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The report identifies significant legal fragmentation and gaps across 12 tiger range countries (TRCs), particularly regarding the regulation of the entire trade chain, captive breeding, hybrid species, and digital markets. Key findings highlight that while tigers are protected, many TRCs lack mandatory confiscation requirements, comprehensive definitions of 'wildlife trade', and explicit regulations for tiger hybrids. Enforcement is often hindered by fragmented inter-agency coordination and a lack of specialized powers for frontline officers. Furthermore, online trade is largely under-regulated, and only a few countries adequately link wildlife crime to anti-money laundering frameworks as a predicate offence. The report recommends mandating permanent inter-agency task forces, criminalising all acts in the trafficking chain, and aligning national laws with CITES and UNTOC standards to combat transnational organised crime.

The document argues that while 'ecological security' is not yet widely recognized in Southeast Asia, it is essential for addressing interconnected threats like the Mekong polycrisis, green transition externalities, and environmental crimes. It highlights the tension between security services and civil society, the influence of US-China competition on resource extraction and infrastructure, and the need for a holistic framework that bridges the gap between political-security and environmental specialists.

The document analyzes the factors driving the high demand for BRICS membership, introducing the concept of 'magnetic pull'—where ideas about development and systemic reform act as coalition magnets. It traces the group's expansion from South Africa's entry in 2010 to the 2023 enlargement (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE) and the 2024 introduction of a 'Partner Country' category. While the group's appeal is rooted in South-South cooperation and de-dollarization, the author notes challenges to internal cohesion and the limits of its attraction, as seen in Argentina's rejection of membership.

The report finds that Canadian financial institutions are major global contributors to LNG expansion, with nine banks providing US$16.7 billion and 21 investors holding US$15.8 billion in LNG assets between 2021 and May 2024. Despite commitments to a 1.5°C pathway, major banks like RBC and Scotiabank have increased their financing for LNG export development. The document highlights the climate risks of this expansion, including methane leakage and the potential for stranded assets, particularly in Europe. It calls for an immediate end to financial services for new LNG projects and the adoption of transition plans aligned with the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario.

The briefing reveals that German financial institutions continue to pour billions into LNG expansion despite climate pledges. Between 2021 and 2023, nine German banks provided US$7.6 billion in financing, with Deutsche Bank and LBBW accounting for 65% of this total. Additionally, eight German investors held US$5.8 billion in assets of top LNG developers as of May 2024, led by Allianz and Deutsche Bank/DWS. The report highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero commitments and their actual financial activities, noting that Deutsche Bank's financing to LNG expansion rose by 35% between 2021 and 2023. Reclaim Finance argues that this infrastructure locks in long-term fossil fuel dependence and risks creating stranded assets, especially in Europe where gas consumption is declining.

The report examines the role of Italian financial institutions in funding the global expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG). It finds that between 2021 and 2023, 12 Italian banks provided US$6 billion to the top 150 LNG developers, with Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit accounting for over 85% of this total. The document highlights a gap between these banks' net-zero pledges and their continued financing of LNG projects, including support for Eni and Enel. It warns that this support risks creating stranded assets and locking in long-term fossil fuel reliance, particularly in Europe where gas consumption is declining.

The report finds that Japanese financial institutions are among the world's largest supporters of LNG expansion, providing billions in financing despite public commitments to carbon neutrality. It highlights a significant gap between these climate pledges and actual financial flows, particularly from four major banks and the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF). The document argues that this support locks in long-term fossil fuel dependence and risks creating stranded assets, especially in Europe and South Korea where gas demand is declining.

The report details how 18 South Korean investment banking institutions provided US$7.4 billion to LNG expansion between 2021 and 2023. It specifically highlights DB Financial, Kyobo Life Insurance, and KDB Financial Group as the primary contributors, accounting for 44% of this total. The document argues that this support fuels a climate disaster by locking in long-term fossil fuel dependence and increasing the risk of stranded assets, particularly through the financing of the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS).

The report finds that US financial institutions are primary drivers of global LNG expansion, providing billions in financing and investments despite climate pledges. Between 2021 and 2023, 85 US banks provided US$51.2 billion to LNG expansion, with six major banks accounting for 80% of this total. US investors held US$179.6 billion in assets of top LNG developers as of May 2024. The document highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero commitments and their actual policies, which lack restrictions on LNG. It warns that new LNG infrastructure risks creating stranded assets, particularly in Europe, and contributes to substantial greenhouse gas emissions, including high levels of methane leakage from US shale gas fields.

The report finds that French financial institutions are among the top global supporters of LNG expansion, with four banks providing nearly all of the US$14 billion in financing between 2021 and 2023. It highlights a significant gap between these institutions' net-zero pledges and their continued funding of LNG export and import terminals, including support for TotalEnergies. The document argues that current sector policies are insufficient due to loopholes regarding corporate financing and import terminals, and calls for a comprehensive end to financial services for new LNG projects.

The RECAF project seeks USD 35 million from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and USD 32.434 million in loans from IFAD to reduce GHG emissions by 6.68 MtCO2-eq over 12 years. The project focuses on five provinces: Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Gia Lai, Lam Dong, and Ninh Thuan. It aims to transform 145,000 hectares of forestland into agroforestry systems and protect 500,000 hectares of natural forests. Key strategies include upgrading the National Forest Monitoring System (NFMS), establishing public-private-producer partnerships (4Ps) for deforestation-free commodities like coffee and pepper, and implementing a performance-based Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) mechanism. The project targets 420,000 direct beneficiaries, with a strong focus on ethnic minorities and women, to improve livelihoods and climate resilience.

Trase's co-directors criticize proposed EPP amendments to the EUDR, specifically the introduction of a "no risk" country category. They argue that the criteria for this category—such as stable net forest area—are scientifically flawed and could mask significant deforestation, create legal uncertainty regarding WTO rules, and introduce loopholes that undermine the regulation's effectiveness.

The report examines the slow progress toward gender equity in climate adaptation decision-making, identifying formal and informal barriers and enablers. Using the Gender at Work Framework, it proposes interventions across three pathways—capacities, policies and governance, and gender and social norms—to improve inclusive climate adaptation.

The author analyzes 405 articles from The Economist published between January 2022 and July 2023, concluding that the publication's reporting aligns with a 'NATO Narrative' that portrays Russia as the sole aggressor. The analysis finds a heavy reliance on Western official sources and a systematic omission of 'Dissident Discourse' regarding NATO's eastward expansion and U.S. involvement in Ukraine. The document further argues that The Economist functions as part of the Anglo-American ruling elite, historically advocating for military intervention and 'war journalism' over 'peace journalism'.

The World Resources Institute warns that proposed amendments to the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) risk 'defanging' the law through the creation of a 'no-risk' country category, the use of an outdated 1990 reference year for forest assessments, and ambiguous language that creates uncertainty for stakeholders and potential trade disputes.

The document argues that Asia can achieve a more rapid coal phase-out by stopping the construction of new plants, which would allow 90% of the existing fleet to exceed their 20-year investment recovery period by 2040. It critiques co-firing with ammonia or biomass as expensive and marginally effective, while highlighting successful financing models from IEEFA and the Griffith Asia Institute that make early retirement financially viable through renewables bundling and refinancing. The briefing emphasizes that a just transition requires concessional and multilateral financing from developed nations to support coal-dependent communities.

The report finds that Indonesia's captive coal capacity tripled between 2019 and 2024, reaching 15.2 GW, with projections to hit 26.2 GW by 2026. This growth is primarily driven by the nickel, aluminium, and iron and steel industries. The authors argue that this trend contradicts Indonesia's climate goals and will cause significant public health burdens, including an estimated 27,000 additional deaths if captive plants are excluded from a 2040 coal phase-out. While some companies are adopting solar and hydro, the report emphasizes that renewable energy solutions are now cost-competitive with coal.

The re-election of Donald Trump may slow US clean technology deployment through the potential repeal of Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) funds and EV tax credits, potentially shifting leadership to emerging economies. The global market for six key technologies—solar PV, wind turbines, EVs, batteries, electrolysers, and heat pumps—is projected to exceed USD 2 trillion by 2035, with global trade reaching USD 575 billion. China currently leads with 70% of the market for these technologies, though it faces risks from proposed US tariffs of 60% on all imports and 100% on EVs. Other nations may benefit: India could become a net exporter of clean technologies by 2035 with annual exports of USD 30 billion, and Brazil is well-positioned in wind turbine blade production, currently accounting for 5% of the global market. In the Global South, renewable energy potential is 400 times greater than fossil fuel production, and solar is expected to have lower upfront costs than coal in Vietnam from 2024 and in India from approximately 2027.

Reclaim Finance outlines the stakes for COP29, emphasizing that the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for North-South climate finance should be at least a trillion dollars and provided as grants or grant-equivalents. The organization warns against allowing private finance or carbon offsets to count toward these public obligations, noting that private capital often bypasses the poorest communities and adaptation projects. While acknowledging the role of private finance in tripling renewable energy, the document criticizes the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) for its failure to restrict fossil fuel financing and the methodological flaws in Net-Zero Banking Alliance targets. It further highlights the failure of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam due to a lack of concessional funding and private sector risk aversion.

The document assesses the effectiveness of the EU ETS and CORSIA in addressing aviation emissions, finding that both schemes fail to cover non-CO2 effects and that CORSIA's reliance on low-quality offsets and a high baseline limits its climate impact. It recommends extending the EU ETS to all flights departing from the European Economic Area (EEA) by 2027.