The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China

The document examines China's approach to the green economy, noting a domestic consensus on the need for green transformation due to severe environmental degradation, while highlighting China's reluctance to accept mandatory international obligations that might hinder economic growth. It analyzes the 2012 G-20 summit in Mexico, where the concept of 'inclusive green growth' was introduced to balance environmental goals with the social and economic concerns of developing nations. The author argues that China's internal organizational framework—where the Ministry of Finance coordinates G-20 affairs but the Ministry of Environmental Protection is excluded—contributed to its lack of engagement with the G-20's green growth agenda. Ultimately, the paper suggests that while the G-20 process has not yet directly shaped Chinese national policy, increasing domestic pressure and international dialogue may eventually push China toward more active participation and acceptance of green obligations.

• China faces a critical need for green economic transformation because rapid growth has caused severe environmental costs, including the fact that the country is home to 20 of the world's 30 most polluted cities and 90% of its rivers and lakes are polluted.
• China's 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15) established specific green targets, including reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16%, carbon emissions by 17%, and increasing non-fossil energy's share of primary energy consumption to 11.4% by 2015.
• In international climate negotiations, China generally prefers non-binding approaches based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities to avoid obligations that could impede its economic development.
• At the 2012 G-20 summit in Mexico, the concept of the green economy was rephrased as 'inclusive green growth' to incorporate social and economic development dimensions relevant to developing countries, though this did not lead to enforceable measures for most members.
• China's participation in the G-20 is hindered by an organizational framework where the Ministry of Finance (MOF) coordinates, but the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is excluded, leaving environmental policy to be handled by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).
• The 'inclusive green growth' concept from the Mexico G-20 summit failed to penetrate Chinese national policy discussions, as evidenced by its absence from the NDRC's 2012 Report on 'China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change' and the 12th FYP for the Development of Circular Economy.
• Domestic pressure from a population increasingly concerned with health and well-being, alongside thousands of annual environmental protests, is creating a basis for China to become more open to international green development efforts.

APA

Xinquan, T. (2013). The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf

Chicago

Xinquan, TU. The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2013. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Xinquan |first1=TU |title=The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=November 2013 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{xinquan2013green, author = {Xinquan, TU}, title = {{The Green Economy in the G-20, Post-Mexico: Implications for China}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2013}, month = nov, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Occasional-Paper-162.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }