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In 2024, global coal power capacity increased by 18.8 GW, as 44.1 GW was commissioned and 25.2 GW retired. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK completed its coal phaseout, global progress was offset by significant expansion in China and India. China commissioned 30.5 GW (70% of the global total) and saw 94.5 GW in new construction starts. India recorded its highest-ever level of new coal proposals at 38.4 GW. Conversely, coal proposals in OECD countries dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, though retirements in these nations must triple to align with the Paris Agreement.

The document examines the Trump administration's efforts to secure critical minerals and reduce dependence on China, focusing on proposed deals in Ukraine and the DRC. It argues that these 'minerals-for-security' arrangements face significant feasibility hurdles and risk mirroring neocolonial patterns. The author recommends that African nations adopt 'strategic neutrality' and focus on domestic value addition to maximize their agency in the global energy transition.

The report argues that while plant-based proteins can significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and land use, global retailers are failing to implement the sales targets, transparent reporting, and price parity necessary to drive a large-scale transition. Using a Methane Action Tracker, the analysis finds that US retailers lag behind European ones, and most retailers lack proportional targets that pair plant-based growth with animal protein reduction.

The U.S. steel industry is already less carbon-intensive than other major regions due to a high reliance on electric arc furnaces (EAFs), which account for 70% of production. However, the remaining 30% relies on integrated blast furnace/basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) routes to produce high-quality steel. Decarbonization requires transitioning these integrated mills to direct reduced iron (DRI) and submerged arc furnaces (SAF) or implementing carbon capture and storage (CCS). While clean electricity offers a 'quick win' for EAFs, deep decarbonization is hindered by the high cost of green hydrogen and the need for extensive CCS infrastructure. The report argues that because steel is a low-margin commodity, government policy—including carbon taxes, border adjustment mechanisms, and demand-side incentives—is essential to offset the increased costs of low-carbon production.

In 2024, global electricity generation reached new record highs for solar, wind, hydro, gas, and coal. Solar was the fastest-growing source, increasing by 474 TWh to reach a 6.9% share of the global mix, with China contributing 53% of this growth. Wind generation also hit a record of 2,494 TWh, though growth slowed due to weather conditions. Hydro rebounded to an all-time high of 4,416 TWh following 2023 droughts, largely driven by China. Nuclear generation grew by 2.5% to 2,768 TWh, but its global market share fell to a 45-year low of 9%. Gas and coal both reached record generation levels in 2024, though their shares of the global electricity mix declined to 22% and 34% respectively, as electricity demand grew faster than their production.

The report examines the 2024 power sectors of China, the US, EU, India, Russia, Japan, and Brazil. Key trends include China's massive solar growth despite record coal generation, the US's first-time transition to wind and solar overtaking coal, the EU's record decline in coal, and Brazil's high renewable share. While India and China continue to see demand growth met partly by coal, the EU and US show a stronger shift toward clean energy, though the US remains reliant on gas.

In 2024, global electricity demand rose by 4% to 30,856 TWh, driven largely by China and extreme heatwaves. Low-carbon sources reached a historic high of 40.9% of global generation, with solar and wind combined surpassing hydropower. Despite this, global power sector emissions hit a record high, increasing by 1.6% due to a rise in fossil generation linked to cooling demand during heatwaves.

In 2024, clean power surpassed 40% of global electricity generation for the first time since the 1940s, driven by record solar growth. Despite this, global power sector emissions reached an all-time high of 14.6 billion tonnes of CO2 because heatwaves drove a 1.4% increase in fossil generation to meet cooling demand. Solar generation doubled over the last three years, reaching 2,131 TWh, while emerging drivers like AI data centres, EVs, and heat pumps structurally increased demand growth. China and India are increasingly decoupling their electricity demand growth from fossil fuel expansion, with China's clean generation meeting 81% of its demand increase in 2024.

G7 countries are on track to miss their 2025 deadline to phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, with total subsidies reaching a record USD 282 billion in 2023. The surge was primarily driven by consumer subsidies for natural gas and petroleum to mitigate energy price volatility following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While some members have implemented domestic reforms or joined coalitions like COFFIS and CETP, the author argues that the G7 must now drop the 'inefficient' qualifier, establish national action plans, and prohibit all subsidies to coal and fossil fuel production to align with 1.5°C climate pathways.

The document examines the gap between legal frameworks and the actual implementation of environmental procedural rights in Southeast Asia. It identifies challenges such as ambiguous disclosure requirements, lack of enforcement in public participation during Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and barriers to judicial remedies. The brief highlights community-driven alternatives like counter-EIAs and the role of legal networks in strengthening the judiciary to protect vulnerable groups and environmental defenders.

The document introduces a workbook designed to help businesses and policy-makers navigate the compliance landscape of due diligence laws. It maps 12 specific mandatory regulations—including the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and the U.S. Lacey Act—against six common themes: risk management, transparency, traceability, accountability, stakeholder engagement, and legality. The analysis is based on the OECD's definition of due diligence, which focuses on identifying and mitigating adverse environmental and social risks in supply chains.

The document analyzes how climate change accelerates biodiversity loss and how the loss of ecosystems further destabilizes the climate. It critiques 'false solutions' such as monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsets, and geoengineering, arguing they often cause more harm than good. The report calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, community-led energy transitions, and the protection of Indigenous rights.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8 GW despite the lowest number of new commissions in 20 years, driven primarily by record construction activity in China and India. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK eliminated coal entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to expand capacity. The report highlights a stark divide between OECD countries, where projects have plummeted, and Asia, where China and India account for 92% of new projects.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.