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The 2022 Forest Declaration Assessment finds that no global indicator is currently on track to meet the 2030 goals of halting forest loss and degradation or restoring 350 million hectares of landscape. While Tropical Asia is the only region on track to stop deforestation, global primary forest loss decreased by only 3.1% in humid tropics. Financial investment for forests is critically insufficient, with current mitigation funding at US$ 2.3 billion per year—less than 1% of the estimated US$ 460 billion needed annually. Corporate action to eliminate deforestation from agricultural supply chains by 2025 is lagging, and governance remains weak, with at least 50% of lands occupied by Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPCs and LCs) lacking legal recognition.

The 2022 Forest Declaration Assessment finds that global forest governance is currently insufficient to meet 2030 targets. While some countries have successfully reduced deforestation through moratoria and strengthened enforcement, these gains are often fragile or being reversed by legislative rollbacks. The report highlights persistent tenure insecurity for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, widespread corruption in the timber trade, and significant gaps in the implementation of demand-side regulations in importing nations.

The 2022 Forest Declaration Assessment finds that no global indicator is currently on track to meet the 2030 goals of halting forest loss and restoring 350 million hectares of landscape. While Tropical Asia is on track to halt deforestation, other regions like Tropical Latin America and Africa are not. The report highlights a massive funding gap, with current mitigation finance at less than 1% of the estimated USD 460 billion annual need. It also notes that commodity-driven deforestation declined by 6% in 2021 but remains far from the trajectory needed for the 2025 private sector target. Governance remains a critical weakness, with persistent tenure insecurity for Indigenous Peoples and local communities and widespread corruption in the timber trade.

The report finds that global forest finance is not on track to meet 2030 goals, with current mitigation finance averaging USD 2.3 billion per year—less than 1 percent of the estimated USD 460 billion annual requirement. It highlights a stark imbalance where 'grey finance' (harmful investments) significantly outweighs 'green finance,' and notes that Indigenous Peoples and local communities remain severely underfunded. While 2021 pledges could quadruple annual finance to USD 9.5 billion, this remains insufficient. The report also analyzes the limited impact of voluntary and compliance carbon markets and the slow progress of REDD+ frameworks.

The document examines the tension between Africa's significant natural gas resources and the global shift toward net-zero emissions. It argues that while gas provides short-term revenue and energy security, long-term investments face high risks of becoming stranded assets due to declining global demand and the falling costs of renewable energy. The paper advocates for leveraging climate finance to scale up renewables and green hydrogen, which it presents as more sustainable pathways for economic diversification and energy access.

The document examines the intersection of debt, capitalism, and patriarchy in Africa, arguing that neoliberal debt architectures and austerity measures externalise the costs of social reproduction onto women. It highlights how sovereign debt crises lead to cuts in public services, which in turn drives households toward predatory private lending and microfinance. The author calls for a systemic reform of the global financial architecture, including debt relief without conditionalities, progressive domestic resource mobilisation, and stricter regulation of predatory lending to protect vulnerable populations.

Central Africa has experienced warming between 0.75°C and 1.2°C since 1960, leading to widespread losses in health, food security, and economic growth. Future risks include lethal heat exposure, severe biodiversity loss above 2°C, and significant GDP reductions. Adaptation requires increased finance, nature-based solutions, and improved climate services, though the region faces severe data constraints and funding gaps.

The document details the disproportionate impact of climate change on Central Africa, highlighting significant temperature increases, biodiversity loss, and economic decline. It emphasizes the critical need for transformative adaptation and increased climate finance to mitigate future risks to health, food security, and infrastructure.

The document introduces the 'Systems Journey,' a three-phase iterative process (Engage, Explore, Learn) designed to move beyond linear thinking in conservation and sustainability work. It outlines eight core principles for systemic change and provides a toolkit of 11 practical methods—such as Systems Mapping, the Iceberg Model, and Scenario Planning—to help navigators identify leverage points and develop adaptive theories of action. The guide emphasizes the importance of co-creation, acknowledging power dynamics, and embracing a 'safe-to-fail' experimental mindset to achieve long-term structural transformation.

The document introduces a 'systems pathway' consisting of three phases: Engaging, Exploring, and Learning. It argues that complex problems cannot be solved with linear thinking and instead requires a collaborative, iterative approach. The guide details a process for understanding system dynamics, identifying high-leverage points for intervention, and developing adaptive theories of change and action. It includes a toolkit of 11 practical methods, such as the Iceberg Model and Scenario Planning, to help practitioners move from a state of 'chaos and confusion' toward systemic renewal.

The document examines the 'militarisation of politics' in Africa, using the conflict in Ethiopia between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as a primary example. It defines militarisation as the tendency to settle political disputes militarily and notes that this trend is often a legacy of colonial rule. The author highlights a history of military coups and civil wars across the continent, noting that by 2017, Africa had experienced 200 successful and failed coups. While the African Union (AU) has frameworks like the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to prevent unconstitutional changes of government, the document argues that inconsistent implementation—such as the AU's failure to suspend Chad after the seizure of power by the Transnational Military Council—undermines these efforts. Additionally, the text notes a 17% increase in African military spending over the last decade, totaling $41.2 billion in 2019. In the Horn of Africa, the conflict involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan risks regional destabilisation and the undoing of previous peace agreements.

The document analyzes the resurgent roles of China and Russia in Africa since 2000. China's influence is primarily economic, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative and long-term infrastructure investments, while Russia's approach is more opportunistic, focusing on mining, arms exports, and the deployment of private military contractors in fragile states. While the two powers coordinate on challenging Western norms and supporting non-interference in the UN Security Council, they maintain a 'competitive partnership' characterized by limited strategic coordination in security and economics, and occasional competition for commercial contracts in countries like Zimbabwe.

The document warns that African oil and gas producing countries risk committing public funds to stranded assets by basing investment decisions on current price trends rather than energy transition scenarios. It highlights the vulnerability of National Oil Companies (NOCs) and the potential for revenue overestimation, specifically citing risks in countries like Angola, Mozambique, and Senegal. The author advocates for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to mandate the disclosure of project viability data and for governments to diversify their economies.

The report characterizes "net zero" agendas as a "Great Cheat," asserting that they allow major polluters to continue emissions while relying on unproven technologies and flawed offsetting schemes. It details how these entities use lobbying, financial influence over academia, and corporate capture of international forums like the UNFCCC to displace real emission reductions. The document highlights specific failures in the plans of companies such as Shell, Total SA, and JBS, and calls for a transition to "Real Zero" by 2030 through systemic change and climate justice.

The document analyzes how 'Big Polluters' across various sectors use 'net zero' targets as a form of greenwashing to delay real emission reductions. It identifies critical conceptual flaws in these plans, such as reliance on unproven geoengineering and carbon offsets, and details how these corporations influence political and academic institutions to validate their agendas. Case studies on companies like Shell, Total SA, and JBS illustrate the gap between public commitments and actual business operations, while the report calls for a transition to 'Real Zero' by 2030.

The report contends that "net zero" pledges from "Big Polluters"—including fossil fuel, agribusiness, and tech giants—are deceptive strategies to avoid responsibility for climate change. It identifies "dangerous distractions" such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), and carbon offsets, arguing these schemes often lead to human rights abuses and "carbon colonialism." The document details how these corporations influence policy through lobbying, financial contributions to politicians, and the funding of academic research at institutions like Stanford and MIT to validate "net zero" narratives. Case studies of Shell, Total SA, and JBS are used to illustrate how these plans often mask continued production of high-emissions products.

The report assesses the impact of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on African infrastructure, economic growth, trade, and debt sustainability. While finding that Chinese investment helps close the infrastructure gap and can boost GDP, the authors note risks including debt distress in specific countries, environmental degradation, and the crowding out of local manufacturing by Chinese imports. Case studies in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Nigeria demonstrate positive outcomes in transport and energy, though the failure of Nigeria's NIGCOM satellite highlights risks of using the continent as a testing ground. The report concludes that benefits generally outweigh costs, provided African nations improve project management and negotiate more symmetrical trade and loan terms.

The document examines the gap between legal design and operational reality regarding how logging companies share benefits with forest communities in four West and Central African nations. It highlights that while laws may exist, a lack of implementing regulations, low payment amounts, and limited community negotiation capacity often lead to poor outcomes. ClientEarth has responded by developing guidance tools, templates, and training to empower communities to negotiate more effective and enforceable agreements.

ClientEarth argues that the European Commission's interim findings on illegal logging rules fail to adequately account for the positive systemic impacts of the EUTR and FLEGT Regulation while overlooking critical enforcement gaps. The organization recommends harmonizing obligations across the supply chain, creating a centralized public registry for compliance data, and adopting a legal definition of 'substantiated concerns' to aid prosecutors. Regarding FLEGT, ClientEarth contends that the slow pace of licensing is a result of the necessary complexity of legal reforms in partner countries and warns that weak EUTR enforcement reduces the incentive for third countries to engage in VPA processes.

The transition to low-carbon technologies is highly mineral-intensive, requiring an estimated 3 billion tons of minerals and metals to achieve a below 2°C future. This demand increases the risk of deforestation and fragmentation of intact forest landscapes (IFLs), particularly in the Amazon and Congo Basin. In the Amazon, mining contributes up to 9% of IFL area loss, while in the Congo Basin, the demand for cobalt for batteries drives exploration in high-forest-cover areas. Analysis shows a gap in corporate and government governance, with only a minority of assessed companies adopting specific forest-related commitments and 78% of state and regional governments lacking forest management plans that directly address mining-related deforestation.