Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture

The report examines the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) process, finding that the Obama administration ignored requests from Japan's elected leadership for a 'sole purpose' nuclear declaration. Instead, the U.S. accommodated a small group of Japanese bureaucrats by maintaining 'tailored' nuclear options, such as dual-capable aircraft, which the author argues contradicts President Obama's Prague commitments and fails to address the actual security concerns of the Japanese public.

• The Obama administration conducted an extensive effort to solicit Japanese input for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but it received and acted upon two contradictory sets of views. The administration accommodated the views of a small group of secretive bureaucrats while interpreting the views of elected Japanese officials as a threat to U.S. interests.
• Elected Japanese leadership, including Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Okada, and 204 members of the Diet, explicitly requested that the U.S. adopt a 'sole purpose' policy, restricting nuclear weapons to the deterrence of other nuclear weapons and banning their use against non-nuclear weapon states.
• The Obama administration rejected the 'sole purpose' declaration, citing the need for nuclear weapons to deter conventional or chemical/biological attacks. As an 'accommodation' to Japanese bureaucratic concerns about 'decoupling,' the U.S. instead developed 'tailored' nuclear options involving dual-capable aircraft that can be globally deployed.
• U.S. officials viewed the Japanese government's push for reduced nuclear roles and Foreign Minister Okada's investigation into 'secret agreements' as signs of an 'unwelcome' shift in foreign policy toward China and a challenge to the U.S. 'non-confirm, non-deny' policy regarding nuclear weapons in Japan.
• The report argues that U.S. concerns that Japan might develop its own nuclear weapons if not sufficiently reassured are unfounded, citing a 1995 Japan Defense Agency study and interviews showing a consensus among Japanese defense experts that such a move would not be advantageous.
• Some Japanese officials, such as Takeo Akiba, argue that the current U.S. accommodations are insufficient and that Japan requires a 'nuclear sharing' arrangement similar to NATO, where the decision to use nuclear weapons would lie with Japan during a crisis.

APA

Kulacki, G. (2013). Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Japan-US-Nuclear-Posture-Update.pdf

Chicago

Kulacki, Gregory. Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture. Union of Concerned Scientists, 2013. https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Japan-US-Nuclear-Posture-Update.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Kulacki |first1=Gregory |title=Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture |publisher=Union of Concerned Scientists |date=November 2013 |url=https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Japan-US-Nuclear-Posture-Update.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kulacki2013japan, author = {Kulacki, Gregory}, title = {{Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture}}, institution = {Union of Concerned Scientists}, year = {2013}, month = nov, url = {https://www.ucs.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/Japan-US-Nuclear-Posture-Update.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }