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The document posits a correlation between domestic climate laws and international ambition, suggesting that national legislation provides the confidence and evidence needed for negotiators to defend ambitious global commitments. It identifies several factors influencing a country's negotiation position, including economic competitiveness, national interest, and leadership goals, while noting that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) serves as the primary system for these negotiations.

The document argues that mega-FTAs like the TPP and TTIP are creating a new global regulatory regime characterized by higher standards in labor, environment, and intellectual property. For non-members like India, these agreements may create trade diversion and higher barriers to entry into global value chains (GVCs). The author emphasizes that India must upgrade its domestic policy framework and producer capacities to meet these escalating standards to avoid being isolated from international investment and markets.

The document analyzes 75 carbon-financed cookstove projects in India and Kenya, finding that while carbon revenues often fund price subsidies and after-sales support, many developers rely on them exclusively, creating financial risk. It suggests that carbon finance is most effective as 'transitional crediting' to stimulate early demand and that the monitoring requirements of carbon markets can actually improve long-term stove uptake.

The Living Planet Report 2014 highlights a critical decline in global vertebrate populations and an ecological overshoot where humanity requires 1.5 Earths to sustain its current consumption. It emphasizes the interdependence of food, water, and energy security with healthy ecosystems and proposes a 'One Planet Perspective' to align human development with planetary boundaries.

The report documents a pattern of violence and judicial harassment against land and environmental rights defenders in 2013. It argues that these individuals are particularly vulnerable as global competition for land and resources increases, often facing threats from government forces and corporations. The document provides specific case studies from Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia, detailing arrests, murders, and forced evictions linked to opposition against extractive industries, mega-projects, and agribusiness.

As of September 30, 2013, the Green Climate Fund Trust Fund had total pledges and contributions of USDeq. 10 million, with USDeq. 8.31 million deposited. The GCF Board approved USD 8.43 million for administrative budgets from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2013, and the interim trustee transferred USD 5.68 million to cover these costs. While USD 2.65 million was held in trust, no funds were available for new funding decisions as of the reporting date, pending outstanding pledges from Norway and the Republic of Korea.

The document outlines the state of climate finance negotiations leading up to COP19, focusing on the mobilization of US$100 billion per year by 2020 and the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. It details the work of the Standing Committee on Finance, the challenges facing the Adaptation Fund due to falling carbon prices, and the need for 'enabling environments' in both developed and developing countries to attract and deploy investment. The guide emphasizes that providing financial assurance to developing countries is critical for securing their commitment to a new global climate agreement in 2015.

The document evaluates the potential for carbon leakage in South Korea as it implements the Korean emission trading scheme (KETS). Using methodology from the EU ETS Directive, the analysis finds that several manufacturing sectors face a moderate to high risk of leakage, primarily driven by high trade intensity rather than additional production costs. The report highlights that while energy efficiency and fuel switching have historically reduced emissions intensity, the recovery of emission-intensive industries like steel and cement has increased structural risks. It recommends that the South Korean government consider mitigation policies such as free allowances, border adjustments, or import taxes to prevent the displacement of emissions to regions with less stringent climate policies.

The document examines the evolution of the EU ETS through its first three phases, focusing on how carbon pricing affects the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries. It analyzes the phenomenon of 'carbon leakage'—where production relocates to countries with laxer environmental rules—and argues that while this risk exists for specific sectors like steel and cement, it is often mitigated by free allowance allocations and broader economic restructuring trends. The author suggests that for countries like South Korea, the EU experience shows that the risk of leakage is manageable if policy focuses on the most vulnerable sectors and the decarbonization of the energy mix.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) should not be established or piloted until the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) defines mitigation commitment requirements and common accounting rules. The author contends that carbon markets have failed to incentivize adequate national commitments and warns that without stringent eligibility criteria and international oversight, the FVA could facilitate the use of low-quality units and 'hot air' offsets. Key recommendations include linking market access to high ambition, eliminating all forms of double-counting to ensure a 'net atmospheric benefit', and excluding detrimental sectors like coal power and REDD+ activities from the framework.

Carbon Market Watch argues that international carbon offsets have failed to deliver promised climate benefits and have undermined the EU's domestic abatement efforts. The brief recommends a legally binding EU domestic GHG reduction target of at least 55% below 1990 levels for 2030, the total elimination of international offsets for meeting mitigation obligations post-2020, and the implementation of safeguards when linking the EU ETS to other trading schemes. It further suggests that climate finance should shift away from carbon markets toward regulation, standards, and incentive programs, such as performance-based financing for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).

The report examines the evolution of low-carbon, climate-resilient development (LCCRD) in developing countries, highlighting the integration of mitigation and adaptation into national planning. It identifies critical barriers, including limited human capacity and a significant imbalance in climate finance, where adaptation receives far less funding than mitigation. The document analyzes the shift from top-down to bottom-up international governance and the role of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) as a vehicle for sustainable development. It also discusses the challenges of monitoring and evaluating adaptation investments and the proliferation of online knowledge platforms, recommending a greater focus on user needs and the translation of high-level strategies into concrete actions.

The document examines China's approach to the green economy, noting a domestic consensus on the need for green transformation due to severe environmental degradation, while highlighting China's reluctance to accept mandatory international obligations that might hinder economic growth. It analyzes the 2012 G-20 summit in Mexico, where the concept of 'inclusive green growth' was introduced to balance environmental goals with the social and economic concerns of developing nations. The author argues that China's internal organizational framework—where the Ministry of Finance coordinates G-20 affairs but the Ministry of Environmental Protection is excluded—contributed to its lack of engagement with the G-20's green growth agenda. Ultimately, the paper suggests that while the G-20 process has not yet directly shaped Chinese national policy, increasing domestic pressure and international dialogue may eventually push China toward more active participation and acceptance of green obligations.

The document examines India's adoption of the G-20's 'green growth' framework, which posits that economic growth and environmental sustainability are compatible. While the Indian government integrates this into its Five-Year Plans through technocratic solutions like renewable energy missions and energy efficiency schemes, a counter-discourse argues that such growth continues to marginalize the poor and deplete natural capital. The author highlights a contradiction between India's G-20 alignment and its stance in multilateral climate forums, where it emphasizes historical responsibility and the need for financial support from developed nations.

The report examines the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) process, finding that the Obama administration ignored requests from Japan's elected leadership for a 'sole purpose' nuclear declaration. Instead, the U.S. accommodated a small group of Japanese bureaucrats by maintaining 'tailored' nuclear options, such as dual-capable aircraft, which the author argues contradicts President Obama's Prague commitments and fails to address the actual security concerns of the Japanese public.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) warns that TTIP may hinder public health and safety goals by promoting regulatory harmonization and mutual recognition that could lower chemical safety standards. The document highlights the divergence between the EU's hazard-based REACH approach and the US's risk-based TSCA approach, arguing that trade-driven 'regulatory coherence' often results in a 'lowest-common denominator' outcome. It further cautions against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which could allow corporations to sue governments over environmental laws, and warns that TTIP could preempt protective sub-national regulations in the US and EU. Finally, it suggests that a US-EU agreement could negatively influence the development of chemical regulations in other regions, such as the BRIICS countries.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), on behalf of several environmental organizations, warns the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance that TTIP may prioritize trade interests over public health. The document highlights the divergence between the EU's hazard-based REACH regulation and the U.S.'s risk-based Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), arguing that harmonization or mutual recognition could lead to a 'lowest-common denominator' approach to chemical safety. It specifically opposes investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which it claims allow corporations to sue governments over public interest laws, and warns that TTIP could preempt protective sub-federal laws in the U.S. and national laws in EU member states. Finally, it suggests that a restrictive TTIP could discourage other nations, particularly BRIICS countries, from adopting more stringent chemical safety standards.

The document analyzes green industrial policy—policies supporting industries that produce environmentally preferable goods—within the context of the global trading system. It identifies various market failures, such as environmental externalities and capital market imperfections, that justify government intervention. However, it warns of governance failures, including rent-seeking and the risk of picking unsuccessful 'winners.' The author argues that while traditional industrial policy is often mercantilist, green industrial policy can provide global benefits, potentially justifying special trade rules or exemptions for climate-related measures and least-developed countries.

The document examines how international carbon offsets under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) have contributed to an oversupply of allowances in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD). It highlights critical failures in 'additionality', noting that many projects would have occurred without offset funding, and points to a lack of sustainability and human rights protections. The author recommends a ban on industrial gas projects, large-scale power projects, and JI track 1 projects for the 2013-2020 period.

The report argues that 'sustainable' and 'legal' timber policies in producer and consumer countries are often rudimentary technical responses that fail to address systemic governance flaws, corruption, and human rights violations. In Malaysia, the report highlights a lack of transparency in logging license awards and systemic violations of indigenous customary land rights. In Japan, South Korea, and Australia, the report identifies weaknesses in procurement frameworks, such as a reliance on exporter-provided paperwork and a failure to reduce overall tropical timber consumption. It concludes that without fundamental governance reforms and a reduction in consumption, certification schemes and procurement guidelines remain insufficient to prevent deforestation and social injustice.