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The report analyzes the 2008 border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, tracing its roots to colonial-era protocols from 1900 and 1901. It argues that the conflict is not primarily about the contested Ras Doumeirah area, but is a strategic move by Eritrea to pressure Ethiopia, which relies heavily on Djibouti's ports. The document details the military imbalance between the two states, the role of external actors like France and the US, and the broader instability in the Horn of Africa, including proxy wars in Somalia and internal tensions in Ethiopia's Ogaden region.

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  • The 2008 border dispute is characterized as a strategic extension of the unresolved conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, rather than a dispute over the intrinsic value of the contested land.
  • Eritrea's military deployment near the border is interpreted as a multi-pronged strategy to pressure Ethiopia, disrupt Somali peace talks in Djibouti, and signal its ability to threaten Ethiopia's vital trade corridor through the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits.
  • The border dispute is rooted in colonial-era agreements, specifically the 1900 and 1901 protocols between France and Italy, though a 1935 agreement that would have altered the border was never ratified by France and was repudiated by Italy in 1938.
  • There is a significant military imbalance between the two nations; Eritrea possesses 200,000 regular ground forces and 150 tanks, while Djibouti has 10,950 regular ground forces and no tanks.
  • Djibouti's economy has become heavily dependent on Ethiopia following the 1998–2000 war, with Ethiopian cargo traffic increasing from 1.7 million tonnes in 1997 to 4.2 million tonnes in 2002.
  • Eritrea felt a strategic blow when the US established a military base in Djibouti (Camp Lemonier) instead of Eritrea, despite Eritrean lobbying efforts that included paying the law firm Greenberg Traurig US$50,000 a month.
  • France maintains a strong military presence in Djibouti to protect its strategic interests in the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits and provided support during the 2008 conflict, including sending three ships and establishing a temporary base at Mouhoule.
  • President Issayas Afeworki of Eritrea is described as a centralized power who is resistant to diplomacy and has a history of 'trigger-happy' foreign relations with neighbors including Sudan, Yemen, Djibouti, and Ethiopia.
  • The conflict in Somalia is intertwined with the Ethiopia-Eritrea rivalry, with Eritrea supporting anti-TFG forces and the UIC to bog down Ethiopian troops.

Cite the original document

APA
Mesfin, B. (2008). The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREP150908.PDF
Chicago
Mesfin, Berouk. The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute. Institute for Security Studies, 2008. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREP150908.PDF.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Mesfin |first1=Berouk |title=The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=15 September 2008 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREP150908.PDF |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{mesfin2008eritreadjibouti, author = {Mesfin, Berouk}, title = {{The Eritrea-Djibouti border dispute}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2008}, month = sep, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SITREP150908.PDF}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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