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The report details a 2009 conference in Addis Ababa focused on structural and operational conflict prevention in Africa. Key discussions included the role of civil society in early warning, the necessity of integrating traditional and modern institutions, and the challenges of political will. The conference highlighted the ECOWAS framework and IGAD's counter-terrorism efforts, while concluding with recommendations to harmonize prevention standards and strengthen partnerships between the AU, RECs, and civil society.

The author contends that structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent 'good governance' prescriptions failed to spur development in Africa because they focused on formal institutional arrangements while ignoring neo-patrimonialism. In neo-patrimonial states, rulers are primarily accountable to followers (clients) rather than the general public, creating a tension with Western norms of transparency. The paper suggests that state decay occurs when the informal sphere fully takes over formal structures, leading to a 'self-reinforcing spiral of state decay'. To reverse this, the author argues that African governments must move away from donor-driven blueprints and instead operationalise local, indigenous measures of legitimacy and accountability to serve developmental goals.

The paper examines the failure of structural adjustment programs and subsequent 'good governance' initiatives in Africa. It posits that the tension between formal institutional norms and informal neo-patrimonial practices—where leaders prioritize clients over the general public—has led to state decay. The author argues that for governance to be effective, it must be conceptualized locally, integrating informal realities into development plans rather than merely replicating Western models of transparency and accountability.

The conference summary outlines discussions on the drivers of the Somali crisis, the role of international and regional actors, and the necessity of Somali-driven peace processes. It highlights the failure of externally imposed state-building templates and the importance of incorporating Islamist forces into peace agreements. The document contrasts the instability of the central government with the relative success of Somaliland, which achieved peace through locally managed, multi-clan conferences addressing land rights and constitutional issues.

The briefing examines how the global banking crisis and falling commodity prices threaten African budgets and social expenditure, while analyzing ongoing political instability in countries like the DRC, Sudan, and Somalia, and the prospects for democratic consolidation across the continent.

The document examines how anthropogenic climate change and rapid population growth intensify resource competition and instability in Africa. It highlights the continent's low adaptive capacity due to poverty and weak governance, while noting that resource scarcity does not linearly lead to war but can also foster cooperation.

The document examines over 200 registered migrant organizations from the Horn of Africa in Norway, noting that while many are inactive or focused on local community needs, some engage in peacebuilding through humanitarian aid or advocacy. It identifies that capacity is limited by fragmentation within communities, restrictive laws in countries of origin (such as Ethiopia's Law on Charities and Societies), and security risks in Somalia. The authors recommend that European institutions adopt long-term, coherent policies and avoid rigid 'equitable distribution' funding models that can inadvertently exacerbate clan-based conflicts.

The document argues that the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers (UNMEE) in 2008 has created a diplomatic vacuum, heightening the risk of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It details how both regimes use the border dispute to justify domestic repression and engage in proxy wars in Somalia and Sudan. The author highlights the personal animosity between leaders Meles Zenawi and Issayas Afwerki and the fragility of the Eritrean state. It concludes by recommending that the US lead a renewed international mediation effort to establish a legally binding border demarcation.

The document examines the concept of 'national ownership' within the context of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, arguing that while the treaty mandates state responsibility, the reality is often dominated by international organizations. It proposes a model where national ownership is viewed as a relational process involving the relative strengths of state institutions and civil society, the actual scope of the mine problem, and the strategies of international donors. The author suggests that sustainable ownership is more likely to be achieved by engaging local civil society and indigenous capacities early in the process rather than relying solely on Western-style state-building.

The briefing analyzes the rise of piracy in Somalia, specifically citing the seizure of the MV Faina, as evidence of systemic security failures. It attributes the crisis to the inability of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to provide security, the limited mandate of AMISOM, and the failure of regional bodies like IGAD. The author contends that piracy gained local legitimacy as a response to the illegal exploitation of Somali marine resources by foreign companies and argues that military solutions are insufficient without a paradigm shift toward human security and the establishment of an inclusive Somali government.

The report analyzes the 2008 border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, tracing its roots to colonial-era protocols from 1900 and 1901. It argues that the conflict is not primarily about the contested Ras Doumeirah area, but is a strategic move by Eritrea to pressure Ethiopia, which relies heavily on Djibouti's ports. The document details the military imbalance between the two states, the role of external actors like France and the US, and the broader instability in the Horn of Africa, including proxy wars in Somalia and internal tensions in Ethiopia's Ogaden region.

The paper argues that agricultural and marine commodities can function as conflict resources, similar to oil or diamonds, by providing funding for rebel groups and governments through trade taxation. It highlights that commodity price volatility and competition over land and water increase political instability and conflict risks. The author recommends that the UN Security Council impose sanctions on these resources when linked to conflict financing, broaden the mandates of UN Expert Panels, and ensure peacekeeping missions are equipped to monitor and secure natural resources.

The briefing argues that Zimbabwe's political crisis, characterized by contested elections and state power abuse, necessitates a transitional government. Unlike a government of national unity, a transitional government acts as a short-term caretaker to draft a new constitution and create an environment for free and fair elections. The author proposes an inclusive body comprising more than just the MDC and Zanu-PF, potentially with Robert Mugabe remaining as president under strict checks and balances, supported by expanded mediation from SADC, the AU, and the UN, as well as international civilian peacekeepers.

The briefing argues that Zimbabwe's political crisis and the contested re-election of Robert Mugabe in June 2008 necessitate a transitional government rather than a government of national unity. It defines a transitional government as a short-term caretaker authority tasked with drafting a new constitution and preparing for legitimate elections. The author proposes a one-year mandate for an inclusive body comprising more than just the MDC and Zanu-PF, supported by expanded mediation from SADC, the AU, and the UN, as well as international civilian peacekeepers.

The report argues that agricultural and marine resources, often dismissed as secondary in conflict analysis, can fuel violence through the taxation of trade, the destabilizing effect of price volatility, and competition over essential inputs like land and water. Through case studies in Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, and Central Asia, it demonstrates how rebel groups and warlords extract funds from cocoa, bananas, and fisheries. It also highlights how commodity dependence and price shocks undermine political stability and how the pursuit of thirsty crops like cotton exacerbates interstate tensions over water sharing. The authors provide fourteen policy recommendations, including the use of UN sanctions on agricultural resources and increased transparency in trade.

The report details a seminar hosted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to evaluate the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006. Experts argued that while the Act aims to curb mercenary activity and align with the South African Constitution, it is overly restrictive, lacks clear definitions for 'humanitarian assistance', and may push the private military and security company (PMSC) industry underground. Discussions highlighted the tension between the Act's punitive approach and the potential utility of PMSCs in peacekeeping and stability operations, as well as the Act's impact on the military profession and its relationship with International Humanitarian Law.

The paper assesses the inadequacy of Africa's counterterrorism framework, highlighting the failure of the African Union (AU) and member states to operationalize the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. It identifies specific regional vulnerabilities—including Somalia, the Sahel, Nigeria, and South Africa—and proposes a practical division of labour between the Algiers centre, key states, and regional organisations to improve security capacity.

The report identifies a disconnect between government priorities and the needs of the business sector in Africa, highlighting corruption and infrastructure failure as primary barriers to growth. Based on dialogues with 56 business organisations and five studies, it asserts that stability in Africa is dependent on prosperity, which requires improvements in property rights, the rule of law, and power reliability.

China is evolving from a 'studied passivity' in the UN Security Council to a more assertive role, driven by the need to protect its economic interests and enhance its global reputation. This shift is most evident in Africa, where Beijing has moved from opposing international intervention to supporting UN peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII resolutions in Sudan and Somalia. While China maintains a formal commitment to national sovereignty, it increasingly adopts a case-by-case approach to intervention to secure energy assets and maintain its image as a 'responsible stakeholder'.

The document analyzes the transition of French foreign policy in Africa from 'la Francafrique'—characterized by personal ties to corrupt elites in former colonies—to a strategy of 'partnership' between equal nations. This shift involves a move toward multilateralism through the European Union and a strategic pivot toward new markets and power-brokers, specifically South Africa. Key drivers for this change include the 'Abidjan doctrine' on economic governance, the devaluation of the CFA franc, and a desire to move beyond a relationship driven by colonial guilt. The text highlights South Africa's role as France's leading economic partner in Africa, noting cooperation in military training in the Central African Republic and nuclear energy projects involving the company Areva.