The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China

This research paper examines China's approach to the green economy and its interaction with the G-20, specifically following the 2012 Los Cabos Summit in Mexico. The author argues that while China is domestically committed to greening its economic development due to severe environmental degradation, it remains reluctant to accept mandatory international obligations that might hinder its economic growth. The paper highlights a disconnect between China's internal policy terminology and the 'inclusive green growth' framework promoted at the G-20, suggesting that China's organizational structure for G-20 participation further marginalizes environmental policy.

• China faces a critical need for green economic transformation due to severe environmental costs of rapid growth, including the fact that it is home to 20 of the world's 30 most polluted cities and 90% of its rivers and lakes are polluted.
• The Chinese government has integrated green targets into its Five-Year Plans (FYP). The 11th FYP aimed to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% and main pollutant emissions by 10% by 2010. The 12th FYP (2011–15) targets a 16% reduction in energy consumption per unit GDP and a 17% reduction in carbon emissions.
• China's international approach to the green economy is characterized by a preference for non-binding dialogues over mandatory obligations, adhering to the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' to avoid encumbering its economic development.
• At the 2012 G-20 Summit in Mexico, the concept of the green economy was rephrased as 'inclusive green growth' to better incorporate the social and economic development concerns of developing countries, though this did not lead to substantive enforceable measures.
• China's organizational framework for G-20 participation limits the influence of environmental policy. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) acts as the primary coordinator, while the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is not present at summits, and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) uses different terminology such as 'circular economy' rather than 'green growth'.
• China's lack of interest in discussing the green economy at the G-20 stems from a desire to keep the forum focused on core economic issues (fiscal, financial, and trade policy) and a fear that environmental issues could be tied to mandatory economic burdens.

APA

Xinquan, T. (2013). The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf

Chicago

Xinquan, TU. The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Xinquan |first1=TU |title=The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2013 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{xinquan2013green, author = {Xinquan, TU}, title = {{The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2013}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }