The Next Administration's Nuclear Posture

The Council on Strategic Risks outlines a strategic framework for the next US administration's nuclear posture, emphasizing the completion of current modernization plans, the preservation of international norms against nuclear testing and use, and the avoidance of provocative posture changes. It warns against 'entanglement' between conventional and nuclear systems and recommends maintaining the 'fundamental purpose' declaratory policy. The report specifically advises against rebuilding nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) and expanding the Sentinel ICBM program beyond its current 400-missile target.

• The United States must prioritize the completion of its current nuclear modernization program, targeted for 2035-2045, and avoid adding new weapon requirements that could strain infrastructure or trigger arms races.
• The US should maintain a clear distinction between nuclear and conventional systems to avoid 'entanglement,' which can complicate decision-making and increase the risk of miscalculation.
• The next administration should uphold the 'fundamental purpose' policy from the 2022 review, stating that nuclear weapons are intended to deter nuclear attack and would only be used in 'extreme circumstances'.
• The US should continue to lead by example in upholding international norms, specifically the norm against explosive nuclear testing and the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won.
• The report recommends against rebuilding nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) due to operational challenges, entanglement risks, and potential negative impacts on alliances with Japan and Australia.
• The Sentinel ICBM program should remain at its currently programmed size of 400 missiles, as increasing the quantity based on counter-force targeting would provide no marginal benefit.
• The US should maintain diplomatic engagement and risk-reduction channels with adversaries, including pursuing peer-to-peer dialogues with China and seeking a follow-on agreement to New START before it expires in February 2026.

APA

du Pont, J., Facini, A., Moulton, J., Parthemore, C., & Weber, A. (2024). The Next Administration's Nuclear Posture. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/10/31/the-next-administrations-nuclear-posture/

Chicago

du Pont, Jackson, Andrew Facini, John Moulton, Christine Parthemore, and Andrew Weber. The Next Administration's Nuclear Posture. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2024. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/10/31/the-next-administrations-nuclear-posture/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=du Pont |first1=Jackson |last2=Facini |first2=Andrew |last3=Moulton |first3=John |last4=Parthemore |first4=Christine |last5=Weber |first5=Andrew |title=The Next Administration's Nuclear Posture |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=31 October 2024 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/10/31/the-next-administrations-nuclear-posture/ |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{dupont2024next, author = {du Pont, Jackson and Facini, Andrew and Moulton, John and Parthemore, Christine and Weber, Andrew}, title = {{The Next Administration's Nuclear Posture}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2024}, month = oct, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2024/10/31/the-next-administrations-nuclear-posture/}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }