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Between 2010 and 2014, Tonga received US$67.4 million in grant-equivalent finance specifically targeting climate change, with a majority (59.7%) supporting mitigation. The primary contributors were Japan and the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), with significant funding directed toward renewable energy and environmental policy. Additionally, Tonga was allocated US$2.64 million from the Global Environment Facility for a renewable energy project between January 2015 and September 2016.

Between 2010 and 2014, Tuvalu received US$37.9 million in grant-equivalent finance specifically targeting climate change, with a significant portion dedicated to renewable energy. Major contributors during this period included New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates, and the Global Environment Facility. Additionally, between January 2015 and September 2016, Tuvalu was allocated US$36 million from the Green Climate Fund for coastal adaptation and US$2.64 million from the Global Environment Facility for national energy targets.

The report finds that recognizing all types of CERs for use after 2020 is unlikely to trigger significant additional emission reductions because most available supply comes from projects that would continue abatement without CER revenues. It identifies critical risks to environmental integrity, including double claiming with 2020 targets and the potential for higher cumulative emissions when using CERs for single-year targets. To safeguard environmental integrity, the authors recommend limiting eligibility to newly developed additional projects or already implemented projects at high risk of discontinuing abatement, while ensuring robust accounting through corresponding adjustments.

The report analyzes seven multilateral climate funds—the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Adaptation Fund (AF), Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)—against five strategies for transformative change: achieving impact at scale, promoting country ownership, improving efficiency, supporting equitable allocation, and increasing accountability. It finds that the proliferation of funds has led to overlapping roles and inefficiencies. The authors recommend short-term reforms to clarify fund specialization and long-term architectural changes, including the potential consolidation or sunsetting of certain funds, such as the CIFs, SCCF, and LDCF, to streamline the climate finance landscape.

The GCF Board's fourteenth meeting resulted in the approval of 10 funding proposals totaling approximately USD 788 million and the accreditation of 8 new entities. Key outcomes include the appointment of Mr. Howard Bamsey as Executive Director, the adoption of a strategy for accreditation prioritization, and a performance review of the World Bank as Interim Trustee, which highlighted a challenge regarding direct cash transfers to non-accredited executing entities.

The briefing argues that ISDS mechanisms in trade deals like RCEP undermine the right of Asian governments to regulate in the public interest by allowing foreign investors to sue states in private tribunals. It highlights that 50 known cases against 11 RCEP countries have resulted in claims totaling at least 31 billion USD, with 67% of resolved cases favoring investors. The document warns that RCEP could 'lock in' these dangerous provisions, making them harder to reform than bilateral treaties.

One year after the Paris Agreement's adoption, the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) finds that national climate policies have made little progress. If NDCs are fully implemented, global warming by 2100 is estimated at 2.8°C, while current policies would lead to 3.6°C. A significant emissions gap remains for 2025 and 2030. The report highlights specific national trajectories, noting that most assessed NDCs are inadequate or medium in ambition, with particular concerns regarding the US, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, while noting positive renewable energy growth in India.

The GCF-EBRD SEFF co-financing Programme aims to mobilize private sector climate finance by providing credit lines and technical support to local partner financial institutions (PFIs). The programme targets 13 countries, with an initial focus on Egypt, Georgia, Morocco, Tajikistan, and Tunisia, to finance over 20,000 projects in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and climate resilience. With a total budget of USD 1,538.5 million, the initiative seeks to reduce carbon emissions by approximately 29 million tonnes over its lifetime and create around 11,500 green jobs.

More than 100 civil society organizations express deep concern over the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) lack of adequate policies for financing high-risk activities. The statement argues that the GCF Board should not approve high-risk projects—including large hydropower and infrastructure—until it adopts a full Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) and a free-standing Indigenous Peoples' Policy aligned with international standards like UNDRIP. The groups demand more rigorous scrutiny for high-risk sub-projects, country-driven proposals, and strict adherence to public disclosure timelines for impact assessments.

The Minister of Planning for Economic and Social Development of Paraguay has nominated the Avina Foundation for accreditation to the Green Climate Fund, citing the foundation's history of promoting sustainable development and climate change strategies in Latin America and its collaboration with the Paraguayan government on the National Development Plan and the Social Progress Index.

The document highlights the immediate threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), noting that the CDC estimates 2 million infections and 23,000 deaths annually in the US. It identifies key drivers of AMR, including the over-prescription of antibiotics, a lack of pharmaceutical research into alternatives, and the use of antibiotics for livestock growth. A significant emphasis is placed on pharmaceutical pollution in India and China, where high concentrations of antibiotics in water sources create reservoirs of resistance that can be exported globally.

The document advocates for a regional phase-out of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in the Arctic, noting that 96 percent of large ships in the region use this toxic fuel. It highlights the role of black carbon emissions in accelerating Arctic ice melt and the extreme difficulty of cleaning up HFO spills in remote, cold environments. The author calls on the Obama administration to use the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to address these risks, specifically by submitting a comment paper by September 2, 2016.

The research analyzes how climate finance investments generate economic value added not only in recipient countries but also in third countries through international trade, termed 'spill-overs'. Using a GMRIO model, the study finds that on average 28.6% of the total economic impact spills over to other countries. The ability to retain value added varies by country, with India and Brazil retaining around 80%, while Mexico and Indonesia retain no more than two thirds. The EU is the primary beneficiary of these spill-overs. The study also identifies that different types of climate actions produce varying levels of spill-overs: renewable energy technologies often generate high spill-overs (exceeding 35% for some), whereas forestry and coastal protection generate fewer than 20%. The authors suggest that donor countries may be influenced by these spill-over prospects when allocating funds, and recipient countries should improve industrial competitiveness to retain more economic gains.

The document argues that South Africa is stuck in a middle-income trap characterized by sluggish growth, deep inequality, and declining government effectiveness. It suggests a paradigm shift away from a state-led developmental model toward a labour-intensive, low-wage growth path and a knowledge economy built on private sector partnerships and technological innovation.

The GCF Board's twelfth meeting resulted in the endorsement of the initial Strategic Plan (2015-2018) and the accreditation of 13 entities, including HSBC and the African Development Bank. Key operational milestones included the adoption of a Comprehensive Information Disclosure Policy, the establishment of a Budget Committee, and the approval of a risk register. The Board also addressed resource mobilization, noting a USD 3 billion contribution arrangement from the United States and approving a budget increase for Secretariat staffing to approximately 100 members by the end of 2016. Additionally, the Board initiated the process for appointing a new Executive Director and approved a USD 1.5 million grant for project preparation in Rwanda.

The report proposes 'Inclusion of Consumption' (IoC) as a way to ensure carbon prices are reflected in the cost of materials like steel and cement, which are currently shielded by free allowance allocations in emissions trading schemes. By adding a charge to the consumption of these materials based on benchmarks, the IoC aims to incentivize material efficiency and innovation without harming competitiveness. The authors argue that IoC is administratively feasible, compliant with WTO law, and qualifies as an environmental regulation under EU law.

The research finds that phasing out U.S. federal fossil fuel leases could reduce global CO2 emissions by approximately 100 million tonnes per year by 2030. The impact is most immediate for coal, where it could leave 4 billion short tons of coal in the ground by 2040. Oil and gas impacts are more gradual due to longer project lead times, but could eventually leave 7 billion barrels of oil and 30 trillion cubic feet of gas undeveloped by 2040. The study concludes that such supply-side measures are a significant complement to demand-side policies like the Clean Power Plan in meeting Paris Agreement targets.

The report details the Co-Chairs' activities from November 2015 to March 2016, highlighting the organization of an informal Board dialogue in Cape Town and preparations for the twelfth Board meeting (B.12) in Songdo. Key focus areas include the development of the 2016 Work Plan, the GCF Strategic Plan, and the goal to meet a US$ 2.5 billion funding approvals target by the end of 2016. The document also notes challenges regarding the execution of Accredited Master Agreements (AMAs) and the need for increased Secretariat staffing to support portfolio development.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) Secretariat reports progress in its public and private sector pipelines, the simplification of funding proposal templates, and the expansion of readiness support to 45 countries. Key achievements include the signing of contribution agreements with five additional countries and the launch of a new website to enhance stakeholder engagement. The Secretariat also operationalized its accreditation framework, moving 11 applicants to stage II, and provided substantive support for the development of the GCF Strategic Plan.

The Green Climate Fund's 2015 administrative expenditures totaled USD 19.1 million, representing 99% of the USD 19.3 million approved budget. While the Secretariat under-spent by USD 0.4 million, the Board over-spent by USD 0.2 million, primarily due to increased costs for the Accreditation Panel. Total fund revenue for 2015 reached USD 1.759 billion, with total assets as of 31 December 2015 amounting to USD 1.851 billion, including USD 1.213 billion in promissory notes.