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The document analyzes why the APRM process in Zambia has lost momentum despite early innovative practices. It identifies a lack of funding, poor coordination within civil society, and the disbandment of the civil society APRM Secretariat in 2011 as key drivers of this decline. The authors argue that the APRM has become dominated by the government post-review and is not central to Zambia's broader governance discourse. Recommendations include integrating the APRM into national development plans, increasing media coverage, and improving budgeting guidance from the continental APRM Secretariat.

The research paper examines whether the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has led to governance improvements in member states using the 2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) as a benchmark. The author finds mixed results: while 10 of 17 reviewed countries showed some progress—most notably Rwanda—others like Mali and Benin experienced regression. The paper concludes that there is no obvious direct positive correlation between APRM reviews and improved IIAG scores, largely because member states have failed to systematically implement the required National Programmes of Action (NPoA). To improve, the author recommends strengthening peer pressure, increasing secretariat support for national planning, and enhancing civil society engagement to ensure domestic accountability.

South Africa is over-exploiting its freshwater resources, with a projected widening gap between supply and demand by 2035. The authors find that the National Water Resource Strategy 2013 (NWRS2) lacks the aggressive measures needed to close this gap, which is driven by urban migration, industrial growth, and agricultural expansion. Proposed solutions include significant reductions in municipal non-revenue water, increased wastewater reuse, and expanded groundwater extraction.

The document assesses South Africa's role as an emerging global actor in peace and security, specifically its interactions with the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBC, PBSO, and PBF). It highlights South Africa's experience in mediation and peacekeeping in countries like the DRC and Burundi, while noting a lack of systematic staffing of South Africans in the UN system. The paper emphasizes the potential of South-South cooperation, exemplified by the IBSA Fund, and recommends that South Africa leverage the 2015 UN peacebuilding review to promote African perspectives and national ownership of peace processes.

The document examines the challenges facing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Africa, highlighting how their proximity to state power often leads to politicised board appointments and regulatory failures. Using data from APRM reviews of six SADC countries, it argues that SOEs must be treated as professional companies, with merit-based appointments and clear legal mandates, to drive broader economic development and good corporate governance across the continent.

The document examines the transition of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Africa from simple philanthropy to a strategic, integrated business approach. Using data from the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), it contrasts the 'first-generation' philanthropic approach seen in less developed economies like Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia with the more 'second-generation' systematic approaches in South Africa and Mauritius. It highlights a gap between advanced conceptual frameworks and actual practice, noting that mandatory labour and environmental regulations are often ignored. The author argues for a 'third-generation' CSR model where businesses partner with society to solve overarching problems, while cautioning that CSR should remain fundamentally voluntary to avoid overburdening companies.

The paper argues that elections in Africa often trigger instability because they are primarily viewed as a means of accessing state resources. It suggests that stability requires 'inclusive political settlements' and a move away from 'electoral autocracy' where elections are used to consolidate power. The author emphasizes the need for credible Election Management Bodies (EMBs), legitimate domestic observation, and inclusive mediation mechanisms involving civil society and traditional leaders to prevent violence.

The document examines the state of corporate governance in Africa, noting that while it is generally underdeveloped and embryonic, a distinctively African approach is emerging. This approach, exemplified by South Africa's King Code, emphasizes socio-economic outcomes and the principle of ubuntu over purely financial or shareholder-centric metrics. The author highlights significant barriers to implementation, including a lack of professional skills (particularly accountants), poor institutional environments, and the prevalence of small, family-owned businesses. The briefing recommends that governments reform the business climate, nurture independent corporate governance infrastructure, and encourage cross-border cooperation to support business growth without imposing unrealistic regulatory burdens.

The report examines corporate governance across six SADC countries, finding a significant gap between the adoption of formal legal frameworks and their practical implementation. While South Africa and Mauritius possess sophisticated systems, others struggle with rudimentary architectures, corruption, and poor infrastructure. The author argues for a principles-based approach to governance that facilitates rather than restricts business growth, particularly for small and medium enterprises.

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a US-Africa trade agreement established in 2001 that provides duty-free access to the US market for qualifying sub-Saharan African states. While exports from AGOA countries to the US grew by 78% between 2001 and 2014, the trade is heavily dominated by energy and commodities, with mineral fuels and oils accounting for 68% of imports. South Africa is a primary beneficiary, contributing an estimated 62,395 jobs and exporting high-end manufactured goods such as vehicles, unlike many other AGOA partners who rely on raw materials.

The paper examines why elections in Africa often trigger violence and fail to legitimise power, attributing this to high stakes regarding access to state resources. It argues that technical fixes are insufficient and that stability requires inclusive political settlements, credible election management bodies (EMBs), and robust domestic observation and mediation systems involving civil society and traditional leaders.

The policy brief examines the impasse in negotiations for the SADC EPA, which were set to end on 1 October 2014. It identifies four primary obstacles: the EU's demand for a ban on export taxes, the restrictive nature of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause, the slow activation of agricultural safeguards, and the technical complexity of rules of origin. The author proposes compromises, such as shifting the MFN clause to a percentage-based liberalisation model and inverting the burden of proof for agricultural safeguards, to ensure the agreement is politically viable and supports African industrialisation and sovereignty.

The paper argues that South Africa's regional policy exhibits an inconsistent and weak linkage between its stated normative values and its economic diplomacy. While South Africa positions itself as a normative leader in Africa, its historical ties to liberation movements and a focus on regional state-building have limited its use of economic resources as tools for political reform. The author concludes that South Africa has not integrated its economic drivers with its normative drivers, often failing to sacrifice economic interests to defend the political anchors of its external identity.

The document argues that South Africa has been reluctant to use its economic power to push for democratic reforms in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, preferring a policy of 'quiet diplomacy' and non-interference. This approach is driven by realpolitik concerns regarding regional stability, personal ties between political elites, and a desire to avoid being perceived as a hegemon. While South Africa's foreign policy officially commits to human rights and democracy, the author finds a disconnect in implementation, noting that economic diplomacy is primarily used for domestic wealth aggregation rather than as a tool for political influence. The paper suggests that South Africa could more effectively advance its agenda by integrating economic statecraft into its foreign policy, potentially through public sector financial institutions or the reformulation of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenue-sharing formula.

The document analyzes the stalled negotiations of the SADC EPA, focusing on export taxes, the Most Favored Nation clause, agricultural safeguards, and rules of origin. It argues that the EU should make strategic concessions on these points to avoid straining diplomatic relations and to support African industrialization.

The document examines South Africa's reactive approach to Swaziland's absolute monarchy, highlighting the tension between South Africa's democratic values and its economic interests. It analyzes the role of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the personal relationship between President Jacob Zuma and King Mswati III, concluding that while South Africa possesses significant economic leverage, it has been reluctant to apply it due to concerns over regional stability, commercial interests, and diplomatic norms of non-interference.

The document examines the socio-economic instability of South Africa's platinum belt, specifically following the 2012 Marikana tragedy. It argues that the 'oscillating migrant labour' system persists because of a 'double balance' in the national elite bargain, where the ruling ANC and traditional authorities maintain insecure communal land tenure to ensure a steady supply of cheap labour. The author contends that corporate social investment (CSI) and Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are insufficient to address these structural issues due to coordination failures and the exclusion of 'informal' migrant settlers. The paper recommends reforming land tenure legislation, prohibiting traditional authorities from operating as corporations, restricting politically connected elites from BEE transactions, and implementing more humane, shorter migration work cycles.

The African Governance Architecture (AGA), established by the African Union in 2011, aims to coordinate continental governance initiatives under a 'shared values' agenda. However, the paper identifies critical gaps in its operationalization, specifically a disconnect between governance and security frameworks and an undefined role for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The authors argue that integrating the AGA with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) would transform the latter from a reactive to a pre-emptive tool by using governance assessments to flag potential conflicts. Additionally, the paper suggests the APRM should serve as the primary diagnostic tool for monitoring member states' compliance with shared values instruments, noting that past APRM reports have already identified systemic barriers to domestication, such as bureaucratic red tape and lack of enforcement capacity.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), established in 2003 under NEPAD, is a voluntary governance assessment system where African states evaluate their own political, economic, and corporate governance. By 2013, 33 states had acceded, with 17 completing their first review. The mechanism utilizes a process of self-assessment, expert missions, and high-level peer review to identify deficiencies and implement National Programmes of Action (NPoAs). While the APRM has successfully expanded democratic space and fostered a common governance vocabulary, it faces challenges in integrating NPoAs into national budgets and ensuring consistent high-level oversight of implementation.

The document outlines that Africa is experiencing significant warming and increased extreme weather, which threatens food security, health, and economic growth. It argues that while Africa has contributed little to historic emissions, it is highly vulnerable and must integrate adaptation and mitigation into long-term development planning. Key opportunities for the region include adopting decentralized renewable energy, implementing conservation agriculture, and planning low-carbon urban growth to avoid fossil fuel lock-in.