The EU-Turkey migrant deal: will it work and at what cost?

This research paper analyzes the 2016 EU-Turkey migrant deal, arguing that while it has succeeded in its primary goal of deterring arrivals via the Aegean Sea, it has done so at a significant humanitarian and legal cost. The author contends that the deal, combined with border closures across Eastern and South Eastern Europe, has trapped refugees in squalid conditions and pushed migrants toward more dangerous smuggling routes, while potentially undermining the international principle of non-refoulement.

• The EU-Turkey deal, which came into force on 18 March 2016, established a 'one in, one out' formula where for every Syrian refugee returned to Turkey from Greek islands, a different Syrian refugee would be resettled in the EU from Turkish camps. In exchange, the EU promised humanitarian aid for the 2.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, loosened visa regulations for Turkish citizens, and accelerated EU membership negotiations.
• The deal has been effective if the sole objective was to reduce the number of migrants crossing the Aegean Sea. Between 20 March and 20 April 2016, 7,375 people arrived in Greece from Turkey, with arrivals dropping to 3,209 in April alone. However, the author notes that border closures and policing in Eastern and South Eastern Europe—including the construction of approximately 1,200km of fencing—were even more influential in stopping the flow of migrants toward Germany.
• The closure of legal and semi-legal routes has increased the danger for refugees, leading to higher mortality rates and a reliance on criminal smuggling gangs. In 2016, 1,361 people were reported dead or missing at sea, including 156 in the Aegean. The author suggests that the Aegean route has become deadlier as smugglers use night crossings and remote landing points, and warns that migrants may shift toward the more perilous Libya-Italy route.
• The deal may jeopardize the international refugee protection regime, specifically the principle of 'non-refoulement' (the prohibition of returning refugees to danger). The author highlights that Turkey has only partially signed the UN Refugee Convention and has previously returned Syrians to Syria. Additionally, Turkey's attempt to create a 'safe zone' on the Syrian border has trapped approximately 250,000 internally displaced people among warring factions, including ISIS.
• The humanitarian situation for refugees stranded in Greece is described as 'appalling,' with many in informal camps like Idomeni or cramped detention centres. The author notes that Greece lacks the capacity to process asylum applications and that the EU's focus on deterrence has created a 'homemade humanitarian crisis.'

APA

South African Institute of International Affairs (2016). The EU-Turkey migrant deal: will it work and at what cost? https://saiia.org.za/research/the-eu-turkey-migrant-deal-will-it-work-and-at-what-cost/

Chicago

South African Institute of International Affairs. The EU-Turkey migrant deal: will it work and at what cost? 2016. https://saiia.org.za/research/the-eu-turkey-migrant-deal-will-it-work-and-at-what-cost/.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=South African Institute of International Affairs |title=The EU-Turkey migrant deal: will it work and at what cost? |date=6 May 2016 |url=https://saiia.org.za/research/the-eu-turkey-migrant-deal-will-it-work-and-at-what-cost/ |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{southafricaninstituteofinternationalaffairs2016euturkey, author = {{South African Institute of International Affairs}}, title = {{The EU-Turkey migrant deal: will it work and at what cost?}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2016}, month = may, url = {https://saiia.org.za/research/the-eu-turkey-migrant-deal-will-it-work-and-at-what-cost/}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }