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The paper examines the use of high-end climate change (HECC) scenarios in adaptation planning across the EU, Hungary, Portugal, and Scotland, finding that decision-makers generally view these scenarios as low-probability and do not routinely integrate them into current actions, often prioritizing non-climate drivers over climate change.

The report proposes a UK-wide Nature and Environment Commission to replace the oversight and enforcement functions previously provided by EU institutions. It argues that environmental law is often ineffective due to poor compliance by public authorities and a lack of a dedicated enforcer. The proposed Commission would combine technical expertise with strong legal powers, including the ability to conduct thematic inquiries, issue binding notices, and seek specific mandatory injunctions from courts. To ensure independence, the report recommends that the Commission be funded by and accountable to parliaments rather than governments, and be composed of an interdisciplinary team of experts. It also emphasizes the need for the Commission to act as a voice for nature and local communities through a transparent complaints process and public advocacy.

The author argues that opposition to immigration is a pervasive popular movement across Europe, regardless of a country's ethnic homogeneity or immigration policy. This trend is contributing to political polarization and a potential 'de-democratization' process, particularly as it aligns with skepticism toward supranational solutions like the EU. The text highlights a divide between 'new' and 'old' Europe, noting that some Eastern European countries lack the same norms of tolerance as Western Europe, which influences their resistance to EU refugee quotas.

The report evaluates the impact of the APRM, EITI, and OGP, concluding that while these initiatives provide platforms for dialogue and some policy changes, there is little measurable evidence that they consistently drive significant governance reforms. It highlights the challenges of voluntary compliance, the risk of 'open-washing' by governments, and the critical but often tokenistic role of civil society. The document recommends that donors support civil society capacity, invest in impact research, and align funding with MSI action plans to better foster accountability and transparency.

The author examines how the rise of populism in Western politics, exemplified by the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and political shifts in the UK and Germany, creates risks for climate action. While some nations and entities have responded by strengthening their commitments, the author contends that overcoming political polarisation requires shifting climate communication from expert-led discourse to a values-based approach that builds broad societal consensus.

The document warns that without a 550gCO2/kWh limit on capacity payments, Europe's 256 operational coal plants could be 'supercharged', potentially extending their design life from 40 to 60 years. It identifies multiple EU policy gaps—including low carbon prices, biomass co-firing, and mining cross-subsidies—that already favour coal. The author contends that poorly designed capacity markets risk crowding out flexible, low-carbon alternatives like batteries and demand-side response, arguing that clean capacity is already cheaper than extending old coal plants.

The Visegrad Four countries lack a coordinated policy on fake news, often treating it as an external security threat while ignoring misinformation spread by their own ruling elites. While the Czech Republic has a dedicated government body for hybrid threats and Poland participates in international counter-hybrid warfare centers, Slovakia relies more on civil society and commercial initiatives to filter dubious content. Hungary is noted for a lack of active government opposition to fake news, with the ruling party itself accused of spreading conspiracy theories. The document warns that this fragmented landscape increases vulnerability to pro-Kremlin influence and populist rhetoric, potentially impacting the 2019 EU parliamentary elections.

The brief finds that while 66% of EU cities have climate plans, there is significant disparity based on city size and national legislation. National mandates in countries like Denmark and the UK significantly increase the likelihood of cities having plans, while many cities in Spain and Italy rely on international networks like the Covenant of Mayors due to a lack of national guidance.

The document argues that the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) provides a framework to counter biased narratives that depict African migration as primarily a crisis of people fleeing to Europe, whereas over 80% of African migration is intra-continental. It emphasizes the need for integrated data systems to inform policy, though it notes challenges such as differing legal systems and the sensitivity of security data. The author recommends that African states develop national implementation roadmaps using a 'whole-of-government' approach, citing Kenya's National Coordination Mechanism as a best practice.

The document contends that the widespread panic regarding 'populism' as a threat to democracy is misplaced because populism is often a secondary ideology. The author distinguishes between left-wing populists, who are generally not anti-pluralist, and the radical right, whose threat to liberal democracy is rooted in xenophobic nationalism and anti-immigration agendas. The text highlights that the real danger lies in the broader corrosion of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, often adopted by mainstream parties in the name of national security and identity.

The report examines biomass co-firing across Europe, noting that in Finland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, biomass is often used alongside fossil fuels. It argues that subsidies for co-firing can hinder the phase-out of coal and peat, specifically citing cases in Finland and the Netherlands where financial support may extend the lifetimes of fossil-fuel plants.

The author contends that European security requires a shift from simple integration to a multifaceted approach combining 'soft, hard, and smart power'. Key priorities include meeting the 2% GDP defense spending target through joint capabilities, securing external EU borders, supporting state-building in fragile neighboring countries, and investing in green technology and development in Sub-Saharan Africa to mitigate migration and instability caused by climate change.

The document evaluates EU countries' positions on the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), which covers 60% of EU greenhouse gas emissions. Using a scoring system across five categories—starting point, land use loopholes, ETS surplus loopholes, governance, and ambition levels—it ranks Sweden as the leader and Poland as the lowest performer. The brief argues that most EU countries are pushing for loopholes that undermine the Paris Agreement, with the European Commission's own proposal scoring only 20 out of 100 points.

The EU Climate Leader Board ranks EU member states on their support for the Effort Sharing Regulation across five categories: starting point, ETS surplus loophole, land use loophole, governance, and ambition level. Sweden ranks highest with a score of 67, while Malta ranks lowest with a score of 2. The analysis concludes that no EU country is currently doing enough to make the regulation compatible with the Paris Agreement.

Following the 1956 Hungarian uprising, approximately 200,000 people fled to Austria and Yugoslavia. An international effort led to the resettlement of nearly 180,000 Hungarians across 37 countries within three years. The document highlights the contrast between Sweden's rapid response, which saw over 7,300 refugees resettled by 1958, and Norway's more cautious approach, which focused initially on financial aid before resettling nearly 1,500 people by the end of 1957.

The author argues that the European radical right is moving toward becoming a dominant political force by utilizing a 'common political playbook' of delegitimizing institutions and reforming state architecture to maintain power. This movement is characterized by opposition to minorities, migration, European integration, and 'gender ideology', with Russia and Turkey serving as strategic reference points. To counter this, the author proposes a three-part Green strategy: exposing the hypocrisy and foreign ties of nationalist movements, 'Europeanising' the Green movement to coordinate support across borders, and addressing the root causes of radical right popularity by championing progressive cultural identities and combating neoliberal economic precarity.

Between 2008 and 2015, heavy industry in 20 European countries generated over €25 billion in windfall profits from the EU ETS. These profits were primarily driven by the free allocation of emission allowances intended to prevent "carbon leakage," a phenomenon the report argues is unsubstantiated by evidence. The most significant gains came from cost-pass through to customers (€16.8 billion), followed by the sale of surplus allowances (€7.5 billion) and the use of cheaper international offsets (€0.8 billion). The iron and steel, cement, refineries, and petrochemicals sectors were the primary beneficiaries. The report concludes that these subsidies reduce the incentive for industrial decarbonisation and deprive governments of an estimated €143 billion in potential auctioning revenues, recommending a phase-out of free allocations and the establishment of a Just Transition Fund.

A coalition of 29 European organizations calls for more ambitious EU climate regulations, specifically targeting the 2030 Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) and the LULUCF regulation. The group advocates for a trajectory toward 95% emission cuts by 2050, the rejection of forestry offsets that undermine other sectors, and the mandatory accounting of wetlands to ensure the EU meets its Paris Agreement commitments to limit warming to 1.5°C.

The author contends that the current political crisis in Europe, often labeled as the rise of 'illiberal democracy,' is more accurately described as the rise of 'authoritarian capitalism.' This shift is driven by the incompatibility of global economic integration, national states, and democracy, which has left marginalized groups—described as 'vagabonds'—vulnerable to right-wing exploitation. The text argues that left-wing parties have failed by adopting economic liberalism and neglecting the working class, and suggests that only a return to egalitarian principles and a confrontation with the capitalist system can restore democratic legitimacy in Europe.

The EU-Turkey deal, implemented in March 2016, aimed to reduce irregular arrivals by establishing a 'one in, one out' resettlement formula for Syrian refugees. While the author notes the deal and accompanying border closures in Eastern and South Eastern Europe have successfully deterred arrivals, this has come at a high humanitarian cost. Refugees are now stranded in squalid conditions in Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia, or are forced onto more dangerous smuggling routes, including the Libya-Italy crossing. The author argues that the deal may undermine the international principle of 'non-refoulement' and that the EU's focus on deterrence has created a 'homemade humanitarian crisis'.