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The Council on Strategic Risks describes a workshop in California that explored how extreme weather events, such as wildfires and droughts, can be leveraged by opportunistic actors to spread mis- and disinformation. The report identifies key uncertainties regarding generative AI, institutional capacity, and public trust, and presents three divergent future scenarios for the state: a 'muddling through' crisis, a geopolitical collapse triggered by conflict in the Pacific, and a positive social transformation in water management. It concludes that information manipulation is a persistent risk to disaster response and national security, necessitating cross-sector partnerships for resilience.

The Council on Strategic Risks proposes that the US government invest $10 billion annually over 10 years in biodefense, noting that the FY26 request of $4.02 billion is insufficient given threats from Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran. The author suggests that 2% of the proposed $500 billion defense spending increase could fund critical enhancements in wastewater surveillance, medical countermeasure discovery via supercomputing, biomanufacturing, and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The report argues that South Korea's heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels (84% of total energy supply) creates critical vulnerabilities to geopolitical conflicts in the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Strait, and South China Sea, as well as climate-driven infrastructure risks. It posits that a rapid shift to renewables can mitigate these risks, reduce financial burdens associated with energy price volatility, and support the energy needs of advanced AI and defense systems. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains and cybersecurity risks associated with digitalized grids, the document concludes these are manageable through battery storage innovation, grid modernization, and supply chain diversification. It recommends integrating renewable energy goals explicitly into national security planning and the 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand.

The report argues that South Korea's heavy reliance on fossil fuel imports—approximately 84% of its total energy supply—creates significant national security vulnerabilities due to geopolitical tensions and climate risks. It posits that transitioning to renewable energy would reduce exposure to fragile maritime chokepoints, lower fiscal strain, and improve military readiness. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains and cybersecurity risks from digitization, the report concludes these are manageable compared to the structural risks of fossil fuel dependence. It recommends integrating renewable energy targets into national security planning and leveraging the newly created Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment to coordinate a whole-of-government approach to energy resilience.

The 2025 East Asia Quadrilateral Dialogue joint statement argues that geopolitical zero-sum thinking and great power competition increase the risk of military conflict in East Asia and hinder cooperation on the climate crisis. The signatories advocate for the institutionalization of Track II diplomacy—linking civil society, parliaments, and experts—to maintain peace and manage regional competition.

The report examines the risks associated with the renewed interest in tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) among global powers. It details three plausible use scenarios—targeting facilities, military forces in the field, or demonstration shots—and models the direct physical effects of a 20-kiloton blast. The authors argue that TNW use would trigger unpredictable international crises, erode the long-standing norm of nuclear non-use, and potentially lead to uncontrolled escalation. The paper recommends reinforcing the non-use norm and implementing risk-reduction measures to prevent the normalization of nuclear warfighting.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a faster shift to renewables—potentially reaching 70% of electricity generation by 2035—would mitigate risks associated with fragile fossil fuel supply chains and geopolitical instability. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the authors contend these are manageable compared to the vulnerabilities of continued fossil fuel dependence. The document recommends greater inter-ministerial coordination between energy, defense, and diplomatic agencies to prioritize renewables as a national security imperative.

The document outlines the existential risk posed by the approximately 12,000 nuclear warheads held by nine nations. It explains the physics of fission and fusion weapons and analyzes the catastrophic effects of detonations, ranging from immediate blast and radiation deaths in urban centers to global climate disruption. The guide highlights the instability of 'launch on warning' postures and the potential for 'nuclear winter' and ozone depletion, arguing that even regional conflicts would cause global famine and societal collapse.

The report examines how AI accelerates biological research, creating a 'dual-use dilemma' where tools for medical advancement can be repurposed for bioweapons. It analyzes the 'risk chain' of biological weapon development, the capabilities of foundation models and biological design tools (BDTs), and the geopolitical landscape involving the US, China, and Russia. The document proposes a 'preferred' 2030 scenario characterized by geopolitical stability and responsible AI development, offering specific US policy recommendations across biosecurity foundations, technical governance, and international diplomacy.

The document outlines an entreaty endorsed by over 100 experts at 'The Spirit of Asilomar' conference, condemning the development and use of biological weapons. It argues that the most effective way to deter biological weapons is to accelerate the equitable global deployment of tools for attribution, early detection, and rapid countermeasure manufacturing. The text highlights ongoing threats from state actors, specifically Russia and North Korea, as well as non-state actors, and emphasizes that increasing global access to vaccines and countermeasures in developing countries reduces the attractiveness of biological weapons.

The Council on Strategic Risks outlines a strategic roadmap for the US government to bolster biodefense, focusing on a 'deterrence by denial' framework. The recommendations are divided into immediate actions for the first month, the first 100 days, and the first year, emphasizing the need for expert leadership, increased budgetary investment, and the integration of AI safety. Key priorities include updating the National Biodefense Strategy, enhancing pathogen early warning systems, and strengthening international partnerships to counter biological weapons programs in countries such as North Korea and Russia.

The Council on Strategic Risks outlines a strategic framework for the next US administration's nuclear posture, emphasizing the completion of current modernization plans, the preservation of international norms against nuclear testing and use, and the avoidance of provocative posture changes. It warns against 'entanglement' between conventional and nuclear systems and recommends maintaining the 'fundamental purpose' declaratory policy. The report specifically advises against rebuilding nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and expanding the Sentinel ICBM program beyond its current 400-missile target.

The report analyzes 450 votes and 5,850 voting decisions by African states at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) between 2006 and 2022. It finds that the African Group generally opposes or is unwilling to defend civil and political rights, particularly regarding sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) and freedom of expression. The group frequently protects African states from international scrutiny through country-specific resolutions while remaining inconsistent or indifferent toward human rights violations in non-African countries. Despite a general decline in the domestic freedom scores of its members, the group's HRC voting patterns show a slight shift toward a more human rights-friendly direction after 2010, though it remains largely obstructive toward intrusive mandates for African nations.

The document details Kazakhstan's efforts to eliminate its inherited Soviet nuclear and biological weapons legacies and its current leadership roles in the NPT and the proposed International Agency for Biological Safety (IABS). It recommends that Kazakhstan push for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, the creation of a nuclear weapons database, and the formalization of the IABS to address gaps in the Biological Weapons Convention.

The report identifies four 'pillars' of protest—demands, strategy, composition, and organization—that influence the size of a movement and the likelihood of regime loyalty shifts. It argues that non-violent, broad-based campaigns demanding regime change are most likely to succeed and lead to democratic consolidation. However, it notes a recent decline in the success rate of such movements and a rise in anti-liberal protests. For international democracy promoters, the report recommends investing in civil society infrastructure during stable periods rather than attempting to instigate regime shifts.

The report finds that the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has significantly eroded international arms control, leading to the breakdown of key treaties like New START and the CFE Treaty, and the unilateral reduction of compliance by Russia in others. It highlights a trend of 'weaponizing' arms control forums to spread disinformation and a decline in verification mechanisms. However, the authors note that adherence to many international norms remains largely intact and that violations have provoked diplomatic responses that may refocus global attention on the necessity of disarmament.

On July 7, 2023, the United States destroyed the last of its declared chemical weapons stockpile, marking the elimination of 100 percent of the world's declared chemical weapons. The process was overseen by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and faced delays due to technical challenges and local opposition to incineration methods at sites like the Pueblo Chemical Depot and Blue Grass Army Depot. Despite this milestone, the report highlights ongoing noncompliance by Burma, Iran, Russia, and Syria, and the use of Novichok nerve agents. It argues that the U.S. must retain its scientific and technical countering-WMD expertise to assist in treaty verification and respond to future contingencies, especially as other nonproliferation frameworks, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, face increasing fragility.

The document examines the contradictions in Namibia's foreign policy on human rights, noting a gap between its progressive Constitution and its practical international conduct. It identifies key tensions, such as the conflict between multilateralism and state sovereignty, and the prioritisation of 'solidarity politics' from the liberation struggle over universal human rights standards. This is evidenced by Namibia's frequent abstentions at the UN on country-specific human rights resolutions and its continued diplomatic ties with authoritarian regimes.

The Green Climate Fund's Accreditation Panel recommends the re-accreditation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for a second term, maintaining its scope for medium-sized projects and medium environmental and social risk (Category B). The assessment confirms FAO's strong technical expertise in adaptation, REDD+, and the blue economy, and its ability to implement GCF's gender and environmental and social policies. While generally compliant, the Panel identified a gap in explicit policy statements regarding Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), making the re-accreditation conditional upon the formal approval of an AML/CFT policy or the inclusion of consistent statements within its prohibited practices policies.

The document examines 'cyber-biosecurity' risks, where advances in automation, synthetic biology, and the proliferation of high-containment labs create vulnerabilities that malicious actors can exploit. It highlights threats such as the manipulation of genomic data, cyber attacks on medical devices, and the targeting of agricultural infrastructure. To mitigate these risks, the author recommends designating the bioeconomy as critical infrastructure, passing comprehensive health privacy laws, strengthening oversight of gain-of-function research, and implementing stringent screening protocols for gene synthesis providers.