,174 million, respectively. Proposed adaptation measures, including water harvesting, increased supply for production, and Integrated Water Resources Management, are found to be economically viable, with some generating a 10% rate of return even with minimal reductions in damage.

The report analyzes the relapse into violence in South Sudan following its 2011 independence, identifying the root causes as political power struggles and structural governance failures rather than purely ethnic conflict. It argues that the leadership of both President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar has failed to provide a strategic vision, resulting in a state characterized by corruption, patronage, and a lack of institutional capacity. The author evaluates three future scenarios: a transitional government of national unity, a neutral interim government, and the maintenance of the status quo. The report concludes that a neutral interim government is the most viable path to implement the systemic reforms necessary to move beyond short-term political fixes and address the country's legacy of injustice.

The paper critiques the 'liberal peace paradigm' in Africa, suggesting that external peacebuilding often reinforces autocratic governance by focusing on state-building and technical capacity rather than addressing systemic inequality and patronage networks. It argues that current conflicts are driven by the collective denial of individual rights to maintain power configurations, and that peacebuilding must shift toward a rights-based approach to be effective.

The document outlines the need for more inclusive, evidence-driven partnerships between African governments, extractive companies, and communities to move beyond raw material exports toward value-addition and beneficiation. It proposes the creation of Regional Mining Visions (RMVs) to set standards on social and environmental impacts and calls for strategic global partnerships with systemic players like China to enhance Africa's position in global minerals value chains.

The document critiques the 'Green Economy' and the financialization of nature, specifically the creation of markets for environmental services. It argues that by dividing nature into measurable units, these markets allow corporations to use 'offsetting' as a 'permit to pollute or destroy' in one area by promising protection elsewhere. The author contends that this process ignores the complex, dynamic nature of ecosystems and the social, cultural, and spiritual values of land. The report highlights the negative impacts on indigenous peoples, who lose control over their territories through restrictive contracts, and provides examples of the failure of biodiversity offsets in the EU, Australia, Brazil, and Costa Rica.

The document critiques the 'green growth' paradigm and the financialization of nature, specifically the creation of markets for ecosystem services. It argues that these mechanisms, such as biodiversity offsets and carbon credits, do not stop environmental degradation but instead provide corporations with a 'social license to destroy' by allowing them to compensate for damage in one area by protecting another. The report highlights the negative impacts on Indigenous territories, the failure of existing offset programs in the EU and Australia, and the risk of 'devaluation' when economic priorities shift, as seen in Costa Rica. It concludes that these financial tools are instruments for capital accumulation and cost reduction rather than genuine ecological protection.

The document critiques the 'Green Economy' and 'green growth' frameworks, asserting that they redefine nature as a collection of 'ecosystem services' to create new financial markets. It argues that these markets, particularly biodiversity and carbon offsets, serve as cost-cutting tools for corporations to bypass environmental regulations and maintain industrial production. The report highlights the risks to indigenous and traditional communities, including loss of territorial control and the imposition of opaque contracts. It provides examples of failed offsetting programs in the EU, Australia, Brazil, and Namibia, concluding that financialization is a 'false solution' that exacerbates ecological crises.

The 2015 IGF Annual General Meeting in Geneva brought together over 230 participants to discuss the integration of environmental, social, and economic planning into the mine life cycle. Key discussions centered on the necessity of early mine closure planning, the alignment of mining activities with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the challenges of financing reclamation. The meeting also presented pilot assessments of the Mining Policy Framework (MPF) in the Dominican Republic, Uganda, and Madagascar, highlighting gaps in socioeconomic benefit optimization and post-mining transition laws.

The document provides a practitioner-focused guide to securing community land rights in Africa, detailing case studies on resolving land conflicts, strengthening local governance, and resisting forced resettlement. It emphasizes the importance of community self-definition, the use of Biocultural Community Protocols, and the necessity of multi-pronged advocacy strategies involving legal education, media engagement, and the building of alliances between grassroots movements and sympathetic government actors.

The guide outlines a process for civil society organizations to monitor adaptation finance, from analyzing national contexts and compiling international data to mapping funding flows and designing local tracking tools. It emphasizes the use of evidence-based advocacy to ensure funds reach the most vulnerable populations.

The document analyzes why the APRM process in Zambia has lost momentum despite early innovative practices. It identifies a lack of funding, poor coordination within civil society, and the disbandment of the civil society APRM Secretariat in 2011 as key drivers of this decline. The authors argue that the APRM has become dominated by the government post-review and is not central to Zambia's broader governance discourse. Recommendations include integrating the APRM into national development plans, increasing media coverage, and improving budgeting guidance from the continental APRM Secretariat.

The 10YFP Programme on Sustainable Lifestyles and Education is a global initiative resulting from Rio+20, co-led by Japan, Sweden (via SEI), and WWF. It defines sustainable lifestyles as choices that "minimize environmental degradation" while supporting equitable development. The programme focuses on three main pillars: educating for sustainable lifestyles across formal and informal settings, developing and replicating low-carbon lifestyle scenarios, and promoting innovative and traditional models of sustainable living. Key objectives include building a common framework for understanding sustainable lifestyles, integrating these principles across society, and empowering individuals—particularly youth—through education and awareness. The programme is supported by a Multi-stakeholder Advisory Committee (MAC) and seeks to provide recommendations for policies, infrastructures, and business strategies that enable sustainable living, with a specific emphasis on urban spaces.

Mike Shinoda describes how Music for Relief has raised over $6 million USD and implemented sustainable energy projects in Haiti, Uganda, and Nepal through the 'Power The World' initiative. He argues that global leaders must move beyond fear-based rhetoric and 'clunky' terminology to earn the trust of a cynical youth population to achieve universal energy access by 2030.

The report provides a guide for city practitioners to build climate resilience in African cities, specifically focusing on the challenges of informality and inequality. It proposes an eight-step process for climate compatible development that integrates climate dynamics with socioeconomic and political dimensions, ranging from developing a vision and mapping linkages to the informal sector to assessing vulnerabilities and tracking progress.

The analysis finds that armed conflict in Africa generally follows a global pattern of decline when measured relative to population growth, though this was disrupted by the Cold War and has seen a recent uptick since 2010. Africa is uniquely characterized by high levels of 'non-state conflict'—violence between armed groups not involving the government—which the author attributes to weak governance. While terrorism is rising globally, the Middle East is currently experiencing faster growth than Africa. The paper also highlights that internal conflicts now dominate globally over interstate wars, and warns that climate change may increase local conflicts over resources in northern and southern Africa.

The document analyzes the African Group's engagement at the UN Human Rights Council, noting a tension between a desire for regional leadership and a tendency to grant accused governments veto power over resolutions. While some 'human rights-friendly' states consistently support country-specific resolutions, others systematically abstain or oppose them, leading to an uneven response to crises across the continent and globally.

The policy brief argues that peace agreements in the DRC, specifically the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (AAFA), reflect shifts in economic power between the eastern Kivus and the southern Katanga province. While early conflicts and the ICGLR were driven by the exploitation of coltan and other minerals in the east by Rwanda and Uganda, the subsequent rise of copper and cobalt investments in Katanga shifted geopolitical influence toward SADC states.

The document analyzes Kenya's regional diplomatic history, noting a traditional preference for cautious, pragmatic engagement over political leadership. It highlights a significant shift in approach with the military intervention in Somalia and discusses the complexities of Kenya's relations with South Africa and the East African Community. The author argues that Kenya often 'punches below its weight' and recommends a more strategic use of hard and soft power to enhance its regional leverage.